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Recent scholarship in literary studies and the history of science has demonstrated 
increasing interest in scientific writing by women. “Beautiful Science” investigates why 
form and genre are important interpretive tools—not static categories—for considering 
ways in which women entered Victorian scientific debates, how they accommodated 
scientific ideas for various audiences, and how formal tensions within their texts reveal 
broader intellectual frictions between secular and religious science in nineteenth-century 
Britain. Far from being marginal figures in scientific studies, the voices of these women 
were prominent, and their interpretations of contemporary theories shaped the reception 
of science among nonspecialists. 
Literary forms and genres—including parables, fairy tales, verse dramas, novels, and 
comic poems—brought with them a wide horizon of readerly expectations into 
conversations about science. Deploying these genres for a variety of purposes, women 
science writers could deliver new knowledge in familiar, recognizable literary ways. My 
 
first chapter uncovers Mary Somerville use of Byron’s closet drama Cain both to explain 
an astronomical phenomenon, parallax, and to respond to the play’s depiction of its 
protagonist’s response to “sublime” astronomical distance. In chapter two, I demonstrate 
how Margaret Gatty and Arabella Buckley employ the genres of parable, beast fables, 
and fairy tales to negotiate the entangled debates of morality, religion, science, and 
education in the Victorian era. Chapter three suggests that reading George Eliot’s early 
“Ilfracombe Journal,” her Westminister Review essays, and The Mill on the Floss within a 
tradition of Victorian natural history writing illuminates matters of form and exchange 
within both natural history narratives and the development of the mid-Victorian novel. 
Lastly, in chapter four I argue Constance Naden’s comic “Evolutional Erotics” poems 
and her philosophical poems all suggest an engagement with scientific and philosophical 
discourse at the level of prosody, particularly in Naden’s choices of rhyme. As a whole, 
“Beautiful Science” argues that an examination of form and genre within both the 
nineteenth-century literary publishing world and the discourses of scientific 
popularization reveal the mutual exchange between both realms, and that Victorian 
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Women Writing Science 
A reader opening A. S. Byatt’s neo-Victorian novella “Morpho Eugenia,” the first of 
the two tales composing Angels and Insects (1992), is likely to be struck by the 
resemblance of the naturalist protagonist, William Adamson, to his historical 
counterparts, Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace. Adamson returns to England in 
1859, following a ten-year natural history expedition to the Amazon, and finds 
employment in the household of his aristocratic patron, Lord Alabaster. There he soon 
falls in love with and marries the oldest Alabaster daughter, the voluptuous Eugenia, and 
continues his entomological studies, observing the estate’s ant colonies in the company of 
the slender Matty Compton, a young woman employed along with the governess and 
nursemaid in the care of the youngest Alabaster children. One of Byatt’s focal points in 
the novella is the debate between Adamson—the name is a telling irony—and Harald 
Alabaster, who is writing a book defending natural theology from the atheistic 
materialism gaining prominence in the wake of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species (1859) 
and other evolutionary texts. But Byatt also draws attention to her female characters 
using symbolism, contrasting the insects occupying Adamson’s studies. First compared 
to the butterflies that comprise the collection William has been sending to her father from 
the Amazon, Eugenia takes on the luxuries of a queen bee as she gives birth to multiple 
children over the years, and even William compares himself to an enthralled drone; the 
taciturn, industrious Matty Compton resembles the dark ants she studies and draws.  
As years pass, Eugenia retreats and emerges with regularity from one confinement to 
another, giving birth to five children. In these intervals, William focuses his attention on 
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studying and documenting Bredely Hall’s ant colonies with Matty, and the two work 
together drafting The Swarming City: A Natural History of a Woodland Society, its polity, 
its economy, its arms and defences, its origin, expansion and decline. While William 
writes, Matty reads and revises the drafts. With his attention on natural history, William 
remains oblivious to the inner life of Bredely Hall (another ironic name), and only 
discovers the true, incestuous nature of the relationship between his wife and brother-in-
law by accident. William’s search for the truth of natural history blinds him to the reality 
of his own domestic life. 
If Byatt’s novella takes a naturalist’s search for truth and origins as one theme, it 
likewise presents a heroine in the guise of Matty Compton. Wise both to the workings of 
the household and to the entomology she studies, Matty—or Matilda, as she finally tells 
William she ought to be called—not only illustrates the book on which she and William 
are working, but also writes a story of her own, too. Titled “Things are Not What they 
Seem,” Matty’s “instructive fable” of magic narrates the adventures of a man named Seth 
among ants, caterpillars, and moths after he is enchanted by a Circe-like witch. If 
William Adamson immediately brings to mind Darwin, Wallace, and other Victorian 
naturalists, the inspirations for Matilda Compton’s character are far less easily named. 
Narratives of Victorian science have only recently begun to include the contributions of 
women naturalists and writers, and most such histories often simply document their work 
as “popularizers,” writers who sought to extend scientific knowledge to broader 
audiences outside the professional world of science. But the forms in which women 
delivered scientific knowledge—the literary clothes in which they dressed such science—
deserve further attention. Just as Matilda’s instructive fable allegorizes William’s life at 
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Bredely Hall and foreshadows the outcome of the plot, the tale likewise reminds today’s 
readers that Victorian scientific women often called upon a variety of genres to instruct 
their readers, incorporating natural history and physical science into fantastical tales, 
realistic novels, and comic poems. 
For much of the twentieth century, the most common stories of Victorian science 
have featured men like Charles Darwin, Robert Chambers, Michael Faraday, Charles 
Lyell, James Clerk Maxwell, or John Tyndall. But things were not what such a narrative 
would make it seem: Victorian women, too, conducted experiments, made observations, 
and shared their work with others. Byatt’s novella reminds readers not simply that 
famous male scientists collaborated with women on their studies, but that women were 
investigators in their own right, and that they frequently found suitable outlets for their 
research and ideas in venues outside the professional communications of scientists. Like 
“Morpho Eugenia,” this dissertation looks back to the nineteenth century and finds 
surprising examples of women’s writings that were both instructive and entertaining. In 
Victorian women’s scientific poetry and prose, literary genres and scientific theories 
inform and shape one other.  
* * *  
“Beautiful Science: Victorian Women’s Poetry and Prose” is a study of why genre 
and form were important for the communication and interpretation of science in 
nineteenth-century Britain. More specifically, it is an examination of the genres women 
writers used for these purposes, and of how and why such women came to be the most 
frequent authors of works within a variety of genres and forms used to circulate and 
critique scientific ideas. “Genre” and “form” can be slippery categories, and classifying 
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them is not the primary aim of this project; however, their usage in the study at hand 
should be defined at the outset. By genre, I mean the kinds or categories of stories and 
poems, such as epic, romance, tragedy, comedy, and so on. A genre brings with it a range 
of writerly and readerly expectations, including theme, style, vocabulary, syntax, and 
allusion. Form refers to the type of text under consideration, like poem, prose, or drama; 
“poetic form” refers to matters usually outside a poem’s content and context.1 Genre here 
is a conceptual category: it refers to features and elements texts share independent of the 
textual means of delivery. Form is a structural description, referring to the shape and 
composition of the text under scrutiny. Prose forms might be described according to 
length or its composite units, such as chapters, paragraphs, or sentences; and poetic forms 
are often categorized according their stanza types or meter. So while scientific 
popularizations might together fall under the umbrella of genre, the forms in which 
popularizations took shape varied considerably. Lectures, essays, and guides may have 
been the most common forms of popularization, but this dissertation adds fantastical tales 
for children, poems, natural history narratives, and novels to this list. The four chapters 
composing this study examine, respectively, a book synthesizing science for both women 
and fellow scientific practitioners; didactic books of natural history and physical science 
for children; realistic fiction written during the height of marine botanizing and “fern 
fever”; and poetry written in the wake of Darwin’s theories of natural and sexual 
                                                
1 For concise explanations of current understandings of genre and form, Susan J. Wolfson’s 
entry on “form” and Max Cavitch’s entry on “genre” in the 4th edition of The Princeton 
Encyclopedia of Poetry & Poetics (2012) are excellent references. Cavitch’s essay is particularly 
salient on our contemporary moment’s understanding of the novel as a synecdoche for genre 
(553). I say poetic form refers to matters “usually” outside a poem’s content and context because 
the field of Victorian historical poetics has suggested the variety of ways nineteenth-century 
poetic forms were not fixed categories, either. I discuss the contingencies of poetic form in 
greater detail in chapter four. 
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selection. Victorian women’s science writing constitutes its own dynamic genre, full of 
variety and worthy of increased scholarly attention. 
For reasons having to do with Victorian gender and class expectations for women, 
their access to formal education (or lack thereof), and the kinds of writing deemed 
acceptable or most suitable for them, women interested in studying and sharing science 
used a number of available genres: stories for children, handbooks, illustrated guides, 
poetry, and novels. They shaped their subject according to their intended audiences and 
according to their own interpretation of the scientific topic at hand. This shaping of a 
scientific idea within the genre likewise registered in the form or shape of the genre itself. 
Often women’s inclusion of scientific ideas led other writers to follow suit, and 
sometimes genres themselves changed accordingly. Thus this dissertation understands a 
few key ideas as guiding premises: first, Victorian science was not an objective mode of 
inquiry but rather a communicative practice shared among a large group of practitioners 
and popularizers; second, that genres are not static categories but historically contingent; 
and third, that scientific practices and their literary transmission within a range of genres 
and forms mutually informed each other. Most crucially, this dissertation suggests that 
because of the contingencies of class, sex, and education, texts by Victorian women 
writers make these guiding premises most visible: while men with scientific interests 
could enter the professional realm and communicate their ideas in established journals 
and educational institutions, most Victorian women did not have this option until late in 
the century. To interpret science for nonspecialist audiences, women often needed to 
adopt creative strategies and forms; thus many of the innovations in forms used to 
communicate science were penned by women. Of course, men also participated in the 
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discourse of scientific communication, popularization, and interpretation, and thanks to 
literary and rhetorical histories, their efforts have been prominent. “Beautiful Science” 
instead places women’s accomplishments in the genres of scientific writing at its center.  
To mention a project on nineteenth-century British women’s science writing has 
seemingly meant inviting one question more often than any other: “Are you working on 
Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein?” Though Shelley’s novel does not occupy a central place 
in this dissertation, it is an appropriate point at which to begin because the texts examined 
in the following chapters vary so dramatically from Frankenstein’s themes. According to 
Shelley’s account in her introduction to the 1831 edition of Frankenstein, the novel began 
in response to a storytelling challenge among Percy and Mary’s friends, including George 
Gordon, Lord Byron, gathered on the shores of Lake Geneva in June 1816. The group 
had been having a conversation about the principle of life, galvanism, and reanimation 
(Shelley 189), and Shelley recounts having had a frightful dream the night of the 
discussion in which a “pale student of unhallowed arts” brings to life a terrible counterfeit 
of a man. The scene, Shelley explains, would necessarily be alarming: 
Frightful it must be; for supremely frightful would be the effect of any human 
endeavor to mock the stupendous mechanism of the Creator of the world. His 
success would terrify the artist; he would rush away from his odious handiwork, 
horror-stricken. (190) 
In her dream and in the novel’s plot, Shelley’s grim perspective on the dangers of 
scientific ambition and the arrogation of divine powers of creation is clear: she 
demonizes a scientific method that fails to consider repercussions and rushes headlong 
after glory. Victor Frankenstein cannot escape from the guilt and grief caused by his 
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creation of the wretch; the creature likewise never receives the understanding and love he 
so desperately craves, becoming disgusted with his own existence; and Robert Walton, 
the ship captain who hears the confessions of both Victor and the creature, turns his ship 
around, saving the lives of his crew but abandoning his hopes for fame. Frequently 
symbolizing the peril of Victor’s decisions in sublime scenery, including jagged Alpine 
peaks and frozen Arctic wastes, Shelley’s novel counsels caution in the pursuit of 
scientific endeavors. Just as Keats famously lamented Newtonian science’s destruction of 
“all the poetry of the rainbow,” and Wordsworth deplored the “middling” human 
intellect’s tendency to “murder to dissect” the beauties of nature, Shelley’s Frankenstein 
participated in a wider Romantic conversation that esteemed poetry and imagination over 
the banal prose of experiment and scientific investigation.2 It also juxtaposed the sublime 
and the beautiful. But for a number of the women writers discussed in this dissertation, 
such a distinction was a false opposition: sublimity could also be beautiful. 
Though the Romantic generation of poets and novelists epitomized in Wordsworth, 
Keats, Byron, and the Shelleys may not have celebrated developments in natural 
philosophy, many of their comrades looked forward with optimism to scientific discovery 
and found beauty—not terror—in observation and experiment. Samuel Taylor Coleridge 
attended meetings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), 
and astronomers like William Herschel (1738-1822) and chemists such as Humphry 
Davy (1778-1829) eagerly anticipated the advancements science would offer, inspiring 
the likes of David Brewster, Michael Faraday, John Herschel, William Whewell, and 
                                                
2 Keats’s remark came at the “immortal dinner” hosted by Benjamin Haydon in December 
1817 (Holmes 318-319). Wordsworth’s lines appear in “The Tables Turned,” a poem printed in 
the Lyrical Ballads he first published with Samuel Taylor Coleridge in 1798. 
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many others. The women whose work comprises the subjects of this dissertation’s 
chapters belong to this latter community of scientific investigators and advocates. Unlike 
Shelley’s Frankenstein, books and poems by these women present a range of optimistic 
perspectives of science. Their engagement with scientific theories is not unequivocal, 
however: to be a proponent of science generally is not necessarily to agree with each 
individual theory. But the project of science for the women considered in the following 
chapters is one alive to the promise of scientific inquiry and progress, rather than one 
marked by fearful apprehension.  
While still relatively unfamiliar to many scholars of nineteenth-century Britain, the 
list of women science writers is long. This dissertation only studies a select few, 
according to the variety of their generic choices in communicating and interpreting 
science: Mary Somerville (1780-1872), Margaret Gatty (1809-1873), Arabella Buckley 
(1840-1929), George Eliot, the pen name of Mary Anne Evans (1819-1880), and 
Constance Naden (1858-1889). To these five, one might easily add women botanists like 
Pricilla Wakefield (1751-1832), Sarah Bowdich Lee (1791-1856), Elizabeth Twining 
(1805-1889), Anne Pratt (1806-1893), Jane Loudon (1807-1858), Phebe Lankester (1825-
1900), and suffragist Lydia Becker (1827-1890). Aside from Mary Somerville, other 
nineteenth-century women astronomers included Caroline Herschel (1750-1848); Rosina 
Zornlin (1795-1859), whose interests also included geology and geography; Margaret 
Bryan (1797-1815); Mary Ward (1827-1869), who likewise wrote about microscopy for 
children; Agnes Clerke (1842-1907); and Agnes Giberne (1845-1939). On chemistry and 
natural philosophy, Jane Marcet (1769-1859) could just as easily occupy a chapter of this 
dissertation, as could Delvalle Lowry Varley’s books on mineralogy, the writings on 
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natural history by the Kirby sisters, Mary (1817-1893) and Elizabeth (1823-1873), or 
Elizabeth Brightwen’s (1830-1906) fin de siécle accounts of evolutionary biology. A 
future iteration of this project might entirely focus on genres these neglected women of 
science chose for communicating science. For example, Jane Marcet authored a fictional 
travel and natural history narrative, voiced by a young woman who moves to England 
after her father’s death, entitled Bertha’s Visit to Her Uncle in England  (1830). Before 
becoming known for her botanical writings and illustrations, Jane Loudon wrote a novel 
set in the future called The Mummy! (1827); and the Kirby sisters wrote books for 
children both about natural history and the goods and technologies that Britain brought 
home from across its empire, including tea, china, coffee, and sugar.3 
 “Beautiful Science” strives to demonstrate the importance behind the varied genres 
chosen by women in thinking about, teaching, debating, and extending scientific 
knowledge during the Victorian era, and to show how important those particular choices 
were. These selected writers—Mary Somerville, Margaret Gatty, Arabella Buckley, 
George Eliot, and Constance Naden—share a common purpose to communicate scientific 
ideas to a wide readership, yet the shapes and styles of their texts differ dramatically. 
Though they belong to a wide tradition of women’s writing, these women are exceptional 
cases, rather than representative: they warrant scholarly attention because of the 
particular ways they used poetry or prose to communicate science. I broadly construe 
“science writer” to include not only the expository works by practitioners working within 
the active community of investigators, but also the writers who hoped to “popularize” 
                                                
3 The Kirby sisters’ works, Things in the Forest (1861) and Aunt Martha’s Corner Cupboard 
(1875) can be found in one of the volumes of Bernard Lightman’s series on nineteenth-century 
science writing, Science Writing by Women (2004). 
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science—accommodating it for a nonspecialist audiences—and those who included 
science within forms characterized as belles lettres: that is, in fiction and poetry. Poets 
and novelists across the nineteenth century not only incorporated science into their 
literary texts, they offered important interpretations of science as well. Across these 
varying genres, women science writers tackled similar problems, and certain features 
emerge when looking at their texts as a long tradition across the nineteenth century.  
These, then, are the themes this dissertation traces in each chapter: first, scientific 
texts by women, like those of their male counterparts, frequently participate in the 
discourse of the sublime. However, the affective register of this discourse in women’s 
texts more often promotes scientific inquiry as a pleasurable study rather than one of self-
sacrifice or moral duty as it has appeared in texts by men. Focusing on this ethos of 
pleasure, this dissertation describes an engagement with science concurrent with, but 
separate from, both the ascetic impulse behind Victorian scientists’ quest for truth and the 
pragmatic aims of “useful” science. Second, scientific texts by women commonly feature 
the longstanding tension between religious and secular science, but their texts engaged 
the debate obliquely: that is, in writings distinct from essays addressing the debate itself. 
As many women sought to align scientific inquiry with religious faith, they chose genres 
befitting this difficult challenge, and the textual frictions emerging from this project show 
how unconventional genres were either adept at or insufficient for blending religious and 
secular beliefs. Lastly, as women gained entry into higher education and began to study 
scientific fields, their formal innovations used to popularize science diminished, 
paralleling the gradual reification of literary versus scientific genres or forms along 
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disciplinary lines by the end of the century that eventually led C. P. Snow to advance his 
model of the “two cultures” by the middle of the twentieth century.4 
In contrast to recent scholarship that primarily discusses women’s science writing 
thematically and historically as part of a broad rehabilitation of Victorian popular 
science, I argue the literary elements of scientific discourse—by which I mean matters of 
form, genre, characterization, and narrative, among other devices—belong at the center 
of these histories. A number of literary scholars and historians of science, like Gillian 
Beer, George Levine, James Secord, Bernard Lightman, and Greg Myers, have already 
shown the ways in which popularizations of science by both men and women shaped 
public understanding of professional science, sometimes even more than professional 
men of science did in their own published work. Yet the manner of such shaping—how 
such popular texts went about this work of influencing their audiences—can be 
articulated more thoroughly in literary studies, using methods common among rhetoric 
scholars.5 Absent from many histories of Victorian science are detailed discussions of 
genre and how writers used familiar literary forms to transform scientific knowledge into 
                                                
4 “The Two Cultures” was the title of the first part of Snow’s 1959 Rede Lecture at 
Cambridge University, based on an essay of the same name he’d published in 1956 in The New 
Statesman. Snow also published it as a book. In it, Snow argued that intellectual culture had been 
starkly divided between science and the humanities. In the Victorian era, however, this distinction 
had not fully come into being, though examples existed, like George Henry Lewes’s division in 
1852 between science as “an expression of the forms and order of Nature” and literature as an 
“expression of the forms and order of human life” (46). The debate between T. H. Huxley and 
Matthew Arnold in the 1880s concerning an education based in the sciences versus one 
emphasizing the classics and liberal arts, respectively, is the most famous Victorian example. 
5 In Darwin’s Plots, Gillian Beer examines Darwin’s rhetoric to reveal how he, like other 
such scientific men, “drew openly upon literary, historical and philosophical material as part of 
their arguments” (5). In Rhetorical Figures in Science, Jeanne Fahnestock traces the importance 
of series reasoning, demonstrating how Darwin’s use of figures like gradatio and incrementum 
proved crucial for supporting his central claims (114); and in Rhetorical Style, she demonstrates 
how the figure of amplification pervades the last paragraph of Origin, prompting Darwin’s 
readers to see evolutionary development as a sublime process. 
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wide understanding. Aside from discussions of how evolutionary thinking pervaded the 
Victorian novel after Darwin, relatively few scholars have analyzed what happened to 
literary genres like the fairy tale or forms like poetry in the nineteenth century once they 
were deployed for the popularization of science.6 Many of the most widely read of these 
popularizations were written by women. Thus, I contend such women had a critical 
impact on the reception of science throughout the nineteenth century, just as they 
fundamentally altered genres traditionally viewed as literary once they used them to 
transform science. 
This study benefits from a corpus of works in a number of disciplines: the history and 
philosophy of science, the rhetoric of science, and literature and science studies. Works 
within the history of science are numerous, and David Elliston Allen’s The Naturalist in 
Britain (1976) still serves as excellent introduction to the major figures of the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. For the purposes of this project, histories that have highlighted 
science as a communicative and interpretive practice are most relevant. Thus sociological 
histories like Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, 
Boyle, and the Experimental Life (1985), while not focused on the historical period at 
hand, offer a germane account of how Enlightenment science relied on literary 
technologies to argue for the validity of experimental practice. In 
Modest_Witness@Second_ Millenium.FemaleMan©_Meets_OncoMouse™ (1997), 
Donna Haraway offers a vital interrogation of the experimental practice Shapin and 
                                                
6 The field of nineteenth-century literature and science has grown dramatically over the past 
thirty years, and most of the work considering science’s pervasiveness has focused on the 
Victorian novel. Gillian Beer, George Levine, Sally Shuttleworth, and John Christie have written 
some of the most foundational studies in the discipline. More recent studies have examined how 
Victorian science likewise pervaded poetry, including work by Barbara Gates, Barri Gold, Anna 
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Schaffer describe, demonstrating the ways it marginalized women and set the stage for 
the gendering of science and for centuries of essentialist thinking about sexual difference. 
Because of the essentializing conflation of women’s intellect with their bodies, Haraway 
argues, there was no way for them to be the “modest witness” esteemed by scientific men 
like Robert Boyle. Feminist philosophers of science offer similarly important 
examinations of science’s marginalization of women throughout its long history, 
including Evelyn Fox Keller’s Reflections on Gender and Science (1985); Sandra 
Harding’s The Science Question in Feminism (1986) and Whose Science? Whose 
Knowledge? Thinking from Women’s Lives (1991); Londa Schiebinger’s The Mind Has 
No Sex? Women in the Origins of Modern Science (1989) and Nature’s Body: Gender in 
the Making of Modern Science (1993); and Body/Politics: Women and the Discourses of 
Science (1990), a volume of essays edited by Mary Jacobus, Evelyn Fox Keller, and Sally 
Shuttleworth. These accounts have taken science since the Enlightenment to task, 
interrogating its personification of nature as female, full of secrets that were the domain 
of science to uncover. Schiebinger’s essay, “The Philosopher’s Beard: Women and 
Gender in Science” (2003) demonstrates also how women’s access to science was more 
diverse across Europe during the eighteenth century, and that status offered women the 
means of providing patronage in exchange for scientific knowledge (188). Yet for most 
women, access to scientific communities was always mediated by men—husbands, 
companions, and tutors (189). Though the Cartesian divide between mind and body had 
given rise to the notion that “the mind has no sex,” epistemological practices of 
                                                                                                                                            
Henchman, John Holmes, Alice Jenkins, and Jason Rudy. Of this list of scholars, only Barbara 
Gates has focused exclusively on women’s popularizations. 
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observation led to experiments measuring the body and associating sexual differences 
with women’s intellectual inferiority. 
Within rhetoric of science studies, the sense of a “rhetorical turn,” a phrase coined by 
Richard Rorty in 1984, remains important for this dissertation’s focus on the practices 
and processes of science, rather than its products, and upon the communities sharing their 
work with each other, not just upon the work they do in laboratories.7 Alan G. Gross’s 
Rhetoric of Science (1990) likewise examines the rhetorical constitution of knowledge. 
Jeanne Fahnestock’s Rhetorical Figures in Science (1999) offers a vital examination of 
the tools of scientific argument beyond the use of metaphor and argues for the importance 
of figuration in how scientific writings shape their meanings, while Greg Myers’s essay 
on Jane Marcet’s Conversations series, “Science for Women and Children: the Dialogue 
of Popular Science in the Nineteenth Century” (1989), has provided a particularly helpful 
model for examining the import of specific genres and forms of early nineteenth-century 
scientific popularization. 
The field of literature and science gets richer with each passing year, especially in 
scholarship on the nineteenth century. Foundational scholarship on Victorian writers’ 
intellectual engagement with contemporary science appear in works like Gillian Beer’s 
Darwin’s Plots (1983), Sally Shuttleworth’s George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century 
Science (1984), George Levine’s Darwin and the Novelists (1988), and John Christie and 
Sally Shuttleworth’s Nature Transfigured: Science and Literature, 1700-1900 (1989). 
This dissertation also draws upon Beer’s and Levine’s subsequent works, including, 
respectively, Open Fields: Science in Cultural Encounter (1996) and Dying to Know: 
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Scientific Epistemology and Narrative in Victorian England (2002). In addition to Dying 
to Know, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s chapter on the “scientific self” in 
Objectivity (2007) has been important for understanding the ethos or character of 
Victorian empiricism as a practice that sought to eliminate the self in its quest for 
objectivity (Daston and Galison 197), a practice at considerable remove from the women 
popularizers. Histories of popularization have been crucial to this project in their 
recovery of many Victorian writers who had fallen into obscurity. Notable texts in this 
area include Bernard Lightman’s Victorian Science in Context (1997) and Victorian 
Popularizers of Science: Designing Nature for New Audiences (2007), as well as a 
collection of essays Lightman edited with Aileen Fyfe, Science in the Marketplace: 
Nineteenth Century Sites and Experiences (2007).  
Without the recuperative scholarship of Ann B. Shteir and Barbara T. Gates, 
however, most of this dissertation’s analysis would not have been possible. Shteir’s 
Cultivating Women, Cultivating Science (1996) and Gates’s Kindred Nature: Victorian 
and Edwardian Women Embrace the Living World (1998), along with their collected 
edition of essays, Natural Eloquence: Women Reinscribe Science (1997) demonstrated 
ways in which women’s importance to nineteenth-century science could be articulated, 
enlarging the field of literature and science to include women’s scientific writing. Gates’s 
anthology, In Nature’s Name: An Anthology of Women’s Writing and Illustration, 1780-
1830 (2002) remains the only work of its kind, though Lightman and James Secord have 
each edited collected works by women, making accessible some work that now exists 
                                                                                                                                            
7 On the “rhetorical turn,” see also Randy Allen Harris’s introduction to Landmark Essays on 
Rhetoric of Science: Case Studies (1997). 
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only in a handful of libraries around the world.8 Exciting recent scholarship on 
nineteenth-century literature and science include Alice Jenkins’s Space and the ‘March of 
Mind’: Literature and the Physical Sciences in Britain, 1815-1850 (2007), William A. 
Cohen’s Embodied: Victorian Literature and the Senses (2009), John Holmes’s Darwin’s 
Bards: British and American Poetry in the Age of Evolution (2009), Jason R. Rudy’s 
Electric Meters: Victorian Physiological Poetics (2009), Barri J. Gold’s Thermopoetics: 
Energy in Victorian Literature and Science (2010), and Daniel Brown’s The Poetry of 
Victorian Scientists: Style, Science and Nonsense (2013). Anna Henchman’s The Starry 
Sky Within: Astronomy & the Reach of the Mind in Victorian Literature (2014) is the 
most recent book to join this list, appearing just as this dissertation was being prepared 
for its defense. 
Because their examinations of evolutionary theory’s pervasiveness in Victorian 
intellectual history have been foundational for Victorian literature and science studies, 
“Beautiful Science” relies especially upon the work of Beer and Levine. In Darwin’s 
Plots, Beer traces the intellectual excitement that followed in the wake of Darwin’s 
Origin and The Descent of Man (1871), and she focuses not only on writers who were 
known to have read Darwin, but on Darwin’s writing itself, identifying the ways in which 
Darwin’s thought was influenced by his own reading and how it shaped both the content 
(Malthus, for example) and the style of his arguments. Levine’s approach differs from 
Beer’s in his interest on the assumptions the public made about evolutionary science—
rather than its direct influences—and his emphasis on science as a “cultural discourse” 
and “cultural formation” underlies my understanding of scientific practices and 
                                                
8 See James A. Secord, Collected Works of Mary Somerville, 9 vols. (2004) and Bernard 
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exchanges among a variety of communities. Levine traces the presence of evolutionary 
ideas in the imaginations of writers who had not necessarily read Darwin directly, 
demonstrating the pervasive diffusion of this theory into Victorian intellectual life and 
beyond. 
Likewise, Bernard Lightman’s history of Victorian popularization provides 
biographical introductions to some of the women this dissertation discusses, and his 
Victorian Popularizers of Science supplies detailed examples of scientific 
accommodation in a particular historical moment and a coherent sense of how the 
practice of popularization changed over the century. Acknowledging the vexed usage of 
the terms “popular” and “popularization,” Lightman prefers it to alternatives like 
“vernacular” and “commercial,” though both of those have useful applications, as 
Lightman notes, but neither sufficiently covers the breadth of popularization within the 
Victorian era (Victorian Popularizers 10). Therefore, I try to use the terms 
communication, interpretation, accommodation, and popularization with care, 
designating the various contexts in which writers adapted their prose according to the 
audience they addressed, and when I use the term popularization, I mean it in its broadest 
sense of speaking to a public with varying degrees of knowledge, without focusing on its 
pejorative connotations. Lightman’s Victorian Popularizers of Science has been an 
especially useful reference in researching this dissertation, demonstrating the different 
traditions in which writers of science were working, like that among clergymen, the 
“maternal tradition” from which women science writers were able to draw their 
                                                                                                                                            
Lightman’s Science Writing by Women, 7 vols. (2004). 
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authorities as writers of moral education, and the variety of forms in which science was 
made popular, including visual means of lecture demonstration and spectacle. 
Shteir and Gates have provided this dissertation’s most relevant models for 
examining women’s scientific writing. Shteir’s Cultivating Women, Cultivating Science 
demonstrates how women in the early nineteenth century were actively engaged in 
botanical study and prolific in sharing their knowledge across a variety of genres 
including verse, juvenile natural history books, novels, and introductory books for 
family-based education (5). My study’s analysis of women’s accommodations of physical 
science throughout the nineteenth century finds a model in Shteir’s book, which focuses 
solely on botany in the earlier period of the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth 
centuries. Though Shteir arranges her book according to genre, she does not interrogate 
genre and form as interpretive tools in the same way as this dissertation. Her chapter 
“Elegant Recreations? Configuring Science Writing for Women,” however, does trace 
ways in which generic changes occurred in tandem with institutional changes and how a 
number of formal innovations by women paved the way for men to do similar kinds of 
science writing (236). Shteir’s observation here became one of the premises informing 
my analysis of Margaret Gatty and Arabella Buckley in chapter two. Barbara Gates’s 
volumes likewise collect and examine the genres of women’s science writing. Kindred 
Nature traces women’s engagement with the natural world, highlighting nineteenth-
century modes of nature writing. Gates considers the parallel work of women as 
popularizers, illustrators, and collectors; but she also demonstrates how such work led 
women toward activist roles on nature’s behalf, marking the fledgling disciplines of 
ecological and environmental writing. 
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“Beautiful Science” focuses these ongoing conversations about women’s responses to 
and communication of science via an examination of genre to suggest both what is 
literary about Victorian science, and how adept women writers were at finding salient 
methods of accommodating science for new audiences. In “Reflections on Popular 
Science in Britain: Genres, Categories, and Historians” (2009), Ralph O’Connor argues 
that “a closer and more systematic engagement with literary history, especially in relation 
to genre, has the potential to transform our understanding of science as a set of 
communicative practices” (333). Published in Isis, the professional journal of the History 
of Science Society, O’Connor’s essay makes a case for eroding some of the disciplinary 
boundaries between histories of science and of literature (337). “Literary craft has always 
been a vital part of science popularization,” writes O’Connor, “and an understanding of 
genre is needed to appreciate how these texts were written and read” (338). “Beautiful 
Science” represents one possible response to O’Connor’s call. It likewise makes women’s 
scientific writing one locus of a fluid, dynamic dialectical relationship between 
“discourse” and “genre” (Williams 520). As Victorian scientific “discourse” names a set 
of cultural practices, so too should “genre” name a cultural as well as literary category. 
Throughout the following four chapters, I strive to demonstrate the ways in which using 
genre as an interpretive tool, not a prescriptive category, might illuminate how Victorian 
women writers shaped contemporary science for their readers, and how scientific culture 
took its varied forms. 
Chapter one begins this study of genres of science by considering ways in which the 
discourse of the sublime pervades and exceeds Mary Somerville’s otherwise 
unembellished delivery of scientific terminology and phenomena in On the Connexion of 
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the Physical Sciences (1834). Focusing on a woman famous among her contemporaries 
for the communication of the most current discoveries and theories in physical science, 
this chapter examines the rhetorical devices and poetical allusions Somerville uses to 
synthesize and accommodate scientific knowledge for a wide audience. Called the “queen 
of science” at her death, Somerville translated Pierre Simon Laplace’s book on celestial 
mechanics, wrote a synthesizing work of physical science that was read by some of the 
most prolific Victorian poets and novelists, and extended her research into the most up-
to-date studies of geography, microscopy, and molecular biology. Her Personal 
Recollections gained wide interest for its account of her journey from being a self-taught 
young woman in Scotland to become a woman eminent among the ranks of Europe’s pre-
eminent scientific circles. This chapter focuses on Somerville’s Connexion as a work 
ostensibly directed to a female audience, yet serving also the research of men working in 
the professional community of science. If Somerville’s genre was an early version or 
prototype of what today we think of a science textbook, this chapter demonstrates what 
that generic category could not readily accommodate or contain within its boundaries: the 
linguistic, aesthetic, and intellectual discourses of the sublime. That is, the sublime 
cannot be bounded by any one genre, and noting its deployment in early nineteenth-
century science can offer insight into the nuances of scientific debate. Alluding to lines 
from Byron’s play Cain, Somerville’s chapter on parallax in particular suggests both a 
way to understanding an astronomical concept and to interpreting its significance. 
Somerville’s book of physical science rejects the disenchanted sentiment found within 
Byron’s play and aligns Victorian physical science instead with a Kantian ideal. 
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Chapter two examines juvenile books of science that use fable and fairy tale genres to 
evoke children’s wonder and imagination to embark on scientific inquiry. Because of 
these chosen genres, the works of Margaret Gatty and Arabella Buckley stand apart from 
texts by their contemporaries that prompted similar affects but used conventional 
descriptive prose. Gatty’s and Buckley’s books demonstrate the generic tensions 
emerging from the combination of religious and scientific discourses. Choosing genres 
that call to mind systems of belief and imaginative states of mind, Gatty and Buckley 
found spaces in which to develop science as a similar practice. But their books also reveal 
how these mental stances did not sit easily with each other, and an examination of genre 
demonstrates where these texts fall short of their stated aims. At the same time, I argue 
we can locate many of the tensions between religious and secular science within the 
frictions generated by the inclusion of scientific ideas, especially in the wake of 
Darwinism in the second half of the century. That is, the tensions between spiritual belief 
and scientific practice found in Gatty’s and Buckley’s volumes can be productive for 
today’s reader who discerns the limitations of the chosen genres for their intended 
purposes. Further, Gatty and Buckley offered their contemporaries examples of what 
fables and fairy tales could look like once scientific ideas were included, shaping the 
ways these genres would develop in coming decades. Works by Lewis Carroll, Charles 
Kingsley, and Rudyard Kipling, for instance, bear the traces of Gatty and Buckley’s 
forays into fantastic tales. 
Chapter three turns to the novel, a genre and form capacious enough to incorporate a 
multitude of themes timely for the Victorians. As one of the most respected Victorian 
novelists—and among those  most often examined in today’s literary scholarship—
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George Eliot was remarkable in her attention to science as both a theme and a 
methodology. Her novels’ attention to both development over time in nature and the 
education of girls in a novel like The Mill on the Floss (1860) makes it relevant for this 
dissertation’s examination of genre and gender. While previous scholars have traced the 
images of natural history in Mill, this chapter demonstrates the ways George Eliot’s 
formal methodology finds inspiration in the natural history narratives that were so 
popular in the two decades leading up the Mill’s publication. Though Eliot read Darwin’s 
Origin of Species almost immediately upon its publication in October 1859, she had 
already nearly completed her draft of Mill, and I suggest her prose owes more to the 
kinds of handbooks that her female contemporaries were publishing than an account of 
her Darwinian influences would have today’s reader believe. Looking to the coastal 
holiday she took with George Henry Lewes in the summer of 1856 and the essays she 
wrote for the Westminster Review that autumn, I demonstrate how George Eliot’s fiction 
presents the most relevant case study for the mutual influence of natural history and 
fictional narratives at mid-century. The imagery of The Mill on the Floss, its presentation 
of Maggie’s impetuous but curious character, and its meditation on the influences of 
heredity, environment, and chance all place it not merely within a conversation about 
Darwinian evolution, but rather in a wider discourse of women’s natural history 
narratives. 
Chapter four concludes this study with an examination of Constance Naden’s comic 
and philosophical poetry. Of all the women writers studied in this dissertation, Naden 
enjoyed the most extensive formal scientific education, and she was a poet as well. Her 
poetry offers insight into her efforts to combine both scientific parody and philosophical 
 23 
contemplation. This chapter examines both, identifying the poetic forms Naden employed 
to interpret the implications of Darwinian sexual selection on the one hand and to 
incorporate an atheistic, materialist philosophy on the other. Naden’s abandonment of 
such a project through poetry suggests that while many women at the fin de siècle used 
poetry to satirize Darwin, her own ambitions found poetry too confining as a genre. As 
much as women science writers earlier in the century had found success in adapting and 
transforming genres for their purposes, Naden held on to fixed notions of a division 
between scientific and literary genres. Thus where this dissertation begins at a time when 
a range of genres and styles of delivery stood available for women’s accommodations of 
science, it ends in the decades when the divisions between “science” and “literature” 
began to harden. As disciplinarity became a fixture of the late nineteenth and the 
twentieth centuries, the discourses of science and the humanities likewise seemed to 
diverge. This dissertation’s use of genre as an interpretive tool to examine these 
discourses in the Victorian era can likewise suggest that seemingly fixed literary 
categories applied today—like romance, science fiction, fiction, poetry—have similarly 
permeable boundaries when it comes to the treatment, exposure, and acceptance of 
scientific ideas. 
* * * 
Perhaps one more reading of Shelley’s Frankenstein should suggest that the novel is 
invested more in the absence of women in the creative process and practice of science 
than it is in undermining the discipline as a whole. Conspicuously absent from Shelley’s 
novel are women in general, and mothers in particular. Victor’s dead mother is a ghostly 
presence over the whole family during his youth, while his creation—the monster itself—
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destroys the Frankenstein family’s ward, Justine, and Victor’s bride, Elizabeth. If 
Shelley’s novel condemns scientific hubris on the one hand, it counsels the inclusion of 
women’s morals and sentiment on the other. The following chapters suggest what such an 
inclusion offered British science over the rest of the nineteenth century: a sense of the 
aesthetic beauty of physical laws and pleasure in apprehending them; the possibility that 
nature could counsel right action and moral behavior; a method of observation that could 
inspire sympathy and raise possibilities for social reform; and an appreciation for the 
spiritual and ideal within the material, not separate from it. But none of these seeming 
virtues for scientific inquiry was a province held exclusively by women. What set 
women’s responses apart were matters of form, and understanding how Victorian women 
writers addressed scientific questions provides insight not only into nineteenth-century 
scientific debates themselves and the gendered expectations of how women could enter 
into them, but also illuminates developments in Victorian literary history and the 
evolution of its genres and forms. 
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Chapter 1: 
Somerville’s Sublime and Byron’s Abyss:  
Nineteenth-Century Astronomy’s Pleasures and Perils 
During the first astronomy lesson shared by the two protagonists of Thomas Hardy’s 
Two on a Tower (1882), Lady Viviette Constantine and Swithin St Cleeve share a 
decidedly gloomy interpretation of human insignificance in the face of a vast universe: 
 “We are now traversing distances beside which the immense line stretching 
from the earth to the sun is but an invisible point,” said the youth. “When, just 
now, we had reached a planet whose remoteness is a hundred times the 
remoteness of the sun from the earth, we were only a two thousandth part of the 
journey to the spot at which we have optically arrived now.” 
 “Oh, pray don’t; it overpowers me!” she replied, not without seriousness. “It 
makes me feel that it is not worth while to live; it quite annihilates me.”  
 “If it annihilates your ladyship to roam over these yawning spaces just once, 
think how it must annihilate me to be, as it were, in constant suspension amid 
them night after night.” (28-29) 
The pair describe a feeling of annihilation, an obliteration of self in relation to cosmic 
distances, and as readers of Hardy’s novel will know, his star-crossed lovers receive no 
mercy or solace from the motions of the heavens by the book’s conclusion. Two on a 
Tower offers a darkly pessimistic vision of human affairs in an unforgiving universe, and 
the notion of gazing into the void of the night sky seems an act of self-punishment when, 
as Swithin claims, “the actual sky is a horror,” filled with the “impersonal 
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monsters…immensities…monsters of magnitude without known shape” (29). The only 
solace such a view offers is that of diminishing the banal problems and worries of daily 
life.  
Though many Victorian intellectuals may have sympathized with the cynical 
worldview of Hardy’s novel, nineteenth-century astronomers like Mary Fairfax Grieg 
Somerville (1780-1872) offered a strikingly different story. An astronomer and 
mathematician, Somerville was a woman at the center of nineteenth-century European 
science, writing books that sold widely and were read by a varied audience of both 
laypersons and professional men of science. Her most ambitious work was On the 
Connexion of the Physical Sciences (1834), a book that stood apart from other scientific 
texts at the time in its wide, synoptic view of all of the known physical sciences and its 
transmission of this knowledge in prose that avoided difficult mathematical expressions 
in her prose, or really, any math at all. Somerville explained science verbally—albeit in 
later editions with frequent diagrams appended to the end of the volume. Within the 
pages of this otherwise dry and technical textbook of physical science appear passages of 
amplified rhetoric and expansive prose. These passages direct a reader to a far more 
positive frame of mind in which to view the celestial heavens and the universal laws 
binding the action of planets and stars than Hardy’s Two on a Tower would later suggest. 
In Connexion, the study of astronomy possesses an intimately spiritual—and aesthetic—
value. Its activities and implications become pleasurable for the practitioner. Further—
and unexplored by Somerville scholars to date—Connexion’s explanation of the 
universe’s massive scale and vast distances contains within it an implicit rebuttal of 
 27 
Byron’s depiction of the sublime in his closet drama, Cain (1821), a play that, like 
Hardy’s Tower, offers no consolation to an observer of the cosmic abyss. 
 In this chapter, I examine why a woman dubbed the “queen of science” would 
have alluded to Byron’s play within her instruction of astronomy.9 Cain’s significance 
only becomes fully visible within the pages of Somerville’s manuscript notebooks, and 
these manuscripts likewise enrich our understanding of Somerville’s published works. 
The manuscripts demonstrate how Cain offered Somerville both an analogy for 
explaining an astronomical concept—parallax—and an epistemology against which she 
could her position her own arguments. Together, Somerville’s notebooks and the 
published volume of On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences illustrate an ethos of the 
sublime particular to the study of physical science in the nineteenth century. Somerville’s 
sublime is rhetorical, aesthetic, and philosophical, and it is an attitude that likewise 
undergirds much of Victorian physics and mathematics.10 Many nineteenth-century 
scientific texts share a discourse of the sublime, including Alexander von Humboldt, John 
Herschel, and William Whewell. Mary Somerville’s use of the sublime is notable, 
however, because it emerges in the teaching of astronomical concepts: if readers 
recognize the feeling of sublime distance—as in Byron’s Cain—then they may begin to 
understand the kind of distances involved in discerning an appreciable angle of parallax. 
                                                
9 See the obituary for Somerville in The Morning Post on 2 December 1872: “whatever 
difficulty we might experience in the middle of the nineteenth century in choosing a king of 
science, there could be no question whatever as to the queen of science.” 
10 Somerville’s sublime variously draws upon the ideas of Longinus, Burke, and Kant, and I 
trace these connections within the body of this chapter. For Longinus, the sublime was a 
rhetorical category, a discourse used when describing grand, elevated subjects. For Burke, it was 
an aesthetic category, delineating differences between the terrifyingly large, vast, or distant; and 
for Kant, the sublime was conceptual, that is, an intellectual and philosophical response to such 
visual stimuli or the ideas they evoked. More detailed explanations of these notions of the 
sublime follow throughout this chapter. 
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 The present chapter suggests a re-estimation of Somerville’s contributions to 
Victorian intellectual life is long overdue. Historians of Victorian science have begun 
emphasizing Somerville’s importance to the professional and popular world of science, 
and literary scholars have highlighted her Personal Recollections (1873), Somerville’s 
posthumously published memoir, because of its reflections on the progress of a self-
educated girl from eastern Scotland to become accepted within the foremost scientific 
circles of London and Europe. The importance of her scientific works to Victorian culture 
requires further discussion beyond the field of the history of science. Close attention to 
Somerville’s amplified rhetoric in On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences reveals 
tensions within Romantic natural philosophy that pulled science toward both the 
idealized mathematics and the disinterested quest for Truth that came to define the 
Victorian era. 
 In the pages to follow, I sketch an overview of Mary Somerville’s life and works, 
followed by a discussion of her reputation within current scholarship in both literary 
studies and the history of science to make a case for her importance within Victorian 
studies. I then describe her manuscript notebooks and the context of her quotations from 
Cain to highlight how her ethos of the sublime in physical science differs from the 
Burkean sublime found in Byron. I finally examine how Cain helped Somerville shape 
her delivery of astronomical instruction. In doing so, I place Byron’s play into the context 
of nineteenth-century debates about astronomy and physical science, not just the 
geological debates where scholars have sometimes located it.11 Somerville’s sublime 
view of astronomy in Connexion epitomizes an attitude toward science that characterized 
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much of Victorian epistemology, a perspective critics like Hardy, however, would 
continue to oppose throughout the nineteenth century. 
Somerville’s History and Criticism 
“My life has been domestic and quiet,” writes Somerville at the outset of her 
Personal Recollections (1873), “I have no events to record that could interest the public. 
My only motive in writing it, is to show my country women that self education is 
possible under the most unfavourable and even discouraging circumstances” (1). And yet, 
far from having “no events…that could interest the public,” Mary Somerville’s life as a 
mathematician, astronomer, and scientific writer is remarkable for the impact she had on 
Victorian science. Born on December 26, 1780 in Jedbergh, Scotland to Lieutenant 
William George Fairfax and his second wife, Margaret Charters, Mary Fairfax grew up in 
the port town of Burntisland, Fife. She mainly taught herself from the family library, 
apart from one year at boarding school. She read copies of Euclid’s Elements of 
Geometry and Bonnycastle’s Algebra her younger brother’s tutor brought back for her 
from Edinburgh, but when her father learned of her studies, he tried to forbid her from 
continuing (McMillan 41-2).12 In 1804, she married a cousin, Samuel Greig, who became 
commissioner for the Russian navy and the Russian vice-consul for Britain in London 
and with whom she had two sons. Grieg discouraged her studies, but upon his untimely 
death in 1807, she returned to Burntisland and began her endeavors in mathematics and 
science anew as an independent woman. She remarried in 1812, this time to another 
                                                                                                                                            
11 See, e.g., Dimitri Karkoulis’s “‘They pluck’d the tree of Science/And sin”: Byron’s Cain 
and the Science of Sacrilege” (2007). 
12 Citations for Personal Recollections refer to Dorothy McMillan’s edition of Somerville’s 
memoir, Queen of Science: Personal Recollections of Mary Somerville. Edinburgh: Canongate 
Books, Ltd., 2001. 
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cousin, army doctor William Somerville (1771-1860), and the pair had two daughters. 
William Somerville, a Fellow of the Royal Society and member of the Linnaean Society, 
encouraged his wife’s pursuits and together the pair was welcomed into scientific society 
throughout Scotland, London, and Europe (Patterson 1-17). The Somervilles moved to 
Italy in 1838 for William’s health, and aside from visits, they never took residence in 
Britain again. William Somerville passed away in 1860, and Mary died in Naples on 
November 29, 1872.  
Despite the accolades she received during her life, Somerville belittled her own 
accomplishments in science, stating, “I was conscious that I had never made a discovery 
myself, that I had no originality. I have perseverance and intelligence but no genius” 
(McMillan 145). Yet she did, in fact, contribute to the field of astronomy, publishing two 
articles on sunlight and magnetism in the Philosophical Transactions of the Royal 
Society (Brock 257). When her claims were later shown to be incorrect, Somerville 
continued to experiment and publish (Brock 258). She did not begin a career in scientific 
writing until she was forty-seven, when Lord Henry Brougham approached her about 
translating Pierre-Simon Laplace’s Mécanique céleste, which she worked on for three 
years and published in 1831 as The Mechanism of the Heavens. On the Connexion of the 
Physical Sciences followed in 1834, Physical Geography in 1848, and On Molecular and 
Microscopic Science in 1869. By late in the nineteenth century, Mary Somerville’s star 
was waning in terms of book sales. Increasing professionalization of science and 
disciplinarity—the movement toward distinct scientific disciplines—meant that synoptic 
overviews of current developments within the various branches of physical science and 
natural history were less feasible. When tasked with editing the tenth and last edition of 
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On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences after Somerville’s death in 1872, Arabella 
Buckley—whose work I consider in chapter two—feared she could not do it justice: each 
branch of the physical sciences had progressed and deepened beyond any single 
individual’s knowledge. Yet Somerville’s reputation lingered. Her honors had been 
varied and numerous throughout her career: polar explorer William Parry named an 
island after her on his first voyage to the arctic in 1819. Whewell intimated the term 
“scientist” could describe Somerville when he reviewed Connexion in 1834, early in her 
career and just months after he coined the term at the 1833 meeting of the BAAS in 
Cambridge.13 Her most solid recognition came in the form of a government pension 
awarded by King William IV, when Sir Robert Peel placed her on the Civil List in 1835 
for her work as a popularizer of science (Patterson 151). The same year, the Royal 
Astronomical Society unanimously elected Somerville and Caroline Herschel as honorary 
members (Patterson 155). 
Over the past fifteen years, Somerville has gained increasing scholarly attention. 
Elizabeth Chambers Patterson conducted the first comprehensive study of Somerville in 
1969 and catalogued the extensive Somerville Collection held at Oxford’s Bodleian 
Library. Patterson’s Mary Somerville and the Cultivation of Science, 1815-1840 (1983), 
was the first full-length Somerville biography, but as her subtitle reveals, it concludes in 
the middle of Somerville’s career. Katherine Neeley drew readers’ attention to 
Somerville’s lyrical treatment of physical science in Mary Somerville: Science, 
Illumination, and the Female Mind (2001), and Alan Chapman’s biography, Mary 
Somerville and the World of Science followed in 2004. Historians of science like Bernard 
                                                
13 Whewell suggested the term “scientist” as a general category designating “the students of 
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Lightman have included her in histories of Victorian popularization, and James A. Secord 
edited a nine-volume set of her collected works in 2004.14 Only in the past ten years, in 
fact, has Somerville’s importance to histories of Victorian science and its intellectual life 
really begun to emerge.15 Anna Henchman’s The Starry Sky Within: Astronomy and the 
Reach of the Mind in Victorian Literature (2014) is the most recent study of astronomical 
metaphors—many echoing Somerville’s prose—in Victorian novels and poetry. 
On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences appeared during a cultural moment in 
Britain that saw a burgeoning market for self-improvement literature, including scientific 
studies. Between 1829 and 1846, Dionysus Lardner published volumes ranging from 
history to arts and manufacture to natural philosophy in Lardner’s Cabinet Cyclopedia. 
Two of John Herschel’s books, for instance, Preliminary Discourse on Natural 
Philosophy (1831) and A Treaty on Astronomy (1833) appeared in the series, as did books 
by Sir David Brewster on optics and John Phillips on geology. Other series devoted to the 
spirit of mass education included Brougham’s Library of Useful Knowledge, Brewster’s 
                                                                                                                                            
the knowledge of the material world” (59). 
14 See, e.g., Lightman’s Victorian Popularizers of Science (2007) and Secord’s Collected 
Works of Mary Somerville (2004). 
15 Alice Jenkins highlights Somerville’s negotiation of both gender and spatial boundaries in 
Space and the March of Mind (2007). Ruth Watts argues for Somerville’s importance as a female 
explicator of science at a time when women were marginalized, tracing the value of Somerville’s 
work to other scientists and highlighting her readers’ reactions. Claire Brock complicates Watts’s 
essay on Somerville’s influence by citing a broader range of public opinion and shows why one 
of the controversies about Somerville that came during Parliamentary debate about the Civil 
List’s pensions was politically motivated (260-266). Earning a pension for her work as a 
“popularizer”—here meaning a writer who was commissioned by the Society for the Diffusion of 
Useful Knowledge (SDUK) to explain science to Britain’s nonspecialist readers—Somerville’s 
Mechanism of the Heavens, in fact, was most useful to university students and professional men 
of science. Thus Brock suggests that Somerville “relished the specialist aspect of her writings and 
valued the difficulties which prevented the ordinary reader from obtaining ultimate insight into 
celestial mechanics” (255). On the heels of Mechanism’s mathematical sophistication came the 
equation-free On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences, a book whose less-technical content, 
Brock suggests, was aimed at an audience Somerville was in danger of losing. 
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Edinburgh Encyclopedia, and the Encyclopedia Metropolitana (Patterson, “Mary 
Somerville” 330 n.121). But none of these books individually tried to synthesize multiple 
branches of physical science the way that Mary Somerville’s Connexion did. For a 
scientific text, it became a commercial and critical success, if not exactly a sensation. The 
first edition of 2,000 copies immediately sold out, and sales of later editions totaled 
15,000. Connexion appeared in nine updated, successive editions between 1835 and 1877 
(Patterson 193; Neeley 42).16  
The book was remarkably popular because it verbally explained up-to-date scientific 
developments, thereby opening a path to scientific knowledge to readers outside the 
academy’s walls who lacked an education in higher math. Likewise, the book’s prestige 
drew professional men of science into its audience and helped advance British science by 
filling gaps with discussions of Continental discoveries. Additionally, Somerville’s 
continued updates to Connexion meant it contained what was state-of-the-art science, and 
she drew together the reports of various professional “gentlemen of science,” helping to 
form consensus via a process similar to the referee procedure common today (Neeley 
114). Of course, one of the charges leveled at Somerville from many quarters, herself 
included, was that she did not contribute original scientific knowledge to her community 
but rather merely distilled it, disseminated it, and interpreted it. Indeed, Connexion is, at 
its core, an extended “literature review” in which Somerville summarizes and brings 
together the research and findings of many men of science, including Newton, Laplace, 
William and John Herschel, Faraday, Young, Biot, Fresnel, Humboldt, and many others, 
                                                
16 Subsequent editions appeared in 1835, 1836, 1837, 1840, 1842, 1846, 1849, 1858, and 
1877. The last edition was posthumously published and edited by Arabella Buckley, formerly 
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both British and continental European, as well as explorers like James Cook and Edward 
Parry. Certainly Connexion gathers together a vast international conversation about 
science. But the privilege “originality” has in scientific fields has not abated in the years 
since Somerville was writing, and it has diminished her reputation as a result.  
Because the text of Connexion resides in the interstices between professional 
scientific papers and more watered-down popularizations, it troubles categories. But this 
troubling is precisely what Connexion offers to scholars of the nineteenth century who 
investigate its intellectual history, constructions of gender, and genre theory. Somerville’s 
On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences is a book critical to accounts of Victorian 
literature and culture, uniting in its pages the terrestrial and the astronomical, the prosaic 
and the poetic. A look at her manuscripts helps readers today see that unity most clearly. 
Somerville’s Manuscripts & Byron’s Abyss 
 Over a dozen quotations from Byron’s Cain, copied in Somerville’s hand, occupy 
three striking pages in a small, brown, undated notebook hardly more than four by six 
inches in size (Somerville Collection Dep c. 352, fol. 5). Kathryn A. Neeley notes the 
presence of these quotations with just this tantalizing remark: 
In one of the notebooks, the left-hand page contains a summary of a statement 
from William Herschel, indicating the number of stars that passed across the view 
through his telescope in an hour. Below this passage is a quotation from Byron 
concerning human insignificance in the grand scheme of nature. On the opposite 
                                                                                                                                            
Charles Lyell’s secretary. Figures quoted by Patterson and Neeley indicate sold copies; James 
Secord records 17,500 copies printed (xi). 
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page, there are extensive quotations from Byron’s Cain (1905),17 which refer to 
the ‘beautiful, unnumbered, and endearing’ suns ‘not dazzling, and yet drawing us 
to them.’ Although the poetry itself does not, the images and sentiment conveyed 
by the poetry find their way into Somerville’s text. Science, poetry, and 
philosophy are interwoven into a coherent and inspiring account. In note form, the 
account seems chaotic, even schizophrenic; in finished form, it is enormously 
rich. (7; emphasis mine) 
 Neeley’s praise of Somerville’s finished prose is fitting, highlighting the implications 
and vibrancy of Somerville’s writing when it rises into an elevated poetic register. Yet, as 
my following pages will show, I suggest an alternate interpretation of the quotations’ 
significance. One line of Byron’s verse does appear in Connexion, and while Somerville 
uses some of the same cosmic imagery, her sentiment differs markedly from Byron’s. But 
before examining how passages both in Somerville’s notebook and in the published 
volume of Connexion interrogate the ideas suggested by these quotations from Cain, a 
very brief summary of the play itself may be useful for readers unfamiliar with Byron’s 
text. 
Cain : A Mystery (1821) retells the Genesis story of Adam and Eve’s family after 
their expulsion from Eden and before Cain’s killing of Abel. Selecting Cain as his play’s 
protagonist and anti-hero, Byron portrays Cain’s distress about his mortality and his 
temptation by Lucifer, who takes him on a journey both to a remote space beyond the 
stars and to Hades, a realm of death where Cain sees creatures that had preceded man on 
                                                
17 Neeley uses a 1905 edition, but Cain was printed in 1821, along with Sardanapalus  and The 
Two Foscari. 
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the earth. Lucifer argues that mortality was not a good part of God’s plan and that the 
sum of human knowledge ultimately concludes with understanding how very 
insignificant man is in relation to the universe. Returning to his family, Cain tries to tear 
down the altar where the family made sacrifices to God. When Abel stands between Cain 
and the altar, the latter strikes him down. In contrast to the Old Testament’s description, 
Byron’s telling suggests the first fratricide was motivated not by Cain’s jealousy but 
rather was an effect of his despair and rage. 
Byron’s play follows Milton’s example in Paradise Lost of rewriting Biblical tales of 
an antediluvian “fall.” Importantly, though, Byron chooses to depict his fratricidal Cain’s 
lack of spiritual faith or religious conviction within the context of early nineteenth-
century natural history. Lucifer provides a history of the earth in Act II that follows 
Georges Cuvier’s catastrophic theory of geology propounded in the “Preliminary 
Discourse” to his Researches on Quadruped Fossil Bones (1812).18 Byron provides in his 
Preface a short note for the scientific theories with which the play engages: 
the notion of Cuvier, that the world had been destroyed several times before the 
creation of man. This speculation, derived from the different strata and the bones 
of enormous and unknown animals found in them, is not contrary to the Mosaic 
account, but rather confirms it; as no human bones have yet been discovered in 
those strata, although those of many known animals are found near the remains of 
the unknown. (337-8) 
Cuvier’s theory suggested that the earth went through catastrophic periods that 
extinguished all planetary life, offering an explanation for gaps in the fossil record. 
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Geology was one of the most active fields of natural philosophy in Britain in the first 
decades of the nineteenth century. Byron admits, though, that he takes some poetic 
license within the explanations Lucifer offers Cain. The discovery of fossils of extinct 
animals in the geological record prompted Cuvier to propose his theory, and in the play, 
part of Cain’s crisis comes from seeing “pre-Adamites,” rational creatures who had 
previously inhabited the earth, in Hades.  
The catalyst for Cain’s crisis—his lack of faith and consequent killing of Abel—is his 
journey to the “abyss” of space, an unspecified but vast distance from the earth. It is not a 
pit like the hell into which Dante descends, but it prompts a similar feeling of terrible 
distance for Cain. When Somerville copies lines from Byron’s play into her notebook, all 
of the lines come from this key scene. 
 Somerville used loose paper and notebooks to work out equations and calculations, 
and into her notebooks she also copied passages from work by her scientific colleagues 
like Faraday, Herschel, and Whewell, as well as quotations from many nonscientific 
acquaintances. In this regard her notebooks often served as scientific commonplace 
books. She did not uniformly attribute her sources, which makes tracing those sources a 
challenge. Nor did she consistently date her entries, so I rely here on those moments 
when she does date a notebook, the content that definitively appears as published text, 
and the original cataloguing work by Patterson.19 
                                                                                                                                            
18 French title: Recherches sur les ossements fossiles de quadrupèdes 
19 The Somerville Collection includes completed manuscripts, drafts, notes, notebooks, 
letters, diaries, genealogies, business papers, personal papers, honors, and awards. Housed in 
Oxford’s Bodleian Library, the collection occupies three linear meters—nearly ten feet—of shelf 
space. When Patterson began cataloguing the collection in the late 1960s, she estimated its 
contents at over 10,000 pieces; Somerville College now approximates a more conservative 9-
10,000 (Patterson “Mary Somerville” 334; Somerville College “Somerville collections at the 
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In the small brown notebook described previously, Somerville recorded a variety of 
notes from well-known scientific figures of her day, including correspondents like 
Laplace, Sir John Leslie, and William Herschel. Byron is the notable poetic anomaly. The 
quotes begin immediately below this passage describing Herschel’s observation of stars 
through a telescope pointed out from his window: “Herschel mentioned that 116,000 stars 
passed through the field of his telescope, which subtended an ∠ of 15°, in a quarter of an 
hour. If we compute from such a narrow gaze, the whole celestial vault must display 
within the range of telescopic vision, more than 5 Billion of fixed stars” (Somerville 
Collection c.352,2). 
To follow this data-filled passage with lines of Romantic poetry at first seems an odd 
juxtaposition, and the pages immediately following these poetic quotations turn again to 
astronomical topics. The Byron pages are surrounded by quotes from experts in physical 
science and astronomy.20 Yet for Somerville, the connection between astronomical 
wonder and Byron’s dramatic lines wasn’t unusual, not least because one of Cain’s 
settings is the depths of space. The quotations’ placement following Leslie’s passage on 
light and Herschel’s observation of the night sky suggest they made Somerville think of 
Byron’s plays, not the reverse. Byron’s play becomes one among many of Somerville’s 
                                                                                                                                            
Bodleian”). Bodleian archivist Chrissie Webb re-catalogued the entire collection in 2012-13, and 
a list of its contents is now available online. My visit to the Bodleian to research in the Somerville 
Collection took place just as this cataloguing began, and I thank the staff of the Special 
Collections Reading Room in the Radcliffe Science Library for accommodating me at an 
inconvenient time. 
20 Kathryn Neeley discusses how Somerville engages a poetic tradition via a pattern of 
describing the world from a “cosmic platform” and via a method of “tracing the mazes” (110-
113). Neeley, however, does not provide nor examine the complete Byron quotations themselves 
except within the short account of how the Herschel description which precedes them in the 
notebook appears in the text of Connexion itself. Yet there is substantive connection between 
Byron’s poetry and the kind of scientific exposition, or popular accommodation, Somerville was 
trying to compose. 
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sources for her astronomical writing. Given the widespread practice of including poetic 
lines in books within a variety of genres across the nineteenth century, it is possible 
Somerville was just keeping a list of potential choices for future use. But later pages in 
the same notebook indicate Somerville’s use of Cain within the prose of Connexion was 
not simply decorative. 
The striking common thread among all of the copied Byron quotations—which I 
discuss in greater detail below—is their expression of humankind’s limited ability to 
observe or comprehend the vast reaches of the universe. By contrast, Connexion opposes 
Byron’s Romantic poetic constructions by showing how scientific analysis—even 
without recourse to mathematics, the unifying language of science—can begin to bridge 
the gulf of incomprehensibility within the sublime. Somerville’s notes have an internal 
logic to them less chaotic than Neeley suggests. Somerville incorporates Byron’s visual 
aesthetic, but not his moral one. She does not import Byron’s sentiment into her work; to 
the contrary, she uses it as a framework to argue against.  
 Somerville’s selected quotations indicate a debate within her own work that was 
aesthetic as well as scientific. The Cain quotations all evoke the Burkean sublime, a sense 
of terrible fascination with the immensity of the universe and the individual human’s 
relative insignificance in the presence of such seeming infinity, as well as the calming 
reassurances of earthly nature’s smaller beauties. But Somerville’s sublime is not quite 
the sublime of Byron or Burke, though it strongly resembles Kant’s “mathematical 
sublime.”21 Hers is an admiration not only for wonders of the universe, but also for the 
                                                
21 Many scholars have traced the eighteenth-century aesthetic theories. See for instance, Terry 
Eagleton’s The Ideology of the Aesthetic (1990), Frances Ferguson’s Solitude and the Sublime: 
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imaginative leaps the human mind can take to the vast depths of space, its ability to 
comprehend the motions and gravitational relations between astronomic bodies, to 
measure them, and to understand how the same laws govern the action of planets as well 
as the motion of matter on earth. To Somerville’s way of thinking, even if human beings 
fall short of full comprehension of the causes of these natural laws, this is not cause for 
dismay. In short, Somerville delights in the pleasures of reason, and her lyrical prose 
aims to kindle that delight in others.  
Somerville’s Sublime 
Cain’s plot provides a context for understanding the quotations Somerville copies 
into her commonplace book: “What nothings we are before the least of these stars,” for 
example. Or, “Myriads of starry worlds, of which our own/ Is the dim and remote 
Companion, in/ Infinity of life,” and “this should be the human sum/ Of Knowledge, to 
know mortal nature’s nothingness.” All of these lines appear in the conversation between 
Cain and Lucifer as they gaze down at the earth from “the Abyss of Space.” Lucifer 
teaches Cain how truly small and insignificant he and all humankind are in the wider 
universe of divine creation. When Somerville asks her readers to imagine these distant 
perspectives, however, she draws far different conclusions, and her rhetoric explicitly 
draws upon the discourse of the sublime.  
 “The heavens afford the most sublime subject of study which can be derived from 
science,” Somerville writes in her introduction to Connexion. Beginning her study of the 
physical sciences with astronomy, Somerville adheres to a longstanding tradition for 
                                                                                                                                            
Romanticism and the Aesthetics of Individuation (1992), or The Sublime: A Reader in British 
Eighteenth-Century Aesthetic Theory, edited by Andrew Ashfield and Peter de Bolla (1996). 
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encyclopedic reviews, from Pliny to John Ray. Astronomy holds within it the principles 
that cover the rest of physical science, and the magnitudes of its objects are massive. It is 
appropriate, then, for Somerville to treat her high subject in the manner of Longinus’s 
sublime: a lofty subject requires grand, elevated discourse. In Connexion’s second 
edition, Somerville explains how astronomy combines 
the sciences of number and quantity, of rest and motion. In it we perceive the 
operation of a force which is mixed up with everything that exists in the heavens 
or on earth; which pervades every atom, rules the motion of animate and 
inanimate beings, and is as sensible in the descent of a rain drop as in the falls of 
Niagara; in the weight of the air, as in the periods of the moon. (1) 
Here Somerville’s prose differs distinctly from the expository text that follows in the 
majority of the book. In terms of rhetorical discourse, it is far more epideictic than 
forensic. With its dense use of figures in a short space, it prompts readerly affect, 
inspiring her reader to undertake an imagined journey through the universe. Rhetorically, 
Somerville’s use of antithetical phrasing creates a syntactical tension that mimics the vast 
gulf between human and divine. Somerville’s syntax not only contrasts but also links 
“rest and motion”; “in the heavens or on the earth”; “the descent of a rain drop” and “the 
falls of Niagara”; “weight of the air” and “periods of the moon.” Each parallel phrase 
amplifies the one preceding it. In two of these—the antitheses of heavens and earth, rain 
drops and Niagara—the contrast is one of scale: the actions of both the very large and the 
very small, Somerville argues, are governed by the same laws. Somerville’s rhetorical 
figuration calls upon a reader to imagine the very small and the immense together, 
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suggesting that the same laws of physics apply to each, and to everything that falls in 
between. 
Somerville’s next line employs the figure of climax or gradatio (elements are arranged 
in increasing importance), including a progressive anadiplosis (a repetition of the last 
word of the previous phrase or clause), to take her reader’s thoughts from a planetary 
plane to a solar and divine sphere: 
Gravitation not only binds satellites to their planet, and planets to the sun, but it 
connects sun with sun throughout the wide extent of creation, and is the cause of 
the disturbances, as well as the order of nature: since every tremour it excites in 
any one planet is immediately transmitted to the farthest limits of the system, in 
oscillations, which correspond in their periods with the cause producing them, 
like sympathetic notes in music, or vibrations from the deep tones of an organ. (1-
2) 
From satellite to planet, planet to sun, and sun to cosmos, Somerville’s construction 
shows gravitational force’s ubiquity within a linking rhetorical figure of increasing 
magnitude. Readers might hear in her construction an echo, too, of Kepler’s theory of the 
“harmony of the spheres” when she shifts to an auditory metaphor of oscillating 
vibrations of sound waves in music. Despite the practical content of most of the volume, 
many such expressive syntactical figures punctuate Somerville’s prose. The greatest 
frisson for Somerville’s novice readers may have come from this aesthetic and affective 
tension between human and divine perspective.  
 Somerville’s expressions of unity and connection are not so different—in either 
subject or its rhetorical style—from one of the lines she copies from Act II of Byron’s 
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Cain into her commonplace book: “The little shining fire-fly in its flight/And the 
immortal star in its great course,/ Must both be guided” (379). Byron’s line, spoken by 
Cain to Lucifer when the latter asks him what he thinks of “worms and worlds,” suggests 
a unifying force more divine than mechanical, and it echoes the same notion of a basic 
law underlying both the miniature and the cosmic. But similarities in subject and 
rhetorical style, while curious, are not sufficient to link Connexion and Cain.  
 In fact, Somerville does quote Byron’s Cain just once within the pages of On the 
Connexion of the Physical Sciences.22 The line appears when she explains the concept of 
parallax, one of the same topics surrounding the quotations in her commonplace book.  
Parallax was a defining metaphor out of nineteenth-century physical science in the 
same way relativity and uncertainty came to characterize the early twentieth. In the 
figurative sense, parallax suggests a visuality inflected by the Newtonian physics and 
Euclidean geometry of the Enlightenment, that is, one far more uniform and regular than 
the relativistic and quantum physics that characterize metaphors emerging from the work 
of Albert Einstein and Werner Heisenberg. George Eliot uses parallax as a metaphor, for 
instance, in her Westminster Review essay, “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists” (1856), a 
text I discuss in chapter three, while Tennyson echoes Somerville’s diction in his own 
literary use of parallax in In Memoriam (Henchman 85-120).23 Because astronomical 
parallax requires the observer or student to imagine vast, seemingly incomprehensible 
                                                
22 The same quotation appears in the “Preliminary Dissertation” to Mechanism of the 
Heavens. Because Connexion is the expanded version of the “Preliminary Dissertation” and it had 
a more prominent influence throughout the century, I focus on the longer book. Much of the text 
in the “Preliminary Dissertation” is quoted verbatim in Connexion. 
23 Both Eliot and Tennyson read Somerville between 1839 and 1840. Anna Henchman’s new 
monograph, The Starry Sky Within traces what she terms literary parallax, demonstrating how 
relevant this optical metaphor was to Victorian writers. 
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distances, it often evokes the kind of fear and despair epitomized in Cain and, at the 
outset of this chapter, Two on a Tower. And it is here, in her discussion of parallax, 
where Somerville’s marked refusal to accept the kind of unease expressed by Byron and 
Hardy can most clearly be found. 
Stated most simply, parallax is a visual effect in which there is an apparent difference 
in an object’s position when viewed along two different lines of sight. Imagine, for 
example, how the backgrounds might differ if two friends positioned a great distance 
apart took a photograph of a third companion from their locations. The apparent 
difference in the friend’s location is a phenomenon called parallax. Mary Somerville’s 
definition in Connexion is far more precise. The following passage opens Connexion’s 
eighth chapter: 
The parallax of a celestial body is the angle under which the radius of the earth 
would be seen, if viewed from the centre of that body; it affords the means of 
ascertaining the distances of the sun, moon, and planets. When the moon is in the 
horizon at the instant of rising or setting, suppose lines to be drawn from her 
centre to the spectator and to the centre of the earth; these would form a right-
angled triangle with the terrestrial radius, which is of a known length; and as the 
parallax or angle at the moon can be measured, all the angles and one side are 
given; whence the distance of the moon from the centre of the earth may be 
computed. (61-62) 
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Figure 1: Diagram from the second edition of On the Connexion of the Physical 
Sciences (1835). Somerville’s first edition did not contain diagrams. Google Books. 
 
What is noteworthy about the difference between my rudimentary but more common 
example and Somerville’s is the position of the observer in the two descriptions. My 
explanation would suggest that an astronomical parallax concerns the relative position of 
a stellar body according to two independent observers, and to an extent, this is true. But 
parallax is really the angle drawn from the perspective of the celestial body to the earth, 
not the angle originating at the position of the earth-bound astronomer. The imagined 
point of observation lies within or from the stellar object, so that the imagined gaze is 
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directed at the earth, and the angle described is that between one line drawn from the 
stellar object to the center of the earth, and the other line is drawn to an observer on the 
earth’s surface. Such a perspective exemplifies a trope common throughout Connexion, a 
view from the heavens, as it were, that Kathryn Neeley terms Somerville’s “cosmic 
platform” (8). Parallax offers the student of astronomy a specific example of Longinus’s 
elevated subject. But so too can it prompt the reader to imagine a terrifying, vertiginous 
perspective of the universe: an individual poised at the outermost reaches of space. Thus 
parallax satisfies the parameters of not just Longinus’s sublime, but Burke’s as well. 
 In her chapter on parallax, Somerville writes about an imagined view from the 
planet Uranus’s position, as well as from that of the nearest fixed star (identified in later 
editions as Alpha Centauri): 
Situate24 on the verge of the system, the sun must appear to it not much larger 
than Venus does to us. The earth cannot even be visible as a telescopic object to a 
body so remote. Yet man, the inhabitant of the earth, soars beyond the vast 
dimensions of the system to which his planet belongs, and assumes the diameter 
of its orbit as the base of a triangle whose apex extends to the stars. …If a fixed 
star had a parallax of one second, its distance from the sun would be 
20500000000000 of miles. At such a distance not only the terrestrial orbit shrinks 
to a point, but the whole solar system seen in the focus of the most powerful 
telescope, might be covered by the thickness of a spider’s thread. (65) 
In Somerville’s prose, abstract geometric calculations elevate the human mind to 
imagined vistas across the heavens; taken to the remote location of a star, that same mind 
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might contemplate human insignificance, evoked in the image of a thin, seemingly fragile 
spider’s thread. The expansion and contraction apparent within Somerville’s imagery—
the millions of miles in distance to planets and stars versus the millionth of a meter across 
a spider’s thread (diameter=1µm)—prompt an affective response for a reader: the awe of 
the Burkean sublime. The passage continues by reminding readers that our perception of 
distant galaxies and their relative distances from each other might be skewed, not just in 
terms of our far-off view—a spatial displacement—but a temporal one, too:  
In the milky way and the other starry nebulae, some of the stars that seem to us to 
be close to others, may be far behind them in the boundless depth of space; nay, 
may be rationally supposed to be situate many thousand times farther off; light 
would therefore require thousands of years to come to the earth from those 
myriads of suns, of which our own is but “the dim and remote companion.” (66)  
“Dim and remote companion” is a line from Act II, scene 2 of Cain, and with that 
allusion, Somerville betrays a larger conversation in which human beings contemplate 
their place in the universe. And yet, while she uses Byron as a touchstone for explaining 
parallax, her notebook suggests that her readers have more to gain via a study of 
astronomy or microscopy than via the kind of despair Cain professes or the terror which 
Burke suggests always accompanies a contemplation of the infinite (54). 
  All of the passages Somerville copies from Byron’s writings contemplate the 
heavens. “And thou who kindlest and quenchest Suns,” reads the line copied from the 
final speech of the eponymous protagonist of Marino Fallero, Doge of Venice: An 
Historical Tragedy in Five Acts. The Cain lines all come from Act II, when Lucifer takes 
                                                                                                                                            
24 Archaic. 
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Cain to the farthest reaches of the universe: from “the Abyss of Space” to Hades itself, 
here not an underworld but a seeming realm beyond the stars, a place no sunlight reaches. 
Their placement in the notebook is significant: the copied passages track Somerville’s 
sources for her own explanations of astronomical physics. Together they suggest that 
Byron’s plays served as analogies that could help Somerville translate astronomy—
parallax, in particular—for her own readers. Yet Somerville prompts her readers not to 
bemoan mortal limitations; instead, she suggests comprehension of universal laws is a 
facet of human reason worth celebrating. 
The quotations Somerville copies into her notebook point to human limitations in 
contrast to an immortal omniscience, perfection, and immortality. The lengthiest 
quotation Somerville selects derives from one of Cain’s dialogues with Lucifer in “The 
Abyss of Space”: 
  Oh thou beautiful 
And unimaginable ether! and 
Ye multiplying maker of increased 
And still increasing lights, What are ye? What 
Is this blue wilderness of interminable  
Air, Where ye roll along, as I have seen 
The leaves along the limpid streams of Eden? 
Is your course measured for ye? Or do ye 
Sweep on in your unbounded revelry 
Through an aerial universe of endless 
Expansion, at which my soul aches to think, 
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Intoxicated with eternity? (378) 
Cain’s adjectives contrast human finite abilities with divine, infinite phenomena: 
“unimaginable ether,” “interminable air,” “unbounded revelry,” and “endless expansion.” 
All these concepts pain his thoughts, making him feel “intoxicated with eternity.” His 
tone in this apostrophe to the fluid ether, which he compares to terrestrial “limpid 
streams,” is somber, and both his pentameter and diction echo Keats’s speaker in the 
opening lines of “Ode to a Nightingale,” particularly Cain’s aching, intoxicated soul. 
Mortal man, both poets suggest, cannot contemplate the infinite without paining their 
senses. 
 This passage from Cain points to a larger intertextual conversation taking place 
both in Somerville’s commonplace book and in her printed volumes. Works like 
Connexion engage with philosophies not limited just to the scientists Somerville names, 
and her scientific thought comes into sharper focus as it engages with literary—here 
poetic—texts. This larger framework becomes especially clear in a striking passage, 
likely composed by Somerville herself25, pages later in the same notebook where the 
Cain quotations appear: 
Pleasure in scientific pursuits astronomy does not merely consist in the beauty of 
the phenomena but in the order and design of the system, the harmony of its parts, 
the skill and efficiency of its contrivances, and in the means by which man has 
ascertained truths and arrived at results which seemed for ever placed beyond his 
grasp. From the efforts of produced  
                                                
25 I have not yet been able to trace this passage’s source. It does not seem to appear in 
Somerville’s published texts, nor any other published books I have been able to search via strings 
of text. 
 50 
Some of the phenomena 
The means by which (Somerville Collection Dep c. 352, fol. 5) 
Both the strikethroughs and the replacement of “scientific pursuits” with “astronomy” 
suggests that this is not simply a transcription error from a secondary source. (Somerville 
does not often make sustained copying errors.) Were it a translation, it is unusual for 
Somerville to leave the thought incomplete. The phrases themselves suggest multiple 
efforts at drafting an original sentence to follow the first sentence’s line of thought. In 
emphasizing the “pleasure” one might derive from analysis— “the means by which man 
has ascertained truths and arrived at results which seemed forever placed beyond his 
grasp”—these lines seem to belong in a conversation with Byron about apprehending the 
sublime. But Somerville acknowledges what Byron, in Cain’s voice, leaves unsaid: apart 
from apprehension at the universe’s vast size, there is also a feeling of aesthetic 
pleasure—of appreciation, even intoxication—at the “harmony of its parts” and a 
satisfaction at having discerned “truths” and “results” via geometric and mathematical 
analysis. The pleasure of astronomy is not merely one of appreciating beauty; it is also 
the enjoyment of comprehending invisible, calculable laws and of using one’s power of 
reason to do so. 
Interestingly, too, the lines of text Somerville has struck out are immediately followed 
on the page by a passage from an anonymously authored text, The Friend, or, Advocate 
of Truth, which was published in Philadelphia in 1830. Rather than completing her 
thought, Somerville instead copies another writer’s statement on the same topic. The lines 
read: 
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He is led to the conception of a power and completeness of a power and 
Intelligence adequate to the production and maintenance of that he sees in nature, 
—a power & Intelligence to [omitted: which] he not only sees no actual limit to 
the instances in which they are manifested, but finds on the contrary that the 
farther he enquires and the wider his sphere of observation extends, they 
continually open upon him in increasing abundance; and that as the study of one 
prepares him to understand and apprehend another refinement follows on 
refinement, wonder on wonder, till his faculties become bewildered in admiration, 
and [end of page] his intellect falls back on itself in utter hopelessness of arriving 
at an end. (Somerville Collection Dep c. 352, fol. 5) 
Here, much like Cain’s “intoxicated with eternity” speech, the theme is the bewilderment 
of the human mind as it tries to trace the workings of a “superior” intelligence. In fact, 
Somerville misses or omits a segment of text found in the printed volume: after 
“Intelligence” the original phrase next reads, “superior to his own.” In this passage, the 
writer suggests that human minds are destined to be thwarted by the fact that questions 
only bring about more questions: “the farther he enquires and the wider his sphere of 
observation extends, they continually open upon him in increasing abundance.” Faced 
with “wonder on wonder,” the student or observer fails “in utter hopelessness” of 
reaching an ultimate answer. 
Yet I do not interpret these lines as a position Somerville embraces. Rather than 
picking up on the thread of “hopelessness” from the preceding quotation, Somerville’s 
next entry is an unattributed passage focusing on the delights of scientific study, even if 
knowledge is finite: 
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One of the pleasures is to investigate the causes from their observed effects to 
determine the connection between these causes and thus to arrive at general laws, 
but in seeking the origin of these laws he is led to a boundary which he cannot 
pass and is compelled to confess that the sum of human knowledge is ^to know 
mortal nature’s nothingness and to acknowledge the goodness of refer the glory 
to Him who has granted such powers to man as clearly to perceive truths which 
must have been clearly known to the divine Intelligence from all eternity. 
(Somerville Collection Dep c. 352, fol. 5; emphasis mine) 
Once again, the lines contain strikethroughs that are not simply corrections but revisions, 
suggesting they are Somerville’s own prose. The fourth line of this passage echoes 
Lucifer’s lines copied earlier in the notebook: “And this should be the human sum/ Of 
knowledge, to know mortal nature’s nothingness” (408). But Somerville does not let 
Byron’s Lucifer have the last word. If this passage about the pleasures of investigation is 
Somerville’s, her lines counter the notion that knowledge only consists of “mortal 
nature’s nothingness”; rather, the pleasure she highlights is that of investigating causes by 
observing their effects—an empirical epistemology—and determining “connections” that 
lead to “general laws.” Somerville halts at the idea of trying to decipher or pursue “the 
origin of these laws,” affirming a religious faith and celebrating the gift of human reason. 
Connexion itself concludes with a lengthy passage that does precisely what the book’s 
title promises, in a concise, impressive summary. Somerville delivers a recap of her 
volume’s contents in a single paragraph: from terrestrial dynamics to their corresponding 
action in celestial bodies, from gravitational attraction to fluid dynamics to barometric 
pressure, from sound and light to chemical action and heat, electricity and magnetism. At 
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the close of the paragraph, she writes, “Innumerable instances might be given in 
illustration of the immediate connexion of the physical sciences, most of which are united 
still more closely by the common bond of analysis, which is daily extending its empire, 
and will ultimately embrace almost every subject in nature in its formulae” (413). 
Somerville’s optimism is clear: analysis (a combination of physical science and 
mathematics) will rule the day, not unlike Britain’s aspirations for its own power and 
reputation around the world. Readers today might chafe at such a Eurocentric mindset, 
fraught with the history of imperialism and the scientific technologies that undergirded 
colonialism. But while Somerville was closely allied with the European science 
community, she was not herself an agent of the British empire. The connotations of 
Somerville’s statement on quantitative reason’s ubiquity should be weighed alongside the 
paragraph to follow, which closes the book as a whole and revisits Somerville’s sense 
that the practice of science and analysis was less about dominating nature or the nations 
of the world and more about a closer existence with the divine, a far more personal 
ambition. Somerville concludes:  
These formulae, emblematic of Omniscience, condense into a few symbols the 
immutable laws of the universe. This mighty instrument of human power itself 
originates in the primitive constitution of the human mind, and rests upon a few 
fundamental axioms, which have eternally existed in Him who implanted them in 
the breast of man when He created him after His own image. (413-14) 
Somerville’s concluding portrait of science is intimate: analytical reasoning exists in the 
human heart or mind because it was placed there by a divine creator. There is a harmony 
in her understanding of reason and scientific inquiry because it does not pit science 
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against religion. Again, Somerville’s stance toward science is a rejection of Cain’s 
worries in Byron’s drama: her conclusion refutes the idea that “this should be the human 
sum/ Of knowledge, to know mortal nature’s nothingness.” Connexion asserts the 
opposite: understanding an order and a divinity in the universe leads one to discover a 
divinity within. 
Conclusion 
Somerville’s styled prose—passages that stand out in their appeals to the reader’s 
imagination, their descriptions of scale or color or complexity, their claims of the natural 
world’s grandeur—demonstrates an ethos at the core of her scientific study strikingly 
different from the cold, detached image we may have of Victorian striving for Truth: hers 
is a principle or spirit of enjoyment in using human reason and an appreciation for the 
beauty of the laws of nature, not just nature’s beauties themselves. Her sublime lay in 
apprehending the physical laws connecting natural phenomena on earth and in the depths 
of space. She directed her efforts of conveying science to disparate audiences along at 
least two trajectories within her books: one of unornamented expository prose that gave 
histories of discoveries and explained astronomical motion, heat, molecular attraction, 
electricity, the composition and transmission of light, and the effects of gravitational 
forces. The other important element of her prose was her use of affective imagery and 
literary allusion. If the former appealed to an audience already invested in physical 
science, the latter sought to engage a readership of potential practitioners and hobbyists. 
Byron was only one source Somerville drew upon when she contemplated how to explain 
astronomical concepts like parallax to such readers, a linking text that provided a suitable 
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metaphor. Byron’s play dramatized the position Somerville’s own readers would need to 
imagine in understanding parallax. 
 But Somerville’s notebooks suggest she did not fully accept the import of Byron’s 
play, particularly indicated by the fact her copied quotations all come from those scenes 
set in non-earthly realms, and none evoke the moral questions Byron’s protagonist asks 
his family elsewhere in the play. Instead, parallax as a concept reminds Somerville of 
Cain and the questions it asks in relation to magnitude and scale. The play calls for the 
same kind of imaginative work in contemplating astronomical distance and size. When it 
comes to the concept of parallax, the same mental action is required of a reader of Byron 
as it is of Somerville. As part of a shared discourse of sublimity, the correspondences are 
not so surprising despite, even, Cain’s spiritual crisis. Alice Jenkins describes, for 
example, how “the scientific reverence which connected God with the great forces of the 
natural world was partly fuelled by the discourse of the sublime, which allowed the 
emotional impact of awe and wonder to slide easily between allegiances to religion and to 
science” (86). The “emotional impact” Jenkins notes about the sublime was not 
necessarily agreeable. And the fact that Romantics like Byron often responded to the 
universe’s scale with a seeming awe leads us initially to think Somerville’s sublime is 
similar. Her sublime is almost as uncomfortable, but for a different reason. Somerville 
calls upon a reader to use an imagination that is composed of intellect rather than fancy, 
fed by reason and analysis, and expressed ultimately in mathematics.26 The mental work 
required was considerable. 
                                                
26 Somerville’s sublime resembles in many respects Kant’s mathematical sublime in Book II 
of his Critique of the Power of Judgment. For Kant, infinity is a concept one might apprehend, 
but scarcely comprehend. The difference between apprehension and comprehension evokes in the 
mind a feeling of the sublime, which lies not in the natural object but in the human power of 
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In Byron’s play, Cain’s soul “aches” when he contemplates an infinite universe, 
especially in contrast to his own limitations and his family’s exile from Paradise.  
Somerville’s Connexion seeks to replace that ache with the intellectual pleasures of 
physical science, turning both ontological and epistemological crises into intellectual 
delight. Yet her volumes pained the senses of her own readers, including women readers 
who were the addressed audience of Connexion. About the “Preliminary Dissertation,” 
Somerville’s friend, the Irish writer Maria Edgeworth, wrote to Somerville at the end of 
May, 1832:  
For my part, I was long in the state of the boa constrictor after a full meal—and 
am but just recovering the powers of motion. My mind was so distended by the 
magnitude, the immensity, of what you put into it! I am afraid that if you had been 
aware how ignorant I was you would not have sent me this dissertation, because 
you would have felt that you were throwing away much that I could not 
understand, and that could be better bestowed on scientific friends capable of 
judging of what they admire. I can only assure you that you have enlarged my 
conception of the sublimity of the universe, beyond any ideas I had ever before 
been enabled to form. (Macmillan 163)  
Edgeworth’s intellectual indigestion—emphasized in her own use of the discourse of the 
sublime—resonates with other apparent physiological effects readers might anticipate. 
                                                                                                                                            
imagination and reason. Kant writes, for instance, “true sublimity must be sought only in the 
mind of the one who judges, not in the object in nature, the judging of which occasions this 
disposition in it. And who would want to call sublime shapeless mountain masses towering above 
one another in wild disorder with their pyramids of ice, or the dark and raging sea, etc.? But the 
mind feels itself elevated in its own judging if, in the consideration of such things, without regard 
to their form, abandoning itself to the imagination and to a reason which, although it is associated 
with it entirely without any determinate end, merely extends it, it nevertheless finds the entire 
power of the imagination inadequate to its ideas” (139-140). 
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Almost a decade later, on June 23, 1840, young Mary Ann Evans wrote to her friend 
Maria Lewis, “I am ashamed to send you so many ill-clothed nothings. My excuse shall 
be a state of head that calls for four leeches before I can attack Mrs. Somerville’s 
Connection of the Physical Sciences” (Haight I.56). Even to the intelligent Evans—not 
yet the novelist George Eliot—Connexion’s small size belied the quantity and complexity 
of knowledge it contained. Surely Evans was not the only reader to approach the volume 
with some trepidation or an application of leeches to treat a headache before opening its 
pages: precise details of planetary rotation and precession, conic sections and parallaxes, 
barometric pressure and wave refraction likely tax even the most able of nonspecialist 
readers.  
Connexion, then, was not an easy book for a reader with some scientific 
background, let alone a novice, to comprehend, despite its stated object in Somerville’s 
dedication. The British Magazine remarked, “Probably our own language does not afford 
another summary at once so brief, so able, and so accurate, of the leading doctrines now 
prevalent in the various departments of physical science. It must require unwearied 
industry to pursue, and a very powerful intellect to grasp and master, so many difficult 
and abstruse subjects” (469). The Edinburgh Review praised its “condensed and 
perspicuous view of the general principles and leading facts of physical science,” but 
voiced “some doubt whether it is sufficiently popular to initiate our fair countrywomen 
into knowledge of the laws of the material universe” (155-56). That doubt was something 
Somerville would have hoped to avoid. In 1837 MP Charles Buller would argue in front 
of Parliament that Somerville’s £300 per annum pension was a “waste of money” 
because he rejected the very idea her works had “enlarged the bounds of science” (qtd. in 
 58 
Brock 255-56). Buller’s assertion speaks to a wider assumption about nineteenth-century 
women’s writing and their intended audiences. In Somerville’s case, Buller presumes her 
work should have been simpler in tone and style, and the implication of his criticism is 
that Somerville continued to speak within the community of practicing men of science, 
rather than exclusively for readers outside those circles. Somerville found herself up 
against competing notions of what her book—as a so-called popular text—“should” do, 
according to reviewers and Parliamentarians, and what she herself aimed to accomplish. 
 In Connexion’s framing, scientific study is as much spiritual as it is secular. In 
this regard, Somerville participates in a trajectory of women practitioners like Jane 
Marcet, Margaret Gatty, Mary Ward, Arabella Buckley, and Agnes Clerke, each of whom 
also presented science from a stance of religious belief. But that stance was one of 
personal satisfaction and gratification—taking pleasure in their intellectual 
employments—rather than abnegation, and here I contend that nineteenth-century British 
women science writers engage in an epistemology that differs in many ways from the 
supposedly objective, disinterested empiricism practiced by a number of their male 
contemporaries. However, I do not wish to pit these two epistemological forms against 
each other; rather, I suggest that women’s exclusion from academic science and the 
professional societies in the early part of the nineteenth century led them to follow a 
different course. The increasing profile of evolutionary theory by mid-century signaled a 
rise in secular theories, and the divergence between religion and science began to solidify 
for reasons not tied to distinctions in gender or class. Practitioners of science, both men 
and women, sought to reconcile new scientific theories with their faith throughout the 
latter half of the century and beyond.  
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Like many of her successors, Somerville celebrates not only the spiritual quest but 
also the aesthetic appeal of the universe’s majesty and the simplicity of laws that bind its 
functions together. Connections between the various sciences reveal an order and an 
elegance within natural law. It is no wonder Somerville’s diction and syntax evoke a 
sublime that initially seems similar to Byron’s. The discourse of the sublime—from 
Longinus through Kant and Burke—lends itself to Somerville’s work first because of the 
universe’s size and the vast distances at play when calculating distant stars’ positions. 
Secondly, the aesthetic of simple laws undergirding the immense and the minute has an 
appeal of its own. Yet Somerville’s sublime always culminates in analysis and its utility 
in discerning these basic principles, illuminating a majestic world. In Connexion, 
Somerville subtly distills the sublime notions of Longinus, Kant, and Burke within the 
crucible of nineteenth-century physical science. Her sublime—a sublime evident to her 
careful readers—is one that underlies much of Victorian physics and mathematics.  
Mary Somerville’s On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences was widely revered 
and consulted by professional men of science in her own day: its audience was 
professional as well as amateur. It kept practitioners up to date on the latest 
developments, helped promote consensus among competing theories, and offered 
nonspecialist readers, including and especially women, an entry into a male-dominated 
discourse. James Clerk Maxwell cited Connexion as being among “suggestive books” 
valuable not just for reporting science, but advancing it. Such books, he wrote, “put into 
definite, intelligible and communicable form, the guiding ideas that are already working 
in the minds of men of science, so as to lead them to discoveries, but which they cannot 
yet shape into a definite statement” (qtd. in Patterson 98; see also Watts 392, 402). But 
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because it fell victim to assumptions of value based on original discoveries—including 
accusations Mary Somerville levied at herself—her work gradually retreated into the 
shadowy recesses of histories of Victorian science. As scholars across the philosophy of 
science, rhetoric of science, women’s studies, and literary studies all have engaged in 
various recuperative studies undergirded by feminist thought, Mary Somerville’s 
reputation has begun shining more brightly. Now, too, we might consider what light her 
scientific works shed on other nineteenth-century texts and revise our notions of both 
genre and Victorian intellectual discourse. 
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Chapter 2: 
Fantastic Physics: Teaching Science with Fables and Fairy Tales in  
Margaret Gatty and Arabella Buckley 
“Can Astronomy be presented to the young as an entertaining study? Has any one 
attempted to cull from treatises addressed to the not wholly unlearned in science, facts 
and anecdotes, the ‘light literature’ of this sublime study, and to tell these things in 
simple words to the young?”—Mary Ward 
 
The epigraph quoted above begins Mary Ward’s astronomy book for children, 
Telescope Teachings (1859). Ward’s questions about describing science’s grandeurs for 
children speak both to my previous chapter’s examination of the sublime within Mary 
Somerville’s work and to similar descriptions of marvelous natural phenomena found 
within books by the two women whose work I examine in this chapter, Margaret Gatty 
(1809-1873) and Arabella Buckley (1840-1929). Ward’s emphasis on the possibility of 
“entertainment” within scientific study is common to many nineteenth-century efforts to 
educate a young audience in natural history and physical science. Like Ward, both Gatty 
and Buckley sought ways to demonstrate the “sublime” aspects of science to young 
audiences. However, while their books contain the “simple words” and “light literature” 
Ward describes, Gatty and Buckley are noteworthy for the ways in which their books 
diverge from existing models of scientific popularization by women. Margaret Gatty and 
Arabella Buckley stand apart from contemporaries like Ward in their choices of genre—
fable and fairy tale, respectively—in which to deliver scientific instruction, and their 
generic innovations have yet to be fully appreciated by scholars. If Somerville used 
poetic allusion to evoke the sublimity of astronomical distance and unities among 
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physical laws, Gatty and Buckley selected genres whose fantastic features bring 
expectations for reverence and delight with them into a discussion of science.   
In chapter one, I argued that Mary Somerville’s poetic allusions and rhetoric in On 
the Connexion of the Physical Sciences (1834) signaled a transitional moment in 
nineteenth-century British epistemology, and that Somerville’s ethos of pleasure within 
scientific study was shared by a number of her contemporaries and successors. In this 
chapter, I turn to pedagogical science texts for children written by two women in the 
second half of the nineteenth century: Margaret Gatty’s Parables from Nature (five 
volumes, 1855-1871) and Arabella Buckley’s The Fairy-Land of Science (1879).  Gatty 
and Buckley share Somerville’s spirit of enjoyment in their scientific pursuits, and like 
many of their female contemporaries who wrote for broad audiences outside the 
“gentlemanly” professional and academic communities of science, they adopted prose 
styles designed to spark their young readers’ curiosity and interest. Gatty and Buckley are 
distinctive, however, because they departed from both the more typical “familiar” format 
of question-driven, dialogical prose found in so-called “governess books” popular during 
the first part of the nineteenth century and the expository prose found in contemporaries 
like Mary Ward.27 Gatty’s stories and Buckley’s lessons harness children’s 
                                                
27 At the turn of the nineteenth century, a number of writers were engaged in writing texts 
providing “useful” knowledge to children, including Maria and Richard Edgeworth’s Practical 
Education (1798) and a host of “conversations” on chemistry, natural philosophy, mineralogy, 
and astronomy. A conversational delivery, the Edgeworths thought, resembled the manner in 
which children learned and was more interesting than expository prose alone (Myers 175). The 
conversation format was common to various kinds of didactic juvenile literature, and in its 
scientific use, it was most famously employed by Jane Marcet in her Conversations on Chemistry 
(1806) and Conversations on Natural Philosophy (1819), usually consisting of lessons given by a 
teacher to two students who could ask questions and converse about the topic. In form, these 
conversations resemble the question and answer format of catechism. Inspired, too, by the likes of 
John Newberry’s Tom Telescope (1761), many of these texts included spiritual or religious 
digressions from the science lesson, so that as a whole, this genre of didactic literature closely 
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imaginations—their abilities to picture scenes and phenomena—and direct their young 
readers to apply familiar ways of thinking and seeing to new situations. 
Attention to genre in Gatty’s and Buckley’s books reveals ways in which the 
entangled debates about morality, education, religion, and science were negotiated—but 
not necessarily resolved—within scientific pedagogies by women. Genres call to mind an 
assortment of cultural and historical assumptions and expectations. Employing familiar 
forms to do new work—the instruction of science, for instance—calls on readers to use 
their assumptions about the known to interpret the new. Gatty’s and Buckley’s tales 
demonstrate, too, how science books for children used an affective register, versus one of 
emotion-free logic, to invite young readers into scientific investigations. These are books 
intended to foster wonder and stimulate curiosity.28 For both Gatty and Buckley, natural 
phenomena were infused with divine, spiritual meaning, and they chose genres befitting 
their simultaneously scientific and spiritual enterprise. Gatty and Buckley stand out 
among a long list of women who wrote popularizations of science in nineteenth-century 
Britain because of these fable and fairy tale forms: genres that, in Gatty’s and Buckley’s 
hands, explicitly bridge a gap between belief and reason, religion and science. Their 
stories not only highlight the religious and moral imperatives found within “natural 
theology,” but they also signal the kind of habits of mind, observational practices, and 
                                                                                                                                            
associated science and religion. See Rauch’s “A World of Faith on a Foundation of Science” 
(1989). 
28 Laurence Talairach-Vielmas argues that Victorian natural history books appealed to 
readers’ imaginations and their ability to experience fear and wonder vicariously, and that this 
wonder transforms in the second half of the nineteenth century because science became harder to 
visualize. “With the advent of evolutionary theory,” he writes, “science became harder to 
conceive and writers turned increasingly to fairies and motifs traditionally associated with the 
marvelous to familiarize readers with new scientific methods” (109). Talairach-Vielmas suggests 
fairies entered popular science works in the second half of the century as a substitute for God 
(110). 
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methodologies necessary in an increasingly complex and professional world of science.29 
Gatty’s Parables and Buckley’s Fairy-Land aim to shape the reception of scientific 
inquiry as both a moral and spiritual practice; in turn, their adaptation of genres from 
established literary traditions for scientific instruction transformed those genres from 
tales of belief and make-believe into narratives of inquiry and investigation. Parables 
from Nature and The Fairy-Land of Science changed the parameters of what fables, fairy 
tales, and scientific textbooks could be, breaking new ground for what these forms could 
encompass, and what they would become in the latter half of the nineteenth century and 
the beginning of the twentieth. 
In the present chapter, I provide first a brief biographical overview of Gatty and 
Buckley, then a summary of how the critics have positioned them within both literary 
studies and the history of science. Lastly, I examine Gatty’s Parables and Buckley’s 
Fairy-Land, considering how they both adhered to and deviated from established generic 
forms in their science lessons for children. My intention is neither merely to compare 
these tales against static definitions of fable and fairy tale nor simply to catalogue what a 
set of children’s lessons in Victorian science looked like. Rather, attention to form and 
variations within this transformation from the literary genre to the scientific lesson—and 
                                                
29 Natural theology denotes a belief that natural phenomena and physical laws are evidence of 
a divine order. The term derives from William Paley’s Natural Theology, or, Evidences of the 
existence and attributes of the Deity: collected from the appearances of nature, published in 1802 
and widely read in the early decades of the nineteenth century. Paley’s book argued that evidence 
of design implies a designer, or creator, introducing also the now-familiar analogy of the watch 
and watchmaker. Paley was not the originator of this idea, however; he was influenced by John 
Ray’s The Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation (1691) and William Derham’s 
Physico-Theology (1713). Paley’s argument received its biggest challenge in the Victorian era 
from Darwin’s thesis of adaptation and evolution through natural selection in On the Origin of 
Species (1859). While Gatty was an adherent of natural theology, Buckley’s position with relation 
to Darwinism and theology was an ambivalent one. 
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vice versa—highlights how nineteenth-century juvenile literature participated in and 
helped to change a dynamic Victorian scientific  discourse. 
Lives and Works 
Though both Margaret Gatty and Arabella Buckley published many books and were 
widely read in their own day, their reputation has faded since the end of the nineteenth 
century. While a number of scholars over the last twenty years have recovered their 
writings and written more detailed biographies elsewhere, a brief history of their lives is 
likely helpful to orient a reader coming to them for the first time. 
If Margaret Gatty is known today among nineteenth-century literary scholars, she 
may more often be remembered for her founding of Aunt Judy’s Magazine in 1866, a 
publication she edited with her daughter, Juliana Horatia Ewing. Yet as the daughter of 
one minister and wife of another, Margaret Gatty combined her Christian faith along with 
her botanical study to become a widely-read author of moral children’s stories on natural 
history and guidebooks for women about marine vegetation. Margaret Scott was born on 
June 3, 1809 to the Reverend Alexander John Scott, who had served as chaplain to 
Horatio Nelson at the Battle of Trafalgar, and Mary Frances Ryder in Burnham, Essex. 
Her earliest education came in her father’s library, and she briefly wrote poetry before 
giving it up when Blackwood’s rejected her. Though her father initially refused to allow 
her to marry Alfred Gatty, a local curate, Scott eventually relented, and the couple 
married in 1839. She gave birth to ten children, eight of whom lived beyond infancy, and 
it was as she recovered from illness by the sea in Hastings (some attribute her illness to 
childbirth) in 1848-49 that her physician recommended Dr. William Henry Harvey’s 
Phycologica Britannica (1846-51, 4 vol.) for her to read and to study seaweeds as she 
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convalesced.30 For fourteen years living in the Ecclesfield parish of Yorkshire, near 
Sheffield—and raising her large family—Gatty collected algae and seaweeds along the 
British coastline, culminating in her publication of British Seaweeds (1863).31 In the same 
years she was researching seaweeds, she was also writing the stories to be included in 
Parables from Nature. Gatty continued to be troubled by ill health in her later years, 
suffering from intermittent muscular paralysis. She died in the Ecclesfield vicarage on 
October 4, 1873. Visitors today to the Ecclesfield parish church will find a memorial 
window that commemorates her life. 
Unlike Gatty, little is known of Arabella Buckley’s early personal life and education 
aside from her birth and parentage. Born on October 24, 1840 in Brighton to vicar John 
Wall Buckley and Elizabeth Burton, Buckley became Charles Lyell’s secretary when she 
was twenty-four years old. Her employment as Lyell’s secretary between 1864 and 1875 
provided her introduction to a famous circle of Victorian evolutionary scientists that 
included Charles Darwin and Alfred Russel Wallace. Following Lyell’s death, Buckley 
found other work as a popular science writer and lecturer, editing, for example, the 1877 
edition of Mary Somerville’s On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences. She published 
her first book, A Short History of Natural Science, in 1876.  Like Gatty’s Parables, 
Buckley’s work demonstrates as a guiding principle something animating nature beyond 
                                                
30 In her memoir preceding the 1880 volume containing the parables in their entirety, Juliana 
Horatia Ewing, Gatty’s daughter, just cites “an illness,” but Bernard Lightman records that she 
was slow to recover from her seventh “confinement” in 1848 and also suffered from a bronchial 
condition. See Victorian Popularizers of Science 107. 
31 The following are Gatty’s other books for children: The Fairy Godmothers, and Other 
Tales 1851), Worlds Not Realized (1856), Magdalen Stafford (1857), Proverbs Illustrated (1857), 
The Poor Incumbent: a Tale (1858), Legendary Tales (1858), Aunt Judy’s Tales (1859), The 
Human Face Divine and Other Tales (1860), Aunt Judy’s Letters (1862), Domestic Pictures and 
Tales (1866), Waifs and Strays of Natural History (1871), and  A Book of Emblems, with 
Interpretations Thereof (1872). 
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physical matter. Though she was a Darwinian thinker and Darwin praised her work, 
Buckley also sought to demonstrate more altruism in nature than Darwin’s theory 
afforded, and her books found a ready audience of children and their parents. In the late 
1870s, Buckley was still thinking about spiritualism, writing “The Soul, and the Theory 
of Evolution,” an anonymously published essay in the University Magazine in 1879 
(Lightman 244), the same year she wrote The Fairy-land of Science. An intangible spirit, 
power, or life-force—as it appears in various iterations of her text—animates this series 
of lectures, even as she conveys the most up-to-date theories of physics as possible. 
Buckley’s subsequent popularizations emphasized the parental fostering of offspring, not 
just the mechanisms of natural and sexual selection. Her book Life and Her Children 
(1881) reveals such a stance even in its title, a book that discusses six divisions of animal 
life, while Winners in Life’s Race (1883) discusses vertebrates. In her correspondence 
with Darwin, Buckley kept her religious and spiritual beliefs to herself; she was more 
akin to Charles Lyell, who remained a Unitarian and accepted evolution as a mode of 
Providence, and she became friends with Wallace, with whom she investigated 
spiritualism (Lightman Victorian Popularizers 242-43). Buckley was also a vocal 
proponent of teaching concepts over examination skills, an argument she makes explicit 
in an article published in The Sheffield & Rotherham Independent on January 30, 1882, 
entitled “Science in Elementary Schools.”32 In 1884, she married a widowed medical 
doctor twenty years her senior, Thomas Fisher. She published Through Magic Glasses, 
the sequel to The Fairy-Land of Science, in 1890. Buckley died of influenza at her home 
in Devon on February 9, 1929. 
                                                
32 As electronic databases continue to index nineteenth-century periodicals, more writings by 
non-canonical writers are being recovered. I am not aware of any scholarship on Buckley to date 
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When Gatty and Buckley appear in the pages of recent scholarly articles and chapters 
on literature and science, critics commonly mention the two writers’ shared view of 
science’s harmony with religious belief, a sense in divine purpose and design. For this 
reason, their books are sometimes categorized together under the umbrella of natural 
theological texts. Gatty would have readily accepted the label: the early decades of the 
nineteenth century saw no disharmony between studying natural philosophy or natural 
history and a belief in a divine creator, and it was the norm rather than the exception to 
write otherwise. By the time Buckley began writing, however, evolutionary thinking had 
come to pervade Victorian culture, whether or not there was consensus on the matter. 
Because of her association with Lyell and Darwin, though, Buckley kept her private 
beliefs in spiritualism under wraps. Yet her notions of an “Unseen Power” at work behind 
the invisible forces pervade her book and shape the style in which she would deliver The 
Fairy-Land of Science. In both cases, spiritual belief and scientific practice shaped how 
these writers approached teaching children and the forms their books would take.33 
Very few scholars, however, have concentrated on matters of form when examining 
Victorian women’s science writing. Or rather, scholars have considered writers like Gatty 
and Buckley within the category of children’s or juvenile literature, but not necessarily 
with an eye to a rhetorical analysis of the genre and the transformative effects it had on 
both scientific writing and fantastic tales for children. Bernard Lightman, for instance, 
includes Margaret Gatty among a lengthy list of female popularizers within the “maternal 
                                                                                                                                            
that has cited or discussed this newspaper article, for instance. 
33 In highlighting Buckley’s spiritualism and her personification of “life” and “winners” in 
evolutionary theory, my reading of Buckley contrasts significantly with Laurence Talairach-
Vielmas’s contention that Buckley, along with Charles Kingsley, offered her readers “a highly 
atheistic view of nature” (111). 
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tradition,” discussing the deference many female popularizers showed toward male 
scientists and their conservative views of women’s authority to speak out publicly on 
social matters and their opposition to the women’s movement (Popularizers 154-159). 
Alan Rauch discusses Gatty in a number of essays on women science writers, arguing 
Gatty chose children’s literature as a way of reaching across audiences in order to counter 
secular, materialist thought not only for the child reader’s benefit, but also that of his or 
her parents (140-141). Tess Cosslett argues Gatty deploys voices of children, animals, or 
adult women to counter “secular naturalism and its attendant disbelief,” especially as 
articulated in poetry by Alfred Tennyson and Matthew Arnold (140). Barbara Gates is an 
exception here, identifying Gatty’s choice of form as an important feature and noting that 
Gatty “was eager to find the old and new literary forms that were best suited to her 
scientific purposes—and to her moral purposes as well. … Acutely aware of the 
limitations of children’s understanding of the natural world, she believed that her 
parables could bridge the gulf between animal life and the human species” (Kindred 
Nature 221). Gates astutely pinpoints here one efficacy of the parable: its thematic 
linking of human and nonhuman species. I propose the genre did even more expansive 
work for Gatty than just helping children think analogously of themselves with their 
animal counterparts. The parables also guide conceptual thinking about natural processes 
like weather, and further, they yoke together the scientific and spiritual as compatible. 
While the moral didacticism of her tales cannot be disconnected from the science, other 
structural and generic features of the fable also inform these parables of natural history 
and shape how readers could interpret their meaning. 
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About Buckley, Gates argues that Buckley’s choice of a fantastic, rather than 
realistic, narrative mode in The Fairy-Land of Science (1879) helped her get around 
difficulties Darwin faced in narrating an evolutionary theory that was predicated, in part, 
on the fallible, temporally limited vision and memory of human beings (Natural 
Eloquence 170-172). “Transgressing the borderlands of acceptable scientific forms,” she 
writes,  
Buckley defied the limitations of both realistic language and the human sensory 
experience. In Fairy-Land, she could comfortably use the language of illusion to 
describe the invisible world of forces, and then in Magic Glasses she could 
reinforce the importance of access to humanly designed machines that help 
correct for flawed human vision. (172) 
Fictional lands, especially fantastic ones, are not limited by the world available to our 
limited senses. In Gates’s reading, the discourse of magic and illusion could represent the 
real, but invisible, forces of magnetism, evaporation, or electricity. Like Gates, Laurence 
Talairach-Vielmas argues that the fairy tale mode “mediates between magic and 
evolution thus bringing to the fore new scientific methods resulting from the advent of 
Darwinism” (112). Richard Somerset argues that Buckley’s narrative recasts natural 
history in “matronly tones,” seeking “a compromise outlook that would balance and 
reconcile the virile virtue of activism with the feminine virtues of love and devotion” 
(n.pag.). He also identifies an ethos of romanticizing science that had taken root in the 
nineteenth century:  
The fact is that the Romantics’ effort to redeem Man’s soul from the mechanising 
clutches of the Enlightenment had become so thoroughly integrated as to become 
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a commonplace of Victorian ethics, and was routinely displayed by mainstream 
writers and novelists such as Thomas Carlyle or Charles Dickens. British natural 
science therefore sought to rid itself of potentially damaging associations with 
materialism and mechanistic philosophies, and by the end of the century, this 
value system had become so pervasive that the promoters of Science were more 
or less obliged to find ways of selling their goods in essentially moral terms. This 
is why we find Buckley assuring her readers that learning science, if only we do it 
according to the proper method, will not only make us wise and knowledgeable, 
but strong and good too. (N.pag.) 
 Somerset’s focus on Buckley’s position as one of compromise is important, though I 
posit her “feminizing” nature may have resulted from the lingering exigencies of 
Victorian gender expectations for women writers, rather than Buckley’s submission to the 
market forces that called for all works to voice rebuttals to materialist science if they 
were to find an audience. Buckley’s texts still fit within the generic tradition of maternal 
tales of morality, but I do not read her as a radical moralist seeking to reform Darwinian 
theories for the young generation.  
Writing about women’s popularizations of science in the early nineteenth century, 
Greg Myers’s “Science for Women and Children: the Dialogue of Popular Science in the 
Nineteenth Century” (1989) focuses on the dialogue form many popularizations took. 
Though the dialogue form had a long history for discussing scientific topics in a way that 
could distance the writer from controversy (the dialogues of Galileo, for example), Myers 
demonstrates how later forms of dialogue divide public and scientific knowledge, 
creating a “lower form of science” for women and children (173). Instead of being 
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dialectical and exploratory, debating two sides of an issue, the kinds of dialogues women 
wrote—coming by way of French dialogues that were more like catechism—instead 
suggested a hierarchical relationship between knowledge and ignorance. Myers shows the 
dialogue sets readers up to be the consumers of scientific knowledge.  
Not so Gatty and Buckley, however. Gatty’s child characters are observers and 
investigators who ask questions; examine plants, animals, and insects of the fields; and 
look through microscopes at tiny organisms. Buckley’s students watch her 
demonstrations and are prompted to try their hands at the experiments as well. The 
passive dialogue form would have been ill-fitting if they had chosen it, even if it was 
falling out of fashion as well. 
Margaret Gatty and Arabella Buckley diverged from the previously popular “familiar 
format” found in governess books, and instead introduced their audiences to scientific 
study using the conventions of fable and fairy tale, narrative strategies that would have 
been familiar to young readers and adults alike. A fantastical literary genre could serve as 
entry into a way of thinking about nature via metaphor, a mode of critical thought crucial 
for understanding invisible physical forces and the actions of nature over unfathomable 
spans of time. Models and metaphors have long been vital tools for scientists trying to 
discern the causes and effects of natural phenomena.34 Through such analogical thinking, 
                                                
34 During his days as a Cambridge Apostle in the early 1850s, James Clerk Maxwell, for 
example, considered physical analogies to be critical to exploring epistemological possibilities. In 
his essay “Analogies in Nature,” Maxwell describes the importance of physical analogies as a 
way not just of describing scientific knowledge, but of discovering it. For Maxwell, poetry and 
punning, too, were means of meditating on physical analogies within a non-scientific discourse. 
See Daniel Brown, Poetry of Victorian Scientists, pages 56-58. Jeanne Fahnestock traces how 
metaphor as an epistemological construct came to dominate rhetorical studies of science in 
Rhetorical Figures in Science, 4-6. In examining other rhetorical figures that appear in Gatty’s 
and Buckley’s tales, I am heavily indebted to Fahnestock’s book. 
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scientists and popularizers alike forged connections between seemingly unrelated 
branches of physical science.35 First, then, these fables and fairy tales offer one insight 
according to the metaphors and analogies they use to frame scientific inquiry; that is, 
using fairies as an analogy helps young readers begin to find similarities in function or 
operation. These analogies are important, and the present chapter will consider many of 
them in the pages to follow: for example, the efficacy of likening fairies to forces, or a 
microscope’s literal use in seeing organisms otherwise invisible to the naked eye and the 
instrument’s figurative importance in suggesting one should believe in more than simply 
what one can see. Yet while examining such analogies proves useful in outlining how 
Gatty and Buckley highlighted similarities in scientific and religious enterprises using 
fable and fairy tale, the frictions that emerge when applying these genres to science are 
likewise illuminating, shedding light on what the generic conventions were and how ill-
fitting they might be for scientific instruction. That is, finding moments of disjunction 
and tension likewise point to the difficulties Victorian scientists and science writers faced 
when explaining new knowledge to wide audiences. 
                                                
35 “Popularizer” and “popularization” are vexed terms within the history of science, 
connoting not simply science aimed at the broad public—hence popular in the most democratic 
sense as science “for the people”—but also watered-down science, bereft of some of its accuracy 
and rigor. When I use the term popularizer, I use it in the first sense of someone who speaks to an 
audience outside the scientific community. Some famous scientists were popularizers as well, like 
John Tyndall; some popularizers were also scientists or mathematicians, like Mary Somerville. 
When speaking of the texts themselves, I will most often use the term “accommodation,” a word 
Jeanne Fahnestock suggests in its less pejorative meaning as a work that tailors the delivery of a 
scientific concept for a particular audience. Ralph O’Connor advocates for the rehabilitation of 
the terms “popular science” and “popularization” within the history of science community, 
arguing that “popular science” is an umbrella category, not a heuristic tool, and serves as a 
helpful shorthand for representing material to be “analyzed, defamiliarized, made richer” (340) 
For O’Connor, the problem lies not in the terminology itself but the “inflexible manner in which 
we often use it” (342). 
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Gatty’s Parables are a clear application of natural theology, yet in form the stories 
depart from established texts within a tradition established in the eighteenth century. 
Gatty’s parables rework the fable genre because for her, it was the most salient genre for 
combining natural history and moral instruction, with the change—from the dialogue 
format—that the audience was invited to compare the behaviors of the animals depicted 
with their own observations, observations that they could in turn apply to themselves to 
guide behavior and help make moral decisions. In turn, Gatty’s influence can be traced in 
books by successors like Lewis Carroll, Charles Kingsley, and Rudyard Kipling, whose 
stories feature animal protagonists that make sense—or nonsense—of their surroundings 
or defining characteristics. Similarly, Buckley’s Fairy-Land of Science demonstrates how 
the fairy tale genre could help young students make sense of an increasingly complex and 
professional realm of physical science. Consistent with her spiritualist ideas, Fairy-Land 
offered Buckley’s readers a magical setting in which to compare how invisible forces act. 
Though Buckley’s text is similar to numerous earlier texts aiming to evoke wonder as an 
affective appeal for the study of science, it likewise illustrates the changing format 
science texts would take in later decades, using diagrams not just of organisms or light 
through a prism, but illustrations of the laboratory demonstrations themselves. The 
illustrations importantly suggest how students might conduct these experiments 
themselves, thus pointing them down the road to becoming practitioners in adulthood. A 
marked feature of Parables and Fairy-Land is the participatory quality of the scientific 
study both texts describe. 
Historians of science have long realized that popularizations of science were 
influential: as critics like Greg Myers have argued, popularizations “shaped the non-
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scientists’ knowledge of science more than the original works of scientists; more than 
that, they shaped non-scientists’ views of scientific authority” (171). The importance of 
Gatty and Buckley to historians of science, then, are the nuances of texts that blur the 
lines between natural theology to secular science. While most British women science 
writers were more aligned with clergymen than with secular science (Lightman Victorian 
Popularizers 97), Gatty’s and Buckley’s approaches likewise find common ground with 
secularly-minded scientists like John Tyndall in their evocation of wonder and the use of 
the imagination so that reason and observation will follow. To educators, then, their work 
can be valued for their keen insight into the practice of teaching itself, of a pedagogy 
capturing students’ interest, asking probing questions, requiring abstract thought as well 
as concrete observation or deduction, and synthesis. To feminist literary critics, Gatty’s 
and Buckley’s importance stands within their contributions to an understudied genre of 
writing within the nineteenth-century literary tradition. These texts belong in a literary 
history of scientific education, marking both consistencies and departures from earlier 
works and signaling directions instructive texts would take thereafter. These works stand 
out not only among male science writers but also among female popularizers frequently 
read during the nineteenth century. 
Nature’s Parables 
Called one of the most popular series of books in the latter half of the nineteenth 
century,36 Parables from Nature first appeared in 1855 as a collection of eight tales 
featuring caterpillars and crickets, bees and birds, a bookworm and a will-o’-the-wisp, 
flowers, seaweed, and a handful of human characters, both children and adults. Four 
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more series of new tales followed in 1857, 1861, 1864, and 1871, containing a total of 
thirty-seven stories by the time Gatty concluded writing them (just two years before her 
death). The first, third, and fifth series each contain eight stories; series two contains just 
six, and series four comprises seven. Many collected editions containing multiple series 
also went into publication, while some organizations like the Society for Promoting 
Christian Knowledge (SPCK) chose smaller selections of the most Christian tales for 
publication under their own auspices.37 Likewise, American publishers made their own 
editorial selections. While Gatty illustrated the first series of Parables herself, later 
editions feature illustrations by notable Victorian artists, including John Tenniel and Pre-
Raphaelites William Holman Hunt and Edward Burne Jones. In later editions of the 
Parables, Gatty began adding explanatory notes containing descriptions of natural history 
at the ends of the volumes.  
These explanatory notes raise a number of questions about how to characterize the 
Parables as a work of scientific accommodation and what factors prompted the notes’ 
inclusion. Their addition suggests a change in the exigencies of writing natural history 
stories for an audience of children and their parents or guardians. A number of editions 
are available digitally for scholarly study, yet it remains difficult to trace when Gatty 
began appending these natural history notes to her volumes without traveling to a number 
of international archival collections. I believe such a study would prove fruitful, yet a full 
history of the book lies beyond the scope of this chapter. For the present, however, I can 
locate Gatty’s appended notes in volumes published by Bell and Daldy as early as 1865, 
containing the stories from the third and fourth series (GoogleBooks), and an 1868 
                                                                                                                                            
36 See, e.g., Barbara Gates, Kindred Nature, 50. 
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edition containing stories from the first and second (HathiTrust).38 When discussing the 
impact of the notes, I use the textual evidence I have gathered to date and limit the 
application of my argument to the mid-1860s and thereafter. 
In form, Gatty’s Parables from Nature combine two genres that in the nineteenth 
century would likely have been understood as distinct: parables and beast fables (also 
known as apologues). Some present realistic human situations in which the lesson comes 
via tacit analogy—as found in parables, while other tales display an abstract moral thesis 
or principle of human behavior via talking, anthropomorphized animals—as found in 
beast fables. Often the essence of the lesson is stated more or less explicitly in the 
characters’ dialogue, but it is not styled in verse like the Fables of La Fontaine nor 
delivered in Aesop’s epigrammatic form or in a list of intended lessons like those one 
finds regularly, for example, in the pages of Harriet Martineau’s Illustrations of Political 
Economy. Readers might also surmise the moral with the help of the stories’ epigraphs, 
many of which are Biblical passages or lines of poetry, especially by Tennyson, with 
some also by Milton, Goethe, and Pope. Some of Gatty’s tales are closer to a traditional 
parable form: they do not involve animal characters, they maintain a realistic setting and 
characters, and they respond to a specific situation, though Gatty relates the narrative in 
an allegorical fashion. 
The importance of moral instruction to Gatty is clear when a reader today considers 
the five series of Parables as a whole, for each tale includes a lesson readily accessible to 
young children. Like many of her predecessors who wrote for juvenile audiences since 
                                                                                                                                            
37 See Lovell-Smith 50 n. 13. 
38 Unless otherwise stated, citations to Parables from Nature are keyed to the facsimile text of 
the complete edition of all five series of stories, published by George Bell and Sons, 1880. 
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the eighteenth century, Gatty conforms to a tradition in which women—mothers, to be 
more precise—were considered the fount of moral knowledge and the seemingly 
“natural” source for such wisdom. But Gatty’s choice of parables as her preferred genre 
for moral instruction represents a departure from one tradition just as she turned to 
another for inspiration. That is, in applying the conventions of beast fables to her 
Parables, Gatty takes on more from the realm of fairy-land than from the catechism-like 
dialogues used by many women writers who preceded her. In her preface to the first 
volume of Parables, Gatty confesses the influence of Hans Christian Andersen, saying 
her first story, “A Lesson of Faith,” was written  
in an outburst of excessive admiration of Hans Andersen’s Fairy Tales, coupled 
with a regret that, although he had, in several cases, shown his power of drawing 
admirable morals from his exquisite peeps into nature, he had so often left his 
charming stories without an object or moral at all. Surely, was the thought, there 
either is, or may be devised, a moral in many more of the incidents of nature than 
Hans Andersen has traced; and on this view the “Lesson of Faith” was written—
an old story; for the ancients, with deep meaning, made the butterfly an emblem 
of immortality—yet, to familiarize the young with so beautiful an idea seemed no 
unworthy aim. (1855 ed., x) 
While Gatty points here to Andersen, her adherence to Paleyian natural theology is 
likewise evident in her suggestion that morals might, indeed ought to, be drawn from 
such “exquisite peeps into nature.” Such moral instruction is present throughout Gatty’s 
corpus. Her career in fiction began, in fact, in 1851 with a tale titled “The Fairy 
Godmothers,” a story about the individual gifts bestowed by fairies on three little girls 
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and culminating in the lesson that “love of employment” was the best gift to receive; and 
her last publication was A Book of Emblems, with Interpretations Thereof (1872). Morals, 
though, were but half of Gatty’s aim in the Parables: virtue was to be found likewise in 
the study of nature, a manifestation of divine creation.  
Gatty’s text thus aims to achieve a dual purpose: the parables instruct children toward 
virtuous behavior while providing fragments of accurate natural history and summaries of 
current debates, such as whether a zoophyte was a plant or animal. Many parables explain 
curious, commonly misunderstood phenomena like the light of an ignus fatuus, or will o’ 
the wisp in the first series; or the red algae found in remote, snowy regions like the 
heights of Mont Blanc in the third series. Throughout the Parables, sight is paramount in 
learning about the natural order. Crucial to all of the lessons is the message that good 
children, especially those aspiring to becoming scientists, must learn how to see the 
world, and that a scientist’s vision involves not just physical, but also metaphysical sight. 
Natural theology is a dominant theme: reading nature carefully and in detail helps the 
naturalist discern divine order and moral law, both of which can help the learner grow 
closer to the divine creator—or at least try to. 
But while identifying natural theology within Gatty’s Parables may be a 
commonplace within circles of Victorian literature and science scholars, the importance 
of the Gatty’s chosen genre for her spiritual-scientific instruction has not been fully 
appreciated. Certainly Gatty appears within histories of Victorian scientific 
popularization, but our accounts need to consider more closely how her books engage 
within the scientific debates of the period. Examining her scientific fables as parables 
shows her orthodox religious views; examining them as scientific texts illuminates the 
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nuances in this kind of transmission among nineteenth-century audiences, and it shows 
the degree to which Gatty grew uncomfortable with secular scientific explanations. In 
years following the publication of Darwin’s Origin, Gatty’s Parables favor moral 
education over and above the delivery of scientific lessons. 
To illustrate what kind of stories these Parables are, I have selected two: “A Lesson 
of Faith,” the tale that opens the very first series in 1855 and shows quickly the kind of 
moral lessons Gatty contains elsewhere; and “Inferior Animals,” a story found in the third 
series of 1861 that, while still allegorical, most explicitly engages with the evolutionary 
controversy of the day. “Inferior Animals” is striking for ways it exceeds the kinds of 
generic boundaries Gatty adheres to elsewhere and drifts even into the realm of fairy tale, 
not unlike the nonsensical Wonderland of her contemporary, Lewis Carroll, or the 
allegorical satire found in George Orwell’s Animal Farm in the twentieth century. Both 
of the selected series of Parables originally appeared without explanatory natural history 
notes appended, so I will also examine how the selected fables change for a reader when 
notes are present. We might surmise that Gatty added them to augment the reader’s 
knowledge and provide paths for additional study, but by including them in her volumes, 
the tensions between religious and secular science become increasingly visible. 
“A Lesson of Faith” tells the tale of a young caterpillar who unexpectedly finds 
herself a nursemaid to a butterfly’s eggs in response to the latter’s dying request, having 
given no helpful instructions about their care before she passes away. With seemingly no 
option now but to watch over the eggs, the young caterpillar decides to ask the advice of 
the wisest animal she can think of, a lark, musing “that because he went up so high, and 
nobody knew where he went to, he must be very clever, and know a great deal; for to go 
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up very high (which she could never do) was the caterpillar’s idea of perfect glory” (3). 
The lark travels far and wide, returning with the surprising knowledge that the young 
eggs will in fact hatch into caterpillars—not butterflies, which had been both the dying 
butterfly’s and caterpillar’s expectation—and that they will find nourishment on the very 
cabbage leaves where the caterpillar has been standing vigil over her charges. Even as 
she learns this fortunate news, the eggs hatch and the tiny caterpillars happily begin 
munching away at the plant. The nightingale continues to relay the knowledge he’s 
gleaned on his travels and informs the caterpillar that she, too, will someday transform 
into a butterfly. The caterpillar is incredulous at first, but upon seeing the hatched young 
caterpillars, “shame and amazement filled our green friend’s heart, but joy soon followed; 
for, as the first wonder was possible, the second might be so too” (6). For the rest of her 
days as a caterpillar, she talks about how she will someday become a butterfly, despite 
her relations’ disbelief. The story concludes with the caterpillar-turned-butterfly’s 
continued faith facing her own death, and her trust that more wonders might yet be 
possible. 
The story’s moral is clearly outlined in the trope of transformation from caterpillar to 
chrysalis to butterfly. In essence, this is a conversion story: it follows in the same vein, 
for example, as Saul’s conversion to Christianity to become St. Paul. For a young reader, 
the butterfly is an accessible emblem of faith and resurrection, and the butterfly’s lines 
concluding the story make the message explicit: “I have known many wonders—I have 
faith—I can trust even now for what shall come next!” (6). Gatty’s epigraph, too, 
articulates the notion of resurrection. The quoted lines come from Job 14:14: “If a man 
die, shall he live again? All the days of my appointed time will I wait, till my change 
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come” (1). Thus the natural theological interpretation of the tale is apparent in the reading 
of caterpillar/butterfly metamorphosis as symbol of mortality and afterlife in the 
Christian belief system. One reads the butterfly in nature as a means to discover or 
discern a divine plan for human existence and trust in the promised afterlife of Christian 
theology. 
But what of this tale’s instruction in natural history? In the 1855 volume, the only 
textual clues a young reader might notice about caterpillars and butterflies are the 
former’s choice of cabbage-plant leaves for food versus the butterfly’s nourishment in 
“honey out of flowers,” and the presence of “gold dust” the butterfly mother shakes off as 
compensation for the caterpillar for caring for the eggs. The dying butterfly tells the 
caterpillar to expect young butterflies to hatch, but of course her supposition is false. The 
life cycle of butterflies is an inherent, integral part of the narrative, but its importance lies 
in its allegorical meaning rather than in a close study of the creatures themselves.  
More becomes clear with Gatty’s appended notes, which transform this tale of natural 
theology into a complement for natural history, even a mnemonic device a young reader 
might recall in later studies. The notes are keyed to specific passages in the text, so they 
appear as technical annotations. In the notes to “A Lesson of Faith,” a reader learns the 
butterfly in question is the female Pieris rapae, the common “cabbage butterfly,” whose 
wings are “of a creamy white color outside; the front ones with two largish black spots 
upon them, the hind ones with one. There is also a dark patch at the outer corner of each 
front wing, and both wings are speckled into a grayish hue near the body. Underneath, the 
hind wings are a pale yellow, and there is a yellow patch in the outer corner of the front 
ones” (423). Gatty also tells her readers about the color composition of the caterpillar, 
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which is the larval stage of the cabbage butterfly; that the food plant of this species is the 
cabbage; how these larvae differ in food sources from other species; that readers might 
find additional knowledge about a butterfly’s physiology—including its ability to suck 
juices from flowers—from William Kirby and William Spence’s Introduction to 
Entomology (1815); and how the “gold dust” of the story is actually composed of the 
rubbed off, minute scales that cover a butterfly’s wings and are the source of the 
scientific name Lepidoptera, meaning “scaly-winged” (424-5). Gatty also anticipates a 
reader’s possible objection that a lark might, in fact, eat a caterpillar like the story’s 
heroine. On this point, Gatty defers to ornithologist John Gould, who asserts that while 
larks do eat very small insects and larvae, they would “certainly” not eat “a large one.” 
When giving additional information about the lark, Gatty also directs her audience to 
Gilbert White’s Natural History and Antiquities of Selbourne (1789). Finally, Gatty ends 
her notes with a passage returning to the moral lesson undergirding the parable, quoting 
lines by Sir Thomas Browne in his Religio Medici (1642) about the “two books”: the 
book of God and the book of Nature. 
In short, Gatty’s notes provide considerably more detail than the original story, and 
they incorporate a number of other sources a reader might consult to study the topics 
further. Paired together, the story and the notes supplement each other, working in 
tandem to provide both spiritual and scientific instruction. Yet they do not rest easily next 
to each other, as the presence of Gatty’s last note indicates. After providing details from 
authorities in entomology and ornithology, Gatty returns to Early Modern physician and 
philosopher Thomas Browne’s confessional memoir to reassert the religious exigencies 
for naturalist study. Gatty reminds her reader that this was St. Paul’s method, too, who 
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used the analogy of a seed’s decay before germination as indicative of the possibility of 
resurrection (426-7). Thus both her story and her notes conclude with a moral lesson, 
emphasizing the objective in looking to nature as a means of studying the divine. Gatty 
quotes Browne’s lines, “There is in these works of Nature, which seem to puzzle reason, 
something divine, and hath more in it than the eye of a common spectator can discover” 
(426). Browne’s lines encapsulate the paradox with which Gatty’s parables and notes 
grapple: a tension between getting “closer to God” through an understanding of nature, 
yet finding oneself at an even greater distance because of an inability to bridge the gap 
between human and divine. Gatty’s Parables are invested in perpetuating this paradox, 
rather than resolving it, however. Gatty’s tales refuse the notion that empiricism and 
scientific theories might ever fill the gap between human experience and the divine. 
Gatty’s story “Inferior Animals,” found in her Third Series of 1861, illustrates this 
refusal well. Beginning with an epigraph containing lines from Goethe (“How? when?and 
whence? The gods give no reply. / Let so it is suffice, and cease to question why”),39 the 
story describes a congregation of rooks who gather together in an open field and debate 
the origin of man. Unlike “A Lesson of Faith,” the narrative of “Inferior Animals” has a 
complicated structure that blends fairy tale elements with an intrusive, editorializing 
narrative voice, sometimes addressing an implied reader, and other times speaking to that 
reader as if he or she is a companion in the tale itself. The story begins in medias res, 
asking “What do they say?—what do they say?—what do they say?—” (213). The 
opening of the story sets the scene, but rather than begin with the creatures’ conversation, 
as happens in many other tales within the Parables, the opening pages compare the noisy 
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cawing of rooks with the “noise” of human debate and suggest that the latter is, in fact, 
the more discordant of the two. “If you never thought of this before O reader,” Gatty 
writes, 
Think of it now, and take an early opportunity of listening, and judging for 
yourself. Listen, not as listening to the meaning of what is uttered, but to the mass 
of noise as mere noise. Listen to it, as you might imagine a rook to do, ignorant of 
human speech, and judging only of the hubbub of sounds; and then own to 
yourself—for conscience will force you to do so—that there is neither sweetness 
nor sublimity, neither melody nor majesty, in the shouting, and piping, and 
whistling, and hissing, and barking, of closely intermixed human voices and 
laughter. (214) 
The narrator asks this comparison of the reader to demonstrate that however much our 
human instinct is to forge bonds and communicate with other species, our efforts will be 
for naught. Gatty’s speaker argues, “Alas, for the barriers which lie so mysteriously 
between us and the other creatures among whom we are born, and pass our short 
existence upon earth!—Alas!—for a desire for intercommunion is one of the strong 
instincts of our nature, and yet it is one which, as regards all the rest of creation but our 
human fellow-beings, we have to unlearn from babyhood” (214). The story asserts a 
hierarchy between human and nonhuman animals, suggesting there is little surprise that 
lower species cannot understand the higher, yet it seems incredible that a higher species 
should never be able to cross the chasm of understanding one lower. To illustrate this 
                                                                                                                                            
39 There may be an error in Gatty’s quotation here. A GoogleBooks search for the lines finds 
the following in The Wisdom of Goethe instead: “How?—when?—and where?—the gods give no 
reply;/ What they will do, they do: nor heed your Why?” 
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lesson, then, Gatty provides the story of the rooks, an allegory of the evolutionary theory 
debates in which the rooks conclude that man, “a featherless, thin-skinned biped,” is but a 
degenerate rook: “Like us they were covered with feathers, like us lived in trees, flew 
instead of walking, roosted instead of squatting in stone boxes, and were happy and 
contented as we are now!” (223). Gatty’s satire is two-fold: first, she targets evolutionary 
theory itself; second, she refutes the greater premise that knowledge of species 
development would be possible, dismissing the value even of asking such a question. The 
timing of Gatty’s Third Series of Parables in 1861, and its frequent inclusion of skeptical 
human characters rather than Christian believers, places it in a cultural moment that not 
only saw the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 1859 but also the 1860 
Oxford meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (BAAS), 
where T. H. Huxley famously attacked Bishop Samuel Wilberforce during a debate about 
human evolution (Weber 428). The raucous debate among the rooks, with their cawing 
interruptions and hopping, coupled with the rook-speaker’s references to his colleagues 
present in the group, “Mr. Grey-legs,” “Mr. Yellow-beak,” and “Mr. Raven-wing,” also 
suggest Gatty had a professional science meeting like the BAAS in mind. 
 Where the imagined world of other parables is consistent and readers are invited 
to immerse themselves in the conversations of animals, “Inferior Animals” betrays the 
generic boundaries of a true fairy story. Her speaker is first simply an editorial voice, 
offering a decided opinion on the question of epistemology: “from the first moment of 
waking to conscious thought, we find ourselves in a country where all utterances but our 
own are to us a blank; all the creatures strange; all life unintelligible, both in its beginning 
and its end: all the present, as well as the past and future, a mystery” (216). This mystery 
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is, for the speaker of “Inferior Animals,” the ultimate answer toward which inquiry will 
end, and the reason for which faith, rather than science is needed. Only children, Gatty’s 
speaker suggests, can cross the gulf between species and commune with animals in their 
imaginations. Thus the speaker addresses her audience, whom the following summons 
identifies not as children but fellow adult readers:  
Reader, can you hear this and remain unmoved, or shall you and I become 
children in heart once more? Come! Own with me how hateful were the lessons 
which undeceived us from our earlier instincts of faith and sweet companionship 
with all created things: and let us go forth together, and for a while forget such 
teaching. 
 Hand in hand, in the dear confiding way which only children use, let us go 
forth into the fields, and read the hidden secrets of the world. Clasp mine firmly 
as I clasp yours. See, there is magic in the action itself! So we placed our hands in 
those of our parents; so our children love to place theirs in our own. So, then, 
even so, let us two walk trustingly and lovingly together for a while, and join 
again the broken threads of old feelings, wishes, friendships, and hopes. (216) 
Gatty invites the adult reader to imagine herself the narrator’s companion in a return to 
childhood. In reaching out her hand, Gatty’s narrator asks the reader to be on her side, an 
ally in the debate that follows. The pair move toward the congregation of rooks in the 
field, with the narrator suggesting the reader “cower down here…by this hole in the 
hedge” where “the honeysuckle is twined in the thorn above our heads, and is giving out 
its scent around us, as if to bid us welcome” (217). At first, the human pair makes no 
sense of the gathering, and the speaker laments that “nature remains mute” and enjoins 
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philosophers to answer the seemingly simple question of what the rooks are saying. The 
narrator’s words to such philosophers become heated: “—you lights of the world, with 
your books and papers and diagrams, and collected facts, and self-confidence unlimited! 
You who turn the bull’s eye of your miserable lanthorns upon isolated corners of the 
universe, and fancy you are sitting in the supreme light of creative knowledge!…Tell me 
what the rooks are doing and saying; those inferior animals about whom you, in your 
wisdom, ought to know everything” (217-18). Then, in a passage full of repeated 
(anaphoric) phrases, Gatty’s speaker commands the philosopher to respond to a series of 
inquiries about the behavior of these rooks: 
 Tell me what these grand assemblies are for; tell me how they are called; tell 
me how they are conducted; tell me by what message the distant colonies are 
warned of the particular spot and hour of meeting. Tell me by what rules the place 
is chosen. Tell me how the messenger is instructed. Tell me by what means he 
delivers his message. Tell me why they meet on level ground and walk like men, 
and not rather in their own deep woods, where they might fly and roost on 
branches, and run no danger, and need no guard?  
 Tell me what do they say, what do they say, what do they say, when they 
meet at last, and whether they are there for business or for play. Tell me these 
things, and then I will listen to you when you point out to me the counsels and the 
workings of the Creator of rooks and men. (218) 
The repetitions of “tell me” and “what do they say” serve both as emphasis for effect, but 
they also mimic the noise of the rooks: repeated again and again, the phrases might begin 
to lose their meaning beyond the sounds of the words. Gatty’s questions are rhetorical, 
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too, though readers today might recognize them as typical of anthropological and 
zoological field research. But to Gatty’s audience, they may have seemed beyond the 
realm of study.  
 Thus the main body of the story, where the rooks debate the development and 
degeneration of humanity, is framed in the style of fairy-story as the narrator suddenly 
hears what the birds are saying and enters into a new, dream-like realm: “Have my senses 
left me, or have I received another? Any how the spell is broken at last, and language, 
language, language resounds on every side!” (219).40 Yet Gatty’s story inverts fairy tale 
convention here, suggesting the veil between human and rook communication was the 
enchantment, now broken, rather than a fairy tale hero’s more typical entry into a 
fantastical realm via the introduction of magic. By the end of the tale, the narrator loses 
her sense of reality and fantasy. Her first-person speaker becomes overwhelmed at the 
rook’s argument, which causes her distress and eventually rouses her from her daydream: 
“What silence is this, which has cut short the sentence, and which neither their caws nor 
the voice of the speaker break again? How is this?—where am I?—Do I wake or dream?” 
(233). In waking from her reverie, Gatty’s speaker echoes Keats’s concluding lines in 
“Ode to a Nightingale”: “Was it a vision or a waking dream?/ Fled is that music:—Do I 
wake or sleep?” Instead of following Darwinian evolutionary theories, Gatty’s tale looks 
back to Romantic notions of nature and a contemplation of birdsong that encourages self-
reflection and consolation. Though unlike the sublime imagery of Somerville and Byron, 
                                                
40 In the twentieth century, J.R.R. Tolkien would argue that use of a dream-like state to 
explain away an encounter or experience in fairy-land transgresses the genre of a true fairy-story: 
“But if a waking writer tells you that his tale is only a thing imagined in his sleep, he cheats 
deliberately the primal desire at the heart of Faërie: the realization, independent of the conceiving 
mind, of imagined wonder” (“On Fairy-Stories,” 116). 
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Gatty’s tale hearkens back to Romantic notions of science. Interestingly, too, Gatty’s 
perspective of holding on to both empiricism and faith seems to be in accord with 
Keatsian negative capability: there seems to come point in her sense of natural history 
knowledge when one must accept a sense of ease with uncertainty and not to reach for 
certitude.41 Each of the three volumes following publication of Origin emphasizes 
religious faith when faced with unknown circumstances, yet while empiricism never truly 
dominates, neither does it fall by the wayside: the Parables encourage observation and 
measurement. In Gatty’s tales, empiricism must, however, yield when human perception 
reaches its limits and then trust in a higher purpose. “Inferior Animals” brings this 
perspective into sharp relief. 
  Given the anti-evolutionary stance and opposition to materialist science 
undergirding “Inferior Animals,” it is not surprising that the explanatory notes differ 
markedly from the kind Gatty provides for “A Lesson of Faith.” Here, it would seem that 
Gatty’s notes pointedly avoid providing too much detail about the physiology and 
behavior of rooks. To do so would seem counter to the impact of her long sequence of 
rhetorical questions in the tale itself. Instead, the notes describe an anecdotal story about 
the care of rooks and give just a passing description containing the binomial 
nomenclature of Linnaean taxonomy: “The rook (Corvus frugilegus) is considered the 
chief English representative of the crow race (Corvidae), as the Hooded Crow (Corvus 
cornix) is in Scandinavia and the Isles of Scotland” (476). Gatty then acknowledges her 
story’s similarity to the writings of John Henry Newman but affirms she had not had 
them in mind at the time of writing the story. She concludes the notes with the passage 
                                                
41 See Keats’s letter to George and Thomas Keats, 21, ?27 December, 1817. 
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from Newman.  Thus again, Gatty’s notes conclude with a religious element rather than a 
scientific one.42  
Gatty’s natural theology consistently asserts the existence of an impermeable 
boundary between the natural and spiritual worlds; consequently her stories feature the 
trope of the eye: the importance of both physical and metaphysical, or spiritual, vision 
appears throughout the course of the Parables. The spiritual vision she seeks to inculcate 
in her readers becomes, too, part of her form insofar as she uses animals as her 
interlocutors. Readers must imagine such fantastical scenes playing out, just as the 
creatures themselves imagine worlds beyond their own limited sensory perceptions. In 
presenting the conversations of animals, however, Gatty’s human characters are never 
truly auditors of what the natural world’s speakers are saying. In exceptions like “Inferior 
Animals,” the ability is explained away as a dream-state. By giving creatures like birds 
and insects, or inanimate objects like water vapor or the ocean speech, Gatty’s text 
suggests that nature is always communicating—but not via language. As in William 
Cullen Bryant’s “Thanatopsis” (1811), which opens with “To him in the love of nature 
holds/ Communion with her visible forms, she speaks a various language,” Gatty’s nature 
communicates through the visible. Her text must constantly—if not consistently—
mediate between the auditory and the visual. Though her readers may learn via the 
language of her text, the natural world must be interpreted by other human senses, usually 
sight. 
                                                
42 Given Newman’s controversial reputation as one of the leaders of the Oxford Movement 
and his shift from the Church of England to the Roman Catholic church, the religious element is a 
highly fraught one as well. 
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 Turning now to Arabella Buckley’s The Fairy-Land of Science, a very different 
shape to scientific education appears, one still saturated with vision and wonder yet far 
more expansive and technical in its delivery. 
Science’s Fairy-Land 
 In the spring of 1878, Arabella Buckley delivered a series of lectures on science to 
an audience of children in St. John’s Wood, London. Receiving a favorable response to 
the lectures and numerous requests to commit them to a printed book, she published The 
Fairy-Land of Science in 1879. Buckley’s innovation in this book was the conceit of a 
fairy tale frame: a conceptual linking device that would figuratively materialize the 
invisible, excite curiosity, and stimulate an affectionate desire to learn more about 
science. The volume contains ten chapters, or lectures: “The Fairy-Land of Science: How 
to Enter It; How to Use It; How to Enjoy it”; “Sunbeams and the Work They Do”; “The 
Aerial Ocean in Which We Live”; “A Drop of Water on Its Travels”; “The Two Great 
Sculptors—Water and Ice”; “The Voices of Nature and How We Hear Them”; “The Life 
of a Primrose”; “The History of a Piece of Coal”; “Bees in the Hive”; and “Bees and 
Flowers.” Illustrations and diagrams appear throughout the volume. The book’s 
frontispiece shows a dramatic glacial moraine with three tiny figures in the foreground, 
suggesting the magnitude of such a scene. Each chapter begins with an illustration that is 
rather more fanciful: the opening chapter’s vignette, for instance, juxtaposes two images 
within a single frame: a frozen landscape on one side, and in the other, a scene depicting 
a knight awakening a maiden in her chamber—the awakening of Sleeping Beauty. The 
significance of this illustration will be discussed in greater detail below. In adapting her 
oral lectures to written lessons, Buckley found she needed to rewrite them entirely to be 
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effective on the page (Gates, “Introduction” vi). Most chapters follow a similar structure: 
an opening illustration; then metadiscourse reviewing the previous lectures and 
previewing what will come in the next five lectures, namely the effects of physical 
phenomena on living creatures; and then a transition to the subject of the current lecture. 
The text also demonstrates thereafter the kind of science classroom pedagogy a reader 
today would also recognize: preliminary questions, a physical demonstration (shown via 
illustrations in the printed text) as a model, then an explanation and expansion of that 
model to apply to phenomena on the macro scale.  
 Both the prose style and arrangement of the text demonstrate Buckley’s aims in 
transcribing her lectures for a wider public: to be both “a source of pleasure to a wider 
circle of young people” and to “awaken in them a love of nature and of the study of 
science” (v). “Love” is the key element here. Buckley ardently hopes her audience will 
develop an affection for the natural world and, by extension, pleasure in studying natural 
laws. In other words, Buckley uses affect—here, the evocation of wonder—as a 
pedagogical strategy to interest her readers. In evoking an excitement about learning 
science, Buckley’s use of fairies as characters to represent forces is foremost a tactic of 
metaphor, yet it also suggests readers should become aware of a kind of magic in the 
laws of the universe: the invisible forces of heat, evaporation, conduction, magnetism. 
That tactic of metaphor is crucial for developing students’ capacity for understanding 
analogy and developing models. Though Buckley’s fairy-land is a fanciful metaphor, the 
potential to shape a scientific acumen—helping children develop the capacity for abstract 
thought—is a pressing need in a science classroom. Modern (i.e., twentieth and twenty-
first century) science relies on the use of theoretical models to consider the physical 
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operation of phenomena that cannot be apprehended by naked human senses. So 
Buckley’s introduction to The Fairy-land of Science is her way of providing an entry 
point into new material: practicing the rhetorical strategy of known-new argument, that 
is, starting with known information as a means of familiarizing the audience with the new 
material to come. 
 In The Fairy-Land of Science, Buckley relies upon the conventions of fantasy and 
folk tale, primarily the notion of invisible fairies. In choosing fairies as her conceit, 
Buckley may have been trading on Victorian popular appetites for fairy tales. Christina 
Rossetti’s “Goblin Market” had appeared in 1862, and Macmillan’s Magazine published 
her poem “The Prince Who Came Too Late” (later, “The Prince’s Progress”) in May 
1863, three months after it had concluded the serialization of Charles Kingsley’s The 
Water-Babies. John Ruskin had written the introduction to the Grimms’ German Popular 
Stories in 1868; his own The King of the Golden River was published in 1851. The 
magazine Good Words for the Young began publication in 1868 and included tales like 
Lady Frances Verney’s “King Arthur’s Boar Hunt: An Ancient British Fairy Tale” and 
George MacDonald’s “The Princess and the Goblin” in the same 1871 volume. Dinah 
Mulock Craik’s “Last News of the Fairies” was published here in 1870.  George 
MacDonald’s fairy tale novella, The Princess and the Goblin was published in 1872.43 
With an abundance of fairy stories in print, Buckley could be confident in her audience’s 
familiarity with the conventions of the genre. 
                                                
43 For more on late-Victorian fairy-tales, see Caroline Sumpter, The Victorian Press and the 
Fairy Tale (2008) and Jason Marc Harris’s Folklore and the Fantastic in Nineteenth-Century 
British Fiction (2008). 
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The Fairy-Land of Science takes its inspiration from fairy tales, yet it is not a work 
that actually fits within the genre; like Gatty, Buckley adapts form to her own ends. The 
folkloric definition of fairy tale, what the Germans call Märchen, is a folktale that 
involves a succession of motifs or episodes. These episodes take place in an unreal world 
lacking a definite locality and time—the “once upon a time, in a land far, far away” 
opening, for instance—and the tales are populated with character types who often have 
magical powers or experience marvelous encounters (Harris 4). In Folklore and the 
Fantastic in Nineteenth-Century British Fiction (2008), Jason Marc Harris distinguishes 
between motifs and tale-types: a fairy godmother is an example of a motif; “Cinderella” 
is a tale-type. He also uses the term “folk metaphysics” to describe “folkloric 
assumptions about how the supernatural engages with the material world” (viii). What is 
supernatural in a fairy tale becomes the explained physics in Buckley’s volume. She does 
not rely on the genre of fairy tales—fairy tales do not guide the structure or contain 
motifs except for fairies—but rather on folk metaphysics: “the rules, behaviors, powers, 
tendencies, and borders of the spiritual world implied by popular beliefs” (Harris 5). That 
is, Buckley observes that the enchantment a fairy tale offers is the notion that magical 
things can happen without human intervention or beyond sensory experience. Gatty, on 
the other hand, includes the motifs of fairy tale and fable: the trickster, mentor, mother, or 
villain. The difference between Gatty’s and Buckley’s chosen genres, then, is a difference 
between the familiar and the strange: Gatty’s tales include familiar motifs so that the 
moral questions and their implied responses are clear; Buckley’s lessons instead highlight 
the unexpected and mysterious workings of invisible laws and forces. 
 96 
 Put into today’s understanding of fairy tales, which we most often think of as taking 
place in unfamiliar, distant realms, where the laws of nature seem to work differently, 
Buckley’s volume—especially her introduction to the lectures—both familiarizes and 
defamiliarizes the physical world. In comparing forces to fairies, she acknowledges they 
are immaterial. Yet in asking students to imagine fairies—diminutive pixie-like creatures 
with wings, invisible yet active and revealing their work by their effects—she also 
materializes such forces.44 Barbara Gates, too, has argued that Fairy-Land offered 
Buckley the means to “comfortably use the language of illusion to describe a palpable 
world. In this way she could induce her readers to visualize the unseeable” 
(“Introduction” vii). Once her students could visualize the phenomena in question, they 
could then begin to interrogate its workings and understand it. 
 The first and sixth lectures illustrate best how Buckley’s Fairy-Land follows a 
pattern of first evoking wonder and curiosity, and then satisfying the student’s desire to 
learn the reason behind an initially perplexing phenomenon. The first, “The Fairy-Land 
of Science: How to Enter It; How to Use It; and How to Enjoy It,” demonstrates how 
Buckley shapes the fairy-story to her purpose and prepares her audience for the lessons to 
follow: this lecture provides the template for all of the subsequent chapters. The sixth, 
“The Voices of Nature, and How We Hear Them,” is both a typical lesson for the volume 
in its style and delivery, but as the halfway point in the volume, it also serves as 
Buckley’s pivot between lessons on pure physical science to lectures on animal life. It is 
also a marked contrast to Gatty’s “Inferior Animals” in its portrayal of what happens 
when one listens to sounds in nature. 
                                                
44 On this point, I owe thanks to Professor Meegan Kennedy for a question she asked about 
this seeming “materialization” of fairies following a paper I delivered at NAVSA at the 2013 
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 Buckley begins her volume with an introduction that aims to awaken her audience’s 
sense of wonder, the kind of childlike curiosity and awe felt when experiencing 
something magical. It is this affect—a combined feeling of curiosity, interest, and 
excitement—that Buckley suggests will support and guide a young student’s continued 
progress through scientific inquiry. She acknowledges that many children might look on 
science as “a bundle of dry facts,” rather than a fanciful tale they associate with fairy 
tales. But, Buckley contends,  
science is full of beautiful pictures, of real poetry, and of wonder-working fairies; 
and what is more, I promise you they shall be true fairies, whom you will love just 
as much when you are old and greyheaded as when you are young; for you will be 
able to call them up wherever you wander by land or by sea, through meadow or 
through wood, through water or through air, and though they themselves will 
always remain invisible, yet you will see their wonderful power at work 
everywhere around you. (2) 
Here Buckley harnesses together the invisible and the visible: the actions of such 
“fairies” or forces like magnetism and heat, and the physical materiality of nature. The 
invisibility of forces makes them suited for Buckley’s metaphor as fairies, and what will 
endear her readers to these science-fairies, she hopes, are the wonderful and beautiful 
effects that humans might observe every day, wherever they may be.  
To illustrate her fairy-land of science conceit, Buckley’s prose next explains the 
presence of the double vignette of frozen landscape and Sleeping Beauty. Describing the 
fairy tale, Buckley asks her audience to recall the story: 
                                                                                                                                            
conference in Pasadena. 
 98 
How under the spell of the angry fairy the maiden pricked herself with the spindle 
and slept a hundred years? How the horses in the stall, the dogs in the court-yard, 
the doves on the roof, the cook who was boxing the scullery boy’s ears in the 
kitchen, and the king and queen with all their courtiers in the hall remained spell-
bound, while a thick hedge grew up all round the castle and all within was still as 
death. But when the hundred years had passed the valiant prince came, the thorny 
hedge opened before him bearing beautiful flowers; and he, entering the castle, 
reached the room where the princess lay, and with one sweet kiss raised her and 
all around her to life again. 
 Can science bring any tale to match this? (2) 
The question is a rhetorical one, for the “magic” of winter’s ability to freeze the motion 
of even the busiest river is Buckley’s answer in the next paragraph. Prompting her 
readers to imagine a frozen winter scene—the “fixed and motionless” wind-ripples of a 
pond, the “beautiful crystal fringe” of icicle-bedecked eaves, the “fern-leaves of ice” on a 
window-pane—this is also a spellbound scene, “the enchantments of the frost-giant who 
holds it fast in his grip and will not let it go” (3). In the frozen scene, the “brave sun” is 
the hero, “and when the sun-beam gently kisses the frozen water it will be set free. …Is 
this not a fairy tale of nature? and such as these it is which science tells” (4). Buckley 
begins her volume with an implicit question: what is magical about science? The motive 
behind asking such a question for Buckley lies in the affective appeal that such fairy tales 
elicit in young readers, an appeal that she believes science can match, if one approaches 
with a similar attitude. If it is not a “willing suspension of disbelief” a reader might adopt 
for the fairy tale, it is, perhaps, an open curiosity to discern the invisible workings of the 
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physical world. So when Buckley asks her readers, “Tell me, why do you love fairy-land? 
what is its charm?” she suggests, “Is it not that things happen so suddenly, so 
mysteriously, and without man having anything to do with it?” (5). The mystery, the 
suddenness, and the lack of human intervention in nature’s actions are the basis of the 
appeal, the wonder, Buckley believes lies at the core of readers’ fascination with fairy 
stories, and, by extension, will hold true when one considers the operation of natural 
laws. 
The only necessary mental tool or prerequisite attitude required to know nature’s 
fairies, Buckley suggests, is the imagination. “I do not mean mere fancy,” Buckley 
clarifies,  
which creates unreal images and impossible monsters, but imagination, the power 
of making pictures or images in our mind, of that which is, though it is invisible to 
us. Most children have this glorious gift, and love to picture to themselves all that 
is told them, and to hear the same tale over and over again till they see every bit 
of it as if it were real. This is why they are sure to love science if its tales are told 
them aright; and I, for one, hope the day may never come when we may lose that 
childish clearness of vision, which enables us through the temporal things which 
are seen, to realize those eternal truths which are unseen. (7-8) 
In this Coleridgean distinction between imagination and fancy, Buckley states an idea 
that is as much spiritual as it is physical and temporal. Unseen eternal truths might be 
divine in their origin, or they might be immutable physical laws, but the importance 
Buckley places here is on the “childish clearness of vision” that can perceive what is 
intangible, ethereal. 
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The fanciful, affectionate prose style Buckley adopts at the outset of her text appears 
regularly throughout The Fairy-land of Science, but predominantly only at the beginnings 
and ends of the lectures. In between, Buckley shifts to an assured tone of instruction, full 
of first-person descriptions of the demonstration and imperatives for children to watch, 
observe, and listen. But woven throughout these lessons are the exhortations to her reader 
to love nature: at the end of chapter one, for instance, she writes, 
We are all groping dimly for the Unseen Power, but no one who loves nature and 
studies it can ever feel alone or unloved in the world. Facts, as mere facts, are dry 
and barren, but nature is full of life and love, and her calm unswerving rule is 
tending to some great though hidden purpose. You may call this Unseen Power 
what you will—may lean on it in loving, trusting faith, or bend in reverent and 
silent awe; but event the little child who lives with nature and gazes on her with 
open eye, must rise in some sense or other through nature to nature’s God. (25) 
Buckley’s diction echoes Carlyle, but it also aims to banish charges of science’s being 
too boring, too “dry and barren” (or “dry-as-dust,” as Carlyle would put it). The child 
Buckley describes “gazes…with open eye” on a nature that provides solace because it is 
not empty; personified as female and maternal, Buckley’s nature here is benevolent, a 
key feature she emphasizes throughout The Fairy-Land of Science. 
The sixth lecture in Buckley’s text, “The Voices of Nature, and How We Hear 
Them,” explains the physics of sound, both the action of sound waves and the anatomy of 
the human ear. The vignette opening the chapter depicts two scenes arranged vertically: 
in the top image, a young boy and girl sit on a hill overlooking a stream. Two birds perch 
on the branches of a nearby bush, while another sits atop a tree growing on the opposite 
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bank. In the foreground of the image, a frog sits behind and to the side of the children. 
The bottom image illustrates a coastal storm. Waves crash to the shore with 
thunderclouds above and lightning flashing in the sky. The opening paragraphs of the 
chapter call on the student-reader to recall experience, describing noises often heard in a 
city or town: “the jolting of the heavy wagon or dray, the rumble of the omnibus, the 
smooth roll of the private carriage and the rattle of the light butcher’s cart,…the crack of 
the carter’s whip, the cry of the costermonger at his stall, and the voices of the passers by 
will strike upon your ear” (125-6). Buckley then turns to examples of the pastoral 
countryside, quieter by comparison, but still filled with the nature’s noises: the buzzing of 
gnats and bees, the chirping of grasshoppers, the rippling sound of a nearby stream, or 
“the song of the birds, the squeak of the field-mouse, the croak of the frog, mingling with 
the sound of the woodman’s axe in the distance, or the dash of some river torrent” (126). 
Unlike Gatty’s “Inferior Animals,” Buckley’s text does not ask why communion with 
nature must stop at aesthetic appreciation of a divine creation. Instead, Buckley asks her 
readers, “Now, has it ever occurred to you to think what sound is, and how it is that we 
hear all these things? Strange as it may seem, if there were no creature that could hear 
upon the earth, there would be no such thing as sound, though all these movements in 
nature were going on just as they are now” (127). The question is a provocative one for 
children and but a variation of the still familiar conundrum, “If a tree falls in the forest 
and no one is there to hear it, does it make a sound?” The answer, as Buckley illustrates 
in her chapter, is no: to a deaf person, 
A heavy hammer falling on an anvil would indeed shake the air violently, but 
since this air when it reached your ear would find a useless instrument, it could 
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not play upon it. And it is this play on the drum of your ear and the nerves within 
it speaking to your brain which makes sound. Therefore, if all creatures on or 
around the earth were without ears or nerves of hearing, there would be no 
instruments on which to play, and consequently there would be no such thing as 
sound. This proves that two things are needed in order that we may hear. First, the 
outside movement which plays on our hearing instrument; and secondly, the 
hearing instrument itself. (127) 
Buckley chooses her examples and analogies carefully, for the hammer and anvil of 
this example reappear when she explains the anatomy of the bones of the inner ear. She 
plants the image early in the chapter so that it is a familiar image later. The “instrument” 
metaphor likewise lays a foundation for her later demonstrations with bells and tuning 
forks, and the diagram of the human ear showing the eardrum. 
The chapter structure begins with the familiar noises described above, then the 
question that presents the subject of inquiry: what sound is and how it works. Beginning 
outside the human ear, Buckley next describes a three-part experiment readers might do 
in their own drawing or sitting rooms at home: first, to tie a long piece of string around 
the end of a poker and hold the other end of the string against the ear while hitting the 
fireplace’s fender with the poker. Buckley suggests then repeating the experiment but this 
time holding the end of the string in one’s teeth and covering one’s ears. In the third 
variation, the child ties the other end of the string to the mantelpiece instead of the poker. 
In this simple experiment, a child reader will be able to tell that the vibrations created 
when the poker hits the fender travel along the string and register in the ear. Because this 
chapter follows one on “the aerial ocean,” Buckley calls on a previous lesson’s 
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knowledge of air and atoms, and she then turns to describe demonstrations carried out in 
a classroom or lecture hall, presumably demonstrations she had physically done when 
teaching the lectures in St. John’s Wood. 
The examples begin with an apparatus John Tyndall had used in his lectures 
comprising a long box with balls in a row, ending with a bell (Fig. 2), then an analogy of 
train cars bumping into each other as they come to a stop in a station, with a 
corresponding illustration modeling atoms in a similar row undergoing collisions like 
those of the balls or train (Fig. 3), and then a diagram of a compression wave (Fig. 4).  
 
 




Fig. 3: Idealized drawing of linearly colliding atoms 
 
 
Fig. 4: Compression wave diagram 
 
Buckley explains the difference between the longitudinal light waves she had described 
in an earlier chapter on sunbeams and the compression waves of sound, identifying the 
latter as “a set of crowdings and partings of the atoms of air which follow each other 
rapidly across the air. A crowding of atoms is called a condensation, and a parting is 
called a rarefaction, and when we speak of the length of a wave of sound, we mean the 
distance between the two condensations, aa Fig. 32, or between two rarefactions, bb” 
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(131). After these examples and diagrams, Buckley then explains the workings of the 
human ear, describing the anatomical mechanics with another diagram, Fig. 5. 
 
 
Fig. 5: Drawing of the inner ear 
 
Buckley’s explanation stops at the neuroscience of what happens after a sound wave 
registers on the fine hairs within the Labyrinth, transmitting the information through the 
nerve (i in the diagram). She then describes the difference between sounds heard as music 
versus noise as one of regularity, using more tuning forks and apparatuses, before turning 
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the reader’s attention outward again to sounds in nature: the regular tones of ocean waves 
and the differences the size of the stones, gravel, or sand make on the pitch of the 
resultant sounds; the sublime noises of claps of thunder, cracking glaciers, avalanches; 
and the small sounds of buzzing insects. She concludes the chapter with the claim that the 
“sweetest sounds of all in the woods are the voices of the birds” (148). Explaining briefly 
the physiology of birds that allow for such variety and duration in their song, Buckley 
closes the chapter with the following passage: 
Only think what a rapid succession of waves must quiver through the air as a tiny 
lark agitates his little throat and pours forth a volume of song! The next time you 
are in the country in the spring, spend half an hour listening to him, and try and 
picture to yourself how that little being is moving all the atmosphere around him. 
Then dream for a little while about sound, what it is, how marvelously it works 
outside in the world, and inside your ear and brain; and then, when you go back to 
work again, you will hardly deny that it well worth while to listen sometimes to 
the voices of nature and ponder how it is that we hear them. (148-9) 
Where Gatty’s rooks produce nothing but noise—either in the reality of a human auditor 
who hears only croaking or the imagined discordant debate they have about humankind—
Buckley’s birds produce music worthy of wonder and contemplation. While Gatty’s story 
had emphasized the disconnect between human and animal, Buckley’s chapter on sound 
unifies human and nonhuman experience within the physics of sound. 
Within The Fairy-Land of Science, Buckley demonstrates a lingering attachment to 
teleological explanations of the workings of the universe when she consistently turns to 
concepts seemingly at odds with empirical methodologies. References to the intentions of 
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“the Unseen Power” thus appear at the conclusions of lectures devoted to explaining 
physical concepts like condensation or gravitation, enjoining her readers to wonder at the 
expansiveness of nature’s complexity. The lecture demonstrations, illustrated visually 
along with the prose exposition, provide evidence that supports the conceptual 
instruction. But Buckley’s chapters aim to evoke fascination as much as they exhibit 
physics. Buckley does not reduce scientific knowledge to fixed categories; instead she 
enlarges its sublime implications and tethers it to spiritual belief. Poised at the 
intersection of empiricism, relativism, evolutionary theory, and natural theology, The 
Fairy-Land of Science resists easy classification in its mixing of fairy tale storytelling 
with scientific demonstrations. To take Buckley’s project seriously is to challenge our 
established histories of Victorian science and its transmission. 
Conclusion: A Scientific Education for the Young 
Striving for conceptual accuracy but not mathematical proof or calculation, Buckley’s 
The Fairy-Land of Science gives young readers a solid foundation of the physical world 
on which to build future study. Hers is not a book keyed to examination results or the 
pragmatics of job training. Buckley was, in fact, a longtime proponent of teaching 
concepts over examination skills, an argument she makes explicitly in “Science in 
Elementary Schools,” a letter she published in both The Sheffield & Rotherham 
Independent and The Leeds Mercury on January 30, 1882. Buckley’s proposed course of 
study begins each module with observation of the natural world and extending the 
observations to the physical concepts that lie behind observable phenomena. Students at 
the first level in her proposed sequence would progress from air and wind to pressure, 
gravitation, and temperature; in the second level, from observations of rain and rivers to 
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an understanding of the water cycle and temperature, from thunder to sound, and from 
lightning to electricity; and then in the next level, from basic understandings in minerals 
to conducting simple chemical experiments. Her course of study ends with astronomy. 
Taught conceptually, a child would “start on every subject from nature.” Physical science 
as a subject, then, would not be a monolithic entity to be mastered, but rather: 
the handmaid to interpret the facts of daily life and observation. Teachers would 
not be afraid of it, for it would give scope for the simplest as well as for the 
highest teaching. True, the children at the end would not have a store of 
quantitative and qualitative facts, such as our friend the manufacturer found worse 
than useless; but under a teacher of ordinary powers they would be accustomed to 
observe and to think, and they would, moreover, instead of the dangerous “little 
knowledge,” be far more likely to have that humility in the face of nature, and the 
desire to learn more, which is of far greater importance at the age of thirteen, 
when they leave school, than a limited, even if it were accurate, knowledge of 
systematic science. 
In today’s educational moment of standardized testing, Buckley’s words still resonate. 
They signal, too, how long debates about courses of study have been with us. In her own 
time, Buckley’s methods were evidently popular among professional men of science. At 
the BAAS meeting in York in 1881, for instance, Buckley’s name came up in a 
conversation which arose about the teaching of rudimentary science in elementary 
schools. She was mentioned approvingly as “a lady who made a most favorable 
impression, and showed much familiarity with the subject in expressing her objections to 
separating theoretical from practical science” (Leeds Mercury 2 February 1881). 
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One of the foremost debates about education in nineteenth-century Britain was the 
place of science as a formal course of study within the curriculum. Other disputes about 
governance and content loomed large over all, mainly about whether the state or the 
Church of England should administer British schools. This tension between secular and 
religious thought, playing out at the institutional level of education, was one of the arenas 
in which the larger intellectual debate between classical and modern scientific modes of 
knowledge came to blows. Men like Herbert Spencer, Thomas Huxley, and John Tyndall 
championed scientists as the new model of public intellectual, a kind of social hero 
markedly different from the sort Thomas Carlyle had advocated. We have come to think 
that women, however, were largely excluded from these conversations about the value of 
science, even as they were carrying out their own scientific inquiries or, in the case of 
Mary Somerville in her On the Connexion of the Physical Sciences, providing overviews 
of the “state of the field.” Fanciful science books for children appear to exist on the 
fringes of both the intellectual debate about humanities and science, and the 
administration of a child’s formal education. In fact, however, women with established 
reputations like Margaret Gatty and Arabella Buckley wrote texts that illustrate the 
Victorian public’s ambivalence on such matters, and their voices were prominent ones. 
While often classified under the broader rubric of “natural theology” because of a 
consistent ethos of religious belief contained therein, Parables from Nature and The 
Fairy-Land of Science demonstrate the diverse ways women writers shaped science’s 
reception among audiences deemed “outside” the scientific establishment. Yet the topics 
and debates their books include were highly topical and at the center of Victorian 
conversations about secular and religious science. Gatty’s emphasis on moral instruction 
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highlights the utility of fable in serving her purpose. Her science has a moral valence. 
Buckley stresses the immaterial element of physical science, the invisible forces at work. 
Thus fairy tales offer the seeming magic of a world populated and influenced by fairies. 
Her science is a spiritual one, with spiritualist leanings. What Gatty and Buckley share is 
a similar understanding that stories and narrative offer useful ways of entering scientific 
inquiry and naturalist study, that these literary forms can help readers recall previous 
experience or awaken a receptive, excited frame of mind. They differ from their 
predecessors like Jane Marcet or contemporaries like Mary Ward in selecting these 
fanciful conceits to convey science. But what the Parables and Fairy-Land share is the 
sense that a student of natural history, natural philosophy, physical science—or whatever 
the common expression for science was at the time—ought to be fully engaged and 
immersed in the inquiry at hand, that she should be invited into the study, asked 
questions, and given the conceptual tools to apply in her everyday activities. 
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Chapter 3:  
Novel Natural History:  
George Eliot and Narratives of Science 
From its opening line—“a wide plain, where the broadening Floss hurries on between 
its green banks to the sea, and the loving tide, rushing to meet it, checks its passage with 
an impetuous embrace”—to its violent drowning of the two protagonists in its 
penultimate chapter, The Mill on the Floss (1860) pays keen attention to landscape and to 
how people grow, mature, and die within it. The opening passage describes St. Ogg’s, a 
town set alongside the River Floss and surrounded by “rich pastures” and “patches of 
dark earth,” where beehives rise “at intervals beyond the hedgerows; and everywhere the 
hedgerows are studded with trees,” and the masts of trade ships bearing lumber, seed, and 
coal, appear in between the branches of the trees when viewed from the narrator’s 
vantage point on the stone bridge by Dorlcote Mill (7). Or at least, the narrator 
remembers this scene, for she finds herself waking from a dreamlike state, the sensation 
of her arms resting on her chair blending with that of leaning on the stone bridge in her 
reverie.  
The narrative voice who relates the tale of the Tulliver family’s changing fortune is 
an intriguing presence within the novel, for it is unclear how she knows the story she 
tells. Perhaps she is a fictional version of the “author”; or perhaps another character, a 
contemporary of Maggie Tulliver; or the older version of the little girl also described in 
the opening scene who gazes at the mill in a manner mirroring the narrator. But 
whomever her identity may be, she is a close observer of both people and place. In this 
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chapter’s reading of the novel, her presence is much like that of an amateur naturalist: an 
observer of appearances, behaviors, and actions. She is someone who looks back to a 
moment in living memory, describing it with a keen eye and considering whether the 
growth and tragic deaths of a brother and sister come at the hand of fate or as a 
consequence of the seeming cruelty of nature’s indifference. In George Eliot’s The Mill 
on the Floss, natural history saturates the novel’s plot and its prose. Though many readers 
today might initially associate the novel’s natural imagery with Darwinian evolutionary 
theory because of the timing of its publication, appearing just six months after Darwin’s 
Origin, in fact, natural history narratives had been in wide circulation for decades and had 
gained increasing popularity in the mid-Victorian era. 
By the middle decades of the nineteenth century, Britain was alive with science. It 
pervaded daily life: technologies of travel like steam engines took families to coastal 
towns where they could collect seaweeds and corals as amateur marine biologists. 
Photography focused Victorian eyes on the details of portraiture and landscape, 
informing and responding to the particularities of Pre-Raphaelite art. Printing presses 
produced masses of books and pamphlets on self-improvement via scientific study. 
Scientists themselves offered new theories of evolutionary biology, light, magnetism, 
electricity, navigation, and cognition. All of these developments found their way into the 
most capacious genre of the nineteenth century, a literary form the Victorian era made 
famous: the novel. Because of so many variations in its use, style, character, kind, subject 
matter, and length, the novel has come to seem a genre unto itself. In this chapter, I 
consider how the novel’s form underwent development within the Victorian era, and I 
define it according to the terms and descriptions offered by a number of contemporary 
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reviewers, especially those writing in the 1850s and 1860s, the time at which Marian 
Evans (1819-1880) began a career writing fiction under the pseudonym George Eliot.  
As the most widely known author this dissertation examines, George Eliot stands out 
for her genius as a novelist.45 Within the tradition of scientific writing by women, she 
warrants a place because she embarked on a writing career at a time when the popularity 
of the novel was reaching a new high thanks to the successful demand created and 
satisfied by the publishing world in its widest sense: a community of publishers, 
circulating librarians, booksellers, authors, reviewers, and readers. It was likewise a time 
when amateur botany and hobbyist natural history saw a similar increase in popularity, 
again, in part, a phenomenon emerging from the increase in scientific publications for the 
layperson. This chapter examines what George Eliot’s own experiences of amateur 
marine biology offered her fictional enterprise, and conversely, how her fiction 
interpreted scientific ideas for her audience of novel readers. If women had previously 
been known in the scientific community primarily for accommodations of science for 
children and other women rather than original investigations, they also were considered 
together in pejorative categories in the literary world as writers of “silly” novels, full of 
the dramas of a drawing room. George Eliot’s fiction represented a departure from the 
kinds of novels most often associated with women authors, a type she herself critiques in 
1856 but that would still find its likeness decades later in Lady Carbury’s literary 
                                                
45 “George Eliot” is the pseudonym of a woman who went by many names, and Rosemarie 
Bodenheimer has written about these various identities in “A Woman of Many Names” (2001). 
Born Mary Anne Evans, she later dropped the “e” of her middle name, then combined the two 
into the name Marian Evans, Marian Evans Lewes, and ultimately Marian Cross. Though “Eliot” 
was never her real surname, I use it on occasion for the sake of avoiding excessive repetition, but 
I generally will refer to her authorial persona as “George Eliot.” I also try to distinguish between 
the activities of the woman and the writings of the author; that is, Marian Evans goes on holiday 
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ambitions in Anthony Trollope’s The Way We Live Now (1875).46 These two traditions of 
women’s writing—scientific accommodation and fiction—meet for George Eliot when 
she goes on holiday with George Henry Lewes to the coastal town of Ilfracombe. In 
natural history narrative, she finds a tradition that would fit her aims for fiction. 
 I focus here on a particular moment in the nineteenth century—the middle decades of 
the 1850s and 1860s—and I do not mean to suggest that George Eliot’s sole influence or 
entry into fiction writing was natural history.47 What I do hope to illustrate, however, is 
how natural history narratives—especially those written at midcentury by women—offer 
a means of understanding the formal changes the novel underwent as it was used to 
interpret and make sense of science, even before Darwin forever altered Victorian 
intellectual life with his publication of On the Origin of Species in 1859. That is, the 
                                                                                                                                            
in 1856 and collects shells, seaweeds, and corals; “George Eliot” is the author Evans creates to 
voice her criticism and fiction from this point in her career forward. 
46 In Trollope’s description, for instance, Lady Carbury “did work hard at what she wrote,—
hard enough at any rate to cover her pages quickly; and was, by nature, a clever woman. She 
could write after a glib, commonplace, sprightly fashion, and had already acquired the knack of 
spreading all she knew very thin, so that it might cover a vast surface. She had no ambition to 
write a good book, but was painfully anxious to write a book that the critics should say was good” 
(17). The irony of bad books receiving high praise, and vice versa, was well known to George 
Eliot, who condemns the practice in her “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists” essay in the 
Westminster Review: “No sooner does a woman show that she has genius or effective talent, than 
she receives the tribute of being moderately praised and severely criticized. By a peculiar 
thermometric adjustment, when a woman’s talent is at zero, journalistic approbation is at the 
boiling pitch; when she attains mediocrity, it is already at no more than summer heat; and if she 
ever reaches excellence, critical enthusiasm drops to the freezing point” (161). Even in her 
review, Eliot draws upon scientific discourse, describing critical popularity with a figure of 
inverse proportionality resembling Robert Boyle’s gas law describing the inverse relationship 
between the pressure and volume of a gas. Charles’s law, describing the proportional relationship 
between an ideal gas’s temperature and pressure, would also be evoked by Eliot’s description, 
where the relationship is a “peculiar” variation. Eliot’s rhetorical effect also derives from the 
antithetical relationship she describes between quality and critical reception. 
47 Too much scholarship on Eliot exists that would show the limitations and error of such a 
claim. See, for example, the very useful essays providing overviews of each of George Eliot’s 
engagements with her era’s intellectual debates included in The Cambridge Companion to 
George Eliot (2001), including Suzy Anger’s “George Eliot and Philosophy,” Barry Qualls’s 
“George Eliot and Religion,” and Nancy Henry’s “George Eliot and Politics.” 
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popularity of natural history among a wide audience of mid-Victorian readers made for a 
relatively easy transition to the inclusion of organic theories of science in fiction. 
Description and narration are a naturalist’s instruments just as much as they are the tools 
of the novelist. This chapter traces how the mid-Victorian era was an especially 
productive moment for natural history narratives to take cues from fiction, and vice versa, 
and that women were vital voices in both of these discourses.48 George Eliot’s fiction 
transformed the prose styles common to the burgeoning natural history craze of the 1850s 
into her ideal form for the Victorian novel. George Eliot, I argue, becomes the most 
appropriate case study for this chapter’s analysis because her own career as a novelist 
overlaps with that of women naturalists within the generic boundaries of the natural 
history narrative.49 Her “Recollections of Ilfracombe,” along with her Westminster 
reviews, “The Natural History of German Life” (July 1856) and “Silly Novels by Lady 
Novelists” (October 1856), firmly place George Eliot into a conversation about both 
natural history writing and women’s fiction.  
The diversity of reviews of George Eliot’s work during her lifetime and the 
availability of her vast correspondence have been a boon to biographers and literary 
scholars alike.50 Her life has been well documented, her reading habits scrutinized, and 
                                                
48 In George Eliot and Nineteenth-Century Science: The Make-Believe of a Beginning (1984), 
Sally Shuttleworth cogently argues for the ways in which Eliot’s novels provide narrative 
resolution for the organic science and experiment in prose related to psychological sciences (xiii). 
49 Her use of science was so marked, it became the occasion for criticism among her 
reviewers. Not only would Henry James take her to task for sounding too much like Darwin and 
Huxley in Middlemarch, but R. H. Hutton would even object, in his view, to her overly-scientific 
diction. See, for example, Beer’s Darwin’s Plots (139). 
50 For a wide selection of contemporary reviews of George Eliot’s novels, see, e.g., David 
Carroll’s edition of George Eliot: The Critical Heritage (1971). 
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her relationships probed for insight into her novels.51 Her literary engagement with 
scientific ideas, especially those of Charles Darwin, and the social philosophies of 
Herbert Spencer and Auguste Comte, have also been widely discussed.52 In placing 
George Eliot into this dissertation’s interrogation of scientific genres used by women, 
though, I hope to extend the reach of conversations about her in literature and science 
circles, demonstrating both how her early understanding of the natural and physical 
sciences was influenced by her reading Somerville’s On the Connection of the Physical 
Sciences in the 1840s and how her science studies affected not simply the content of her 
novels, but also their form.  
In this regard, I also draw from the body of George Eliot scholarship concerned with 
the novel as a genre, including mid- to late-twentieth-century work by Barbara Hardy, 
Frank Kermode, and J. Hillis Miller.53 In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate the ways 
                                                
51 See biographies by Mathilde Blind (1888), Gordon Haight (1968), Ruby V. Redinger 
(1975), Jennifer Uglow (1987), Rosemarie Bodenheimer (1994), Rosemary Ashton (1996), and 
Kathryn Hughes (1999) for a range of approaches to George Eliot and her work. Tanya 
Agathocleous’s bibliography in The Cambridge Companion to George Eliot concisely assesses 
the merits of the Haight, Hughes, Bodenheimer, and Ashton biographies in particular (237-8). 
Though I focus on a specific historical moment in Marian Evans’s life, I do not aim to read her 
fiction through her biography. 
52 See, e.g., Gillian Beer’s Darwin’s Plots (1983), Sally Shuttleworth’s George Eliot and 
Nineteenth-Century Science (1984), and George Levine’s Darwin And the Novelists (1988) for 
investigations of Eliot’s science; and Nancy L. Paxton’s George Eliot and Herbert Spencer: 
Feminism, Evolutionism, and the Reconstruction of Gender (1991) and Suzy Anger’s Victorian 
Interpretation (2005) for examinations of Eliot’s responses to Spencer and Comte. Anger’s 
analysis of Eliot’s understanding of the uses and limits of observation to develop sympathies that 
would prompt right, moral social actions is particularly relevant for my reading of “The Natural 
History of German Life.” 
53 In The Novels of George Eliot: A Study in Form (1959), Barbara Hardy corrects what had 
been a prevailing criticism of Eliot’s lack of organization among her contemporary reviewers and 
a number of readers in the early twentieth century. She argues “the novels of George Eliot depend 
on the emphasis of formal relations as well as the ordinary interest of the human relations of 
loving and hating and betraying and serving and so on. Here the formal element binds, unifies, 
and makes a moral emphasis. Just as it is possible to see the pattern of continued and varied 
images making part of the form of the novel, so it is possible—and even more important—to see 
a pattern of symmetry and contrast and repetition forming the tension and irony of action, and 
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George Eliot might fruitfully be compared to the other women this dissertation studies. 
The organic, web-like structure that Middlemarch derives from evolutionary theory, for 
example, which Gillian Beer describes in Darwin’s Plots, might likewise be compared to 
Somerville’s synthesis of the physical laws of nature in Connexion. But whereas 
Somerville’s use of Byron’s play when describing astronomy prompts comparisons of the 
two writers’ affective appeals, George Eliot’s use of scientific discourse points to a shared 
method of observation and narrative exposition in fiction. Further, just as Margaret Gatty 
and Arabella Buckley chose imaginative fantasy settings as their preferred method of 
teaching children natural history and physical science, both Somerville and George Eliot 
selected prose forms that would synthesize scientific knowledge for adult readers and 
offer suggested ways of interpreting it. Yet Gatty, too, was a naturalist, publishing British 
Seaweeds in 1863, and her advice for women embarking on seaside collecting speaks to 
the very same challenges Marian Evans and George Henry Lewes met with in 
Ilfracombe. Lastly, George Eliot was the person most often cited in descriptions of 
                                                                                                                                            
contributing to the definiteness and the mutability of what we call theme or generalization” (10). 
Hardy continues: “It is because her organization, though complex and sustained, is so embedded 
in her narrative that it has usually passed unpraised” (11). Hardy finds patterns within Eliot’s 
characters (113-14), her repeated phrases and images (8), in contrasts between seemingly divine 
coincidences and accidental causes (135), and in the intrusions of the narrative voice (158). Frank 
Kermode’s The Sense of an Ending (1966) suggests a common human desire for narrative 
resolution lay beneath centuries of storytelling: “Men, like poets, risk ‘into the middest,’ in 
medias res, when they are born; they also die in mediis rebus, and to make sense of their span, 
they need fictive concords with origins and ends, such as give meaning to lives and to poems” 
(7). In “Narrative and History,” J. Hillis Miller examines the ways in which novelists seem to 
take pains to make fiction seem like a representational form and the various “displacements” it 
uses, like letters, manuscripts, memoirs, legal depositions, and journalism (456). But “history” 
becomes the most important masking device in Miller’s study, and where he sees the “notions of 
narrative, of character, and of formal unity in fiction” to be congruent with the concepts 
comprising Western history, this chapter understands natural history narratives as being fraught 
with the same challenges faced by writers of history and drawing upon the same narrative devices 
as the novelists. 
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Constance Naden, the poet, science student, and philosopher I consider in chapter four.54 
In their wry humor, wide study of contemporary scientific ideas, and inclusion of those 
scientific themes in their literary work, Eliot and Naden have much in common. 
In the first part of this chapter, I place George Eliot’s “Recollections of Ilfracombe” 
into the context of other mid-Victorian naturalist writings, along with her essays about 
fiction in order to identify where and how naturalist narratives might seep through their 
generic boundaries to find new resonances in fiction. I then turn to The Mill on the Floss 
(1860) as the most salient example of how characteristics and methods of natural history 
appear within George Eliot’s early fiction. Maggie Tulliver’s trials as a clever young girl 
whose brother reluctantly receives the education she craves, and the abundance of natural 
imagery describing Maggie’s character, demonstrate how the novel fits within mid-
Victorian discourses of natural history. Maggie’s inner conflicts, her mistakes, and how 
the community of St. Ogg’s regards her actions are all important, but I focus less on the 
scandal of her near-elopement with Stephen Guest than on how the novel depicts the 
wave-like oscillations of her emotions in conjunction with surging of the Floss.55 Within 
my analysis of Mill, I also consider how the same themes of a child’s experiences in a 
rural landscape appear differently in Eliot’s “Brother and Sister” sonnets, a poem sharing 
its title with Book I of Mill, but offering a different structural form in which to express 
shared scenes or episodes. In both theme and style, The Mill on the Floss most clearly 
shows an engagement with many of the issues of genre, science, gender, and education 
                                                
54 Herbert Spencer befriended both women, and he is the source of the most frequent 
comparison of Naden to Eliot. 
55 In Sex Scandal: The Private Parts of Victorian Fiction, William A. Cohen examines both 
how public opinion shapes expectations for sexuality and gender, and how gender inflects the 
public in his chapter on The Mill in the Floss (138). If the novel subverts the traditional marriage 
 119 
this dissertation examines. My primary goal is to demonstrate that George Eliot 
participates in a much broader discourse of naturalist writings by women: though scholars 
have noted the pervasive presence of science in her novels, they have not yet suggested 
the ways in which George Eliot might illuminate the questions and challenges other 
women naturalists faced at mid-century. Though she used her Ilfracombe journal to 
embark on a career writing fiction, the increased visibility of her natural history 
narratives may in turn arouse interest in the overlooked naturalist writings by her female 
contemporaries. 
The Wonders of the Shore 
On May 8, 1856, Marian and George Henry Lewes packed some belongings—
including a selection of deep, empty jars—into a carriage that would take them the first 
leg of their train journey to Ilfracombe, a small seaside town on the northern coast of 
Devon. For Lewes, the trip would help facilitate his composition of Seaside Studies 
(1858), and Marian had reviews to write for the Leader and the Westminster Review. The 
couple arrived in Ilfracombe at the height of marine botany’s popularity as a suitable 
pastime not just for women but also their families. From the 1840s through the 1860s, 
numerous marine botanical titles were published, among them Elizabeth Anne Allom’s 
The Sea-Weed Collector (1841), Isabella Gifford’s The Marine Botanist (1848), David 
Landsborough’s A Popular History of British Seaweeds (1849), Anne Pratt’s Chapters on 
the Common Things of the Sea-Side (1850), Mary Roberts’s Popular History of the 
Mollusca (1851), Philip Henry Gosse’s A Naturalist’s Rambles on the Devonshire Coast 
(1853), Charles Kingsley’s Glaucus: or, the Wonders of the Shore (1855), Margaret 
                                                                                                                                            
plot and refuses the “coupling logic of heterosexuality” (Cohen 156), it does so within the context 
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Gatty’s British Seaweeds (1863), and Louisa Lane Clarke’s The Common Seaweeds of 
the British Coast and Channel Islands (1865) (Hunt 6; Bellanca Daybooks 177). This list 
only comprises the books on marine botany, neglecting other concurrent naturalist fads at 
the time, including “pteridomania,” a term coined by Kingsley in Glaucus to describe the 
craze for fern collecting that had taken the country by storm (Kingsley 4).56 
Glaucus offers one glimpse of how popular the seaside holiday had become, 
especially since the advent of railroad transport, and why it might be both an enriching 
and polite pastime for whole families. His tone suggests that the seaside holiday, 
however, brings with it a mundane routine—a banality for which his volume offers a 
remedy. In the opening of his book, Kingsley addresses an audience of fathers, guessing 
they might be grateful for a seemly activity to occupy their children:  
You are going down, perhaps, by railway, to pass your usual six weeks at some 
watering-place along the coast, and as you roll along think more than once, and 
that not over-cheerfully, of what you shall do when you get there. You are half-
tired, half-ashamed, of making one more in the ignoble army of idlers, who 
                                                                                                                                            
of mid-Victorian science, as much as its mores. 
56 Sarah Whittingham explains how avid interest in ferns seemed to come “out of nowhere” in 
the 1840s in her detailed—and visually stunning—history, Fern Fever: The Story of 
Pteridomania (2012). At the opening of her book, she writes, “Ferns were not just the obsession 
of a few professional botanists, nor even of the thousands of amateur gardeners and naturalists, 
but held a popular fascination for much of society. If you decorated and furnished your house, 
went to the seaside, strolled in pleasure gardens, patronized the theatre and concerts, visited 
exhibitions, read novels, played music, or spent time in hospital, you encountered ferns and 
ferneries” (11). The technology that aided the public’s ability to transport and keep ferns so close 
at hand was the “closely-glazed” case made by Dr. Nathaniel Bagshaw Ward (1791-1868). 
Whittingham discusses the effect of Wardian cases on the fern craze in Fern Fever (16-19), as 
does David Elliston Allen in The Naturalist in Britain (119-122). Kingsley likewise anticipates 
his readers’ daughters “have been been seized with the prevailing ‘Pteridomania,’ and are 
collecting and buying ferns, with Ward’s cases wherein to keep them (for which you have to pay), 
and wrangling over unpronounceable names of species (which seem to be different in each new 
Fern-book that they buy), till the Pteridomania seems to you somewhat of a bore” (4). 
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saunter the cliffs, and sands, and quays; to whom every wharf is but a “wharf of 
Lethe,” by which they rot “dull as the oozy weed.” (1) 
Kingsley’s narrator voices the perspective of a male speaker writing to other men who 
take their families on a seaside holiday as they likely have in years past. There is sardonic 
humor here as the speaker invites the “you” reader to remember all the various 
unpleasant, banal, or boring things he and his family likely do on other trips. The speaker 
invites the reader to consider having a go at some naturalist pursuits at the shore this time 
around. After all, the narrator suggests, it has been good for the girls: while they’ve been 
buying up new books on ferns or boxes in which to store them—which the father has had 
to pay for—they haven’t been preoccupied with the other typical drawing-room 
accomplishments that seem to bore the paternal speaker and implied reader. 
The idea of embarking on some amateur naturalism serves as an ironic contrast to the 
uses of other scientific apparatuses that have become popular for something other than 
their original purposes. Kingsley mentions that one of the likely occupations or 
recreations, not overly exciting, on this beach holiday would be to stop at a restaurant or 
pub and casually look out at the sea using a telescope from the window: “You foreknow 
your doom by sad experience. A great deal of dressing, a lounge in the club-room, a stare 
out of the window with the telescope, an attempt to take down a bad sketch, a walk up 
one parade and down another, interminable reading of the silliest of novels, over which 
you fall asleep on a bench in the sun, and probably have your umbrella stolen” (1-2). The 
telescope viewing is listed amid a list of other idle activities done not out of real pleasure 
or interest but rather as the habits or expected pursuits of any beach holiday-maker. 
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 This activity was evidently quite the popular pastime, for just four years later, Mary 
Ward mentions it in the opening of her 1859 Telescope Teachings. Ward’s purpose is to 
correct the direction in which her young readers point their telescopes:  
has it been suggested to those who can admire and wonder at the splendour of the 
firmament, to try how much they can improve their view of star or planet, by 
examining them with the help of a small telescope, such as one may see, 
perchance, at every sixth window, on a fine summer’s day, at a watering-place, its 
object-glass, capable of better things, idly directed to fishing-boat or distant 
steamer, or still more idly, to unconscious group on the pier? (v) 
Together, the two suggest how much the telescope had entered into the social milieu of 
middle- to upper-class Britain, becoming less an apparatus for scientific study and more a 
prop for social surveillance. Ward, of course, voices stronger disapproval at the use of the 
telescope for people-watching. But what they also share is a common expression of 
admiration and wonder for the natural world and the personal enrichment natural history 
study might provide. So Kingsley urges the vacationer-by-the-sea to find a more 
worthwhile occupation: 
And does it not seem to you that six weeks’ rest, free from the cares of town 
business and the whirlwind of town pleasure, could not be better spent than in 
examining those wonders a little, instead of wandering up and down like the 
many, still wrapt up each in his little world of vanity and self-interest, 
unconscious of what and where they really are, as they gaze lazily around at earth 
and sea and sky, and have ‘No speculation in those eyes/ Which they do glare 
withal’? Why not, then, try to discover a few of the Wonders of the Shore? For 
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wonders there are around you at every step, stranger than ever opium-eater 
dreamed, and yet to be seen at no greater expense than a very little time and 
trouble” (3-4). 
Endorsing amateur naturalism as a worthy alternative to mindless wandering and vacant 
self-absorption, Kingsley’s Glaucus goes on to demonstrate the ensuing delights in 
collecting “the wonders of the shore.”  
These wonders were the subject of many other books and poems. Margaret Gatty’s 
story in the first series of Parables, “Knowledge Not the Limit of Belief” takes place in a 
naturalist’s library and recounts the conversation among a seaweed, zoophyte, and 
bookworm about whether the zoophyte is a plant or an animal: in 1855, the year both 
Parables and Glaucus were published, the classification of zoophytes as animals was still 
new. In her third series of Parables in 1861, the story “Whereunto” takes place in a 
coastal tidal pool, where a crab and starfish debate divine Providence when a passing 
naturalist happens to toss the starfish back into a pool after it had become stranded on the 
shore and lay in danger of drying out. In Elizabeth Barrett Browning’s verse novel 
Aurora Leigh (1856), Aurora compares her arrival in England to that of a seaweed, cast 
on the shores and sapped of her vitality: 
I only thought 
Of lying quiet there where I was thrown 
Like sea-weed on the rocks, and suffering her 
To prick me to a pattern with her pin 
Fibre from fibre, delicate leaf from leaf, 
And dry out from my drowned anatomy 
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The last sea-salt left in me. (I: 378-384) 
In Aurora’s metaphor, her aunt becomes the pattern-pricking naturalist, creating an 
ordered design just as she tames Aurora’s hair (I.385-6). Conversely, Eliza Cook’s poem, 
“Song of the Sea-weed” (1869), asserts the independent life of the eponymous plant:  
I am born in crystal bower 
Where the despot hath no power 
To trail and turn the oozy fern,  
Or trample down the fair sea-flower. 
I am born where human skill 
Cannot bend me to its will; 
None can delve about my root, 
And nurse me for my bloom and fruit. (Gates In Nature’s Name 548) 
“Song of the Sea-weed” suggests the seaweed lies beyond the sphere of cultivation and 
domestication. As a poetic metaphor, then, seaweed could be employed for quite opposite 
ends.  
Seaweed study, though, was not just a source of didactic moralizing or poetic 
metaphors for women writers. The introduction of Margaret Gatty’s British Seaweeds 
(1863), for example, tends toward the practical needs of the marine botanist in addition to 
commending its pleasures. Listing the necessary tools, “a basket, a bottle, a stick, a strong 
pair of boots (oiled, not polished with blacking)” and a “strong, friendly, and willing, if 
not learned companion,” Gatty champions the delights of sea-side study as, “an 
enthusiastic love, which throws a charm over eery sea-place on the coast, however dull 
and ugly to the world in general; makes every day spent there too short, and every visit 
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too quickly ended” (vii). Gatty’s practical introduction to seaweed collection even 
includes advice on dress: 
Next to boots comes the question of petticoats; and if anything could excuse a 
woman for imitating the costume of a man, it would be what she suffers as a sea-
weed collector from those necessary draperies! But to make the best of a bad 
matter, let woollen be in the ascendant as much as possible; and let the petticoats 
never come below the ankle. A ladies’ yachting costume has come into fashion of 
late, which is, perhaps, as near perfection for shore-work as anything that could be 
devised. …Cloaks and shawls, which necessarily hamper the arms, besides having 
long ends and corners which cannot fail to get soaked, are, of course, very 
inconvenient, and should be as much avoided as possible; but where this cannot 
be, a good deal may be done towards tucking them neatly up out of the way. In 
conclusion, a hat is preferable to a bonnet, merino stockings to cotton ones, and a 
strong pair of gloves is indispensable. All millinery work—silks, satins, lace, 
bracelets, and other jewellery, &c. must, and will, be laid aside by every rational 
being who attempts to shore-hunt. (viii-ix) 
Gatty’s detailed suggestions on attire would have come out of her fourteen years 
researching and writing her book, and likely her observations of fellow shore-hunters, 
too. William Dyce’s painting, Pegwell Bay—a Recollection of October 5, 1858, may just 
be an idealized representation of Dyce’s family on holiday, where the painter’s wife and 
two sisters appear wearing long skirts, bonnets, and shawls; but it might likewise suggest 
that many female seaside ramblers needed the practical advice Gatty’s volume would 
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provide.57 In her descriptions of the process of collecting coral with Lewes, Marian Evans 
likewise learns the practicalities of the endeavor. 
I offer these examples to show just a sample of the diversity of responses to marine 
botanizing that were available to mid-Victorian readers, and how likely it is that Marian 
Evans was familiar with such texts. Her letters indicate she sought a “smattering of 
botany from Miss [Agnes] Catlow” (qtd. in Bellanca Daybooks 176). Evans and Lewes 
may even have crossed paths with other aspiring naturalist writers, like Eliza Brightwen, 
whose journal indicates she visited Ilfracombe on the day Evans and Lewes departed 
(Bellanca Daybooks 177). Within this extensive and varied discourse of natural history 
and marine botany, Marian Evans and George Henry Lewes, too, offer their own studies. 
“Recollections of Ilfracombe” is a crafted piece of prose, one which demonstrates 
Ruskin’s influence on George Eliot and her thinking about observation and realism. In 
her review of Modern Painters, she writes, "The truth of infinite value that he teaches is 
realism—the doctrine that all truth and beauty are to be attained by a humble and faithful 
study of nature, and not by substituting vague forms, bred by imagination on the mists of 
feeling, in place of definite, substantial reality” (Selected Essays 368). For George Eliot, 
realism meant both careful observation and emotional authenticity, and its opposite was 
not idealism but falsity (Levine “Introduction” 7). Her descriptions of the coastal 
landscape of Ilfracombe show a writer highly attuned to the physical details of her 
                                                
57 A digital image of Dyce’s painting can be found on the Tate Britain museum’s website. 
This painting is notable not just for its meticulous depiction of women collecting marine samples 
in the foreground—details like mollusk shells, seaweed, and skate egg cases are visible—but also 
for the presence of Donati’s comet in the upper center of the painting. An excellent description of 
Dyce’s painting appears in Pre-Raphaelites: Victorian Avant-Garde (2012), the catalog 
accompanying the Tate’s recent exhibition, edited by Tim Barringer, Jason Rosenfeld, and Alison 
Smith. 
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surroundings, observations and details that add verisimilitude to novels like A Mill on the 
Floss.58 
She begins the Ilfracombe journal as a narrative, giving it a beginning as if it were a 
chapter: “It was a cold unfriendly day—the eighth of May on which we set out for 
Ilfracombe, with our hamper of tall glass jars, which we meant for our sea-side 
Vivarium” (Selected Essays 215). The opening lines personify the day, verging on a 
pathetic fallacy. If the day weren’t exactly unfriendly toward the travelers, it at least 
made them feel such a chill reception. The first hint that the holiday might be slightly 
unusual is the fact she and Lewes pack a hamper not of picnic items or food stores, but 
instead of empty jars. Her activities in Ilfracombe consisted of seeking out coral, 
seaweed, and anemones and collecting them for further observation. At the same time, 
she writes she “had a great deal of work before [her]—the writing of an article on Riehl’s 
books, which I had not half read, as well as the article on belles lettres—but my head was 
still dizzy and it seemed impossible to sit down to writing at once in these new scenes, so 
we determined to spend the day in explorations” (“Ilfracombe” 217). Her daily activities 
alternated between her own writing and these explorations, and the two endeavors 
mutually influence the other.  
                                                
58 In “Modeling Natural History: George Eliot’s Framings of the Present” (1983), Suzanne 
Graver demonstrates at a formal level how Eliot’s fiction operates within a natural historical 
register. She begins by examining Eliot’s relations of time at the openings and conclusions of her 
fiction. Rather than setting the action at a historical remove, Eliot places the action at times 
within living history, within the memory of much of her readership. Doing so, Graver argues, 
promotes a sense of historical connectedness, of seeing the present as a current condition which 
has emerged out of a combination of traditions, happenings, and circumstances. Graver also notes 
that Eliot and her contemporaries were beginning to call for just such cultural histories—
evolutionary histories—rather than just records of sequential political history and the actions of a 
powerful few. 
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The trip offered Evans and Lewes a chance to experiment, and the pair often 
discovered errors in their initial guesses about the equipment they would need. About 
their “first zoophyte hunt” she writes: 
It is characteristic enough of the wide difference there is between having eyes and 
seeing, that in this region of sea-anemones, where the Mesyembryanthemum 
especially is as ‘plenty as blackberries,’ we climbed about for two hours without 
seeing one anemone, and went in again with scarcely anything but a few stones 
and weeds to put into our deep well-like jars, which we had taken the trouble to 
carry in a hamper from London, and which we had afterwards the satisfaction of 
discovering to be quite unfit for our purpose. (219-20) 
Citing the difference “between having eyes and seeing,” she acknowledges the 
difficulties amateur naturalists face before their eyes have been “trained” to find their 
intended specimens, just as experience teaches them the proper equipment to carry and 
use. 
The spring and summer of 1856 were also the seasons in which she read John 
Ruskin’s Modern Painters, books III and IV. Her descriptions in both her Ilfracombe 
journal and in “The Natural History of German Life” show her desire to enact the same 
fastidious attention to realism in art. When she arrives in Ilfracombe, she turns a keen eye 
to the details of the area and describes the landscape with terms of art evocative of 
Ruskin: 
From this end of the Capstone we have an admirable bit for a picture. In the 
background rises old Hillsborough jutting out far into the sea—rugged and rocky 
as it fronts the waves, green and accessible landward; in front of this stands 
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Lantern Hill, a picturesque mass of green and grey surmounted by an old bit of 
building that looks as if it were the habitation of some mollusc that had secreted 
its shell from the material of the rock; and quite in the foreground, contrasting 
finely in colour with the rest are some lower perpendicular rocks, of dark brown 
tints patched here and there with vivid green. (218) 
Not unlike the tendency today of looking at scenery with an eye to what composition 
would make for a good photograph (and indeed, that art was emerging in the mid-
nineteenth century as well), Eliot’s passage here is striking for its discussion of landscape 
in terms of the art used to represent it. A vista has no absolute background or foreground 
except as it is translated to canvas or paper. Colors are “tints patched here and there” as 
by an invisible brush. In order to describe a scene to her reader, Eliot must rely on the 
mediating language of art, a representational medium itself. This reversal between 
external object and the medium used to represent it is mirrored by yet another inversion 
of a typical binary, that of human versus animal. When Eliot describes a building looking 
“as if it were the habitation of some mollusc that had secreted its shell from the material 
of the rock,” she thwarts what might be the more typical readerly expectation of 
anthropomorphism, here not describing a mollusk in terms of its similarity or difference 
from human features, but instead illustrating the human habitation’s shared function with 
that of any other creature’s protective shelter. Eliot’s equating of humans with other 
animals continues, 
In hilly districts, where houses and clusters of houses look so tiny against the 
huge limbs of Mother Earth one cannot help thinking of man as a parasitic 
animal—an epizoon making his abode on the skin of the planetary organism. In a 
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flat country a house or a town looks imposing—there is nothing to rival it in 
height, and we may imagine the earth a mere pedestal for us. But when one sees a 
house stuck on the side of a great hill, and still more a number of houses looking 
like a few barnacles clustered on the side of a great rock, we begin to think of the 
strong family likeness between ourselves and all other building, burrowing house-
appropriating and shell-secreting animals. (218-19) 
Personifying the earth as a mother, perhaps with arms outstretched to her human 
offspring, Eliot quickly shifts to a more pejorative comparison: “man as a parasitic 
animal.” Eliot kicks out the pedestal, dropping humans from an elevated perspective to 
one on par with epizoa, barnacles, and “all other building, burrowing house-appropriating 
and shell-secreting animals.” Eliot’s observation realigns, or recalibrates, a reader’s 
human perspective on her species’ position in a supposed hierarchy or link in the “great 
chain of being.” 
Eliot, of course, never published this journal in her lifetime, and perhaps the notions 
she proposes here would have batted nary an eyelash. Posing such similarities did not 
upset the whole system in the way that Darwin’s On the Origin of Species would in a just 
few years’ time. But the comparisons are crucial to the habits of mind, description, and 
thinking about her human subjects that Eliot later develops in her Westminster reviews 
and her later fiction. 
Marian Evans’s journal in Ilfracombe became a space in which she could safely 
practice writing dramatic action as well as landscape description. Without dating the 
incident, she records a “favourite walk” she and Lewes took through a wood to a lane off 
Braunton Road. This route leads the pair to a ravine with a stream at the bottom, which 
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they elect to try to walk along. They approach a cottage situated near the beginning of the 
ravine and evidently associated with “a rather important looking farm-house standing 
near” (227). There they encounter one of the farm’s four-legged residents: 
As we approached this cottage, we were descried by a black pig, probably of an 
amiable and sociable disposition. But as unfortunately our initiation in porcine 
physiognomy was not deep enough to allow any decisive inferences, we felt it an 
equivocal pleasure to perceive that piggie had made up his mind to join us in our 
walk without the formality of an introduction. So G. put himself in my rear and 
made intimations to piggie that his society was not desired, and though very slow 
to take a hint, he at last turned back and we entered the path by the stream among 
the brushwood, not without some anxiety on my part lest our self-elected 
companion should return. Presently a grunt assured us that he was on our traces; 
G. Resorted in vain to hishes,59 and, at last, instigated as he says by me, threw a 
stone and hit piggie on the chop. (227-228) 
Eliot’s account inflects the meeting with humor, imbuing “piggie’s” character with 
amiability and sociability but an unfortunate obtuseness about social niceties. The 
passage also evinces amusement and a tongue-in-cheek bit of self-mocking in Eliot’s fear 
and the passive syntax in relating how Lewes’s unceremonious dismissal of the pig by 
throwing a stone at him, was “at last, instigated as he says, by me.”  
The action has its intended effect, but it elicits very different feelings in Lewes and 
Eliot: 
                                                
59 The OED defines the verb “hish" as “to make a hissing noise to hound on a dog.” It 
likewise cites a scene in Book V of The Mill on the Floss as its example for usage, where Bob 
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This was final. He trotted away, squealing, as fast as his legs would carry him; but 
my imagination had become so fully possessed with fierce pigs and the malignity 
of their bite, that I had no more peace of mind until we were fairly outside the 
gate that took us out of piggie’s haunts. G.'s peace of mind was disturbed for 
another reason: he was remorseful that he had bruised the cheek of a probably 
affectionate beast, and the sense of this crime hung about him for several days. I 
satisfied my conscience by thinking of the addition to the pig’s savoir-vivre that 
might be expected from the blow; he would in future wait to be introduced. (228) 
Eliot’s description paints a colorful scene, depicting both the action of her characters 
and suggesting their varied personalities with the account of each’s “disturbed” peace of 
mind. The decidedly ironic tone here mitigates any inept lapses into pathetic fallacy. 
Eliot’s selection of elevated diction throughout the episode (“porcine physiognomy,” 
“equivocal pleasure,” “malignity of their bite,” “savoir-vivre”) underlines the vast 
difference between simply meeting a pig on a wooded lane and the formality of 
introductions in high society. It also diffuses the fear Eliot very likely did feel in the 
situation itself; the care of omnivorous hogs unfortunately may have brought a number of 
provincial pig farmers to gruesome ends.60 
This episode is a writing exercise for Eliot, a moment recorded not for immediate 
consumption in a letter or essay, nor for a planned fictional scene. It is an experimental 
                                                                                                                                            
Jakin describes the docility of his bull-terrier, Mumps, to Mrs. Glegg: “I might hish at him by th’ 
hour together, before he’d fly at a real gentlewoman like you” (316). 
60 The danger of tending hogs is improbable, but not implausible. When I was first drafting 
this examination of the “piggie story” in 2012, I ran across an article about an Oregon pig farmer 
who had been devoured by his hogs that very week (see, e.g., the BBC news article from October 
2, 2012, available online). George Eliot’s portrayal of the episode may be told in an ironic tone, 
but beneath it lies some validity to her fear at being bitten. 
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sketch for her own pleasure, yet it is crafted by an able hand, achieving its dramatic effect 
and readerly amusement.61 Additionally, readers today should be reminded that portions 
of the Ilfracombe journal were published as passages in Lewes’s Seaside Studies. The 
Ilfracombe trip merits attention both for the effect of these excursions on George Eliot’s 
understanding of natural history and her practice in narrating them. Eliot did not simply 
record the days’ activities in her diary, but rather she constructed a version of the trip 
through her letters and journal to create an idealized narrative.62 In her journals of this 
trip, one sees the writer beginning to practice her craft. Marian and Lewes went on 
numerous nature walks, seaside rambles, and “expeditions” in the tide pools to collect 
specimens. Though she did not admit to a significant sense of accomplishment on this 
trip, Marian completed a good amount of writing: she worked on her Riehl essay for the 
Westminster; she wrote some descriptions that showed up uncredited in Lewes’s Seaside 
Studies, and her “Recollections” of the trip clearly show her appreciation of Ruskin’s 
Modern Painters, Vol. III, about which she had recently written a favorable review. Her 
diary for 20 July records that besides her review for the Leader, her journal, and another 
piece she’d begun in April, she felt she had done very little: “I have done no visible work. 
But I have absorbed many ideas and much bodily strength; indeed I do not remember 
ever feeling so strong in mind and body as I feel at this moment” (Haight 206). As Haight 
comments, “her creative life was about to begin” (206). Despite the fact that she had not 
yet chosen her pseudonym, Marian was beginning her career as George Eliot. 
                                                
61 Mary Ellen Bellanca argues Eliot “takes advantage of the journal genre’s flexibility, 
flourishing in the safety of privacy while exploiting serviceable ideas from periodical nonfiction, 
popular natural history books, and imaginative reflection” (“Recollecting Nature” 33). 
62 See Mary Ellen Bellanca’s “Recollecting Nature: George Eliot's ‘Ilfracombe Journal’ and 
Victorian Women's Natural History Writing” (1997) and her chapter on Eliot’s Ilfracombe 
journal in Daybooks of Discovery: Nature Diaries in Britain, 1770-1870 (2007). 
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Transformations of Genus and Genre 
The trip was important to Eliot as a prose stylist, a crafter of prose, and formative in 
the experience of practicing the trade, as she saw it through Riehl, of being a novelist. 
Eliot did not consider natural history from a distance, as a theory. In Ilfracombe, she 
literally rolled up her sleeves and got her hands dirty: "When we put our anemones into 
our glass wells, they floated topsy-turvy in the water and looked utterly uncomfortable; 
and I was constantly called upon to turn up my sleeve and plunge in my arm up to the 
elbow to set things right" (“Recollections” 220). Natural history required observation of 
flora and fauna close up, of being in the tide pools, the woods, the fields. To describe 
human beings was no less theoretical or abstract. Surely one could describe characters as 
they sat in drawing rooms, but so too must a writer find them in the fields, factories, 
mills, alleys, sick rooms, hospitals, nurseries, pubs, libraries, and athenaeums where they 
toiled or relaxed. For Eliot, the setting could not be an idealized creation—it must be an 
environment in which the inhabitants were born, raised, educated, married, and deceased. 
Reading Riehl amid close encounters with marine life and the locals of Ilfracombe set the 
stage for the position she’d take when writing her reviews for the Westminster.  
Looking to Eliot’s essays in the Westminster Review for clues to her fiction is not 
new. Gordon S. Haight exhorted all scholars to read “The Natural History of German 
Life” if they wished to understand the origin of her novels. “Any one who wishes to 
understand the origin of George Eliot’s novels,” he wrote, “should read the essay on 
Riehl” (202).63 My examination of Eliot in this chapter delves into this notion of an 
                                                
63 Fionnuala Dillane critiques prior work on Eliot that fails to interrogate the site of her 
publication when marking the essays as the origin of her “mission statement” for fiction. She 
argues that Marian Evans’s voice is mediated through the political stance of the periodical and its 
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“origin” for Eliot, and I focus less on Riehl as Eliot’s model for a proto-sociological 
approach to observing a people than on the methodology of natural history she applied to 
her fiction after 1856. As Mary Ellen Bellanca has noted, scholars have read Eliot’s 
“Ilfracombe Journal” as the threshold of her fiction; a sign of her interest in science; 
textual evidence of her uncredited assistance of George Henry Lewes in his Sea-side 
Studies; an effusive response to the ideas Ruskin promoted in Modern Painters; and a 
space in which her interest in observation assisted her development of her “realist” fiction 
(“Recollecting Nature” 20). Bellanca’s own take on the “Ilfracombe Journal,” however, 
suggests that the journal was a formal strategy of Eliot’s to engage in a dialogue with 
other female Victorian natural history writers, and that her text shows innovation within 
the genre. “Eliot draws on the diverse languages used by women writers of popular 
natural history,” Bellanca argues, “joining in their celebration of nature yet eschewing the 
theological and didactic orientation of many of their works” (28). 
In July 1856, the Westminster Review published George Eliot’s article, “The Natural 
History of German Life.” Eliot had just returned from her holiday in Ilfracombe with 
Lewes. Featured prominently are the effects of a sojourn during which the pair’s 
activities were so focused on marine botany and natural history: Eliot’s descriptions 
include various optical metaphors and tropes of observation, beginning with her 
                                                                                                                                            
editors, and that her claims are therefore far more vexed than critics like Haight or Shuttleworth 
allow. Dillane calls “The Natural History of German Life” “an oblique piece of writing that is 
anything but a transparent representation of George Eliot’s views on fiction, though Evans’s 
controlled turn of phrase…is of course both affecting and effective” (248). She calls Evans by 
turns “an evasive reviewer,” and “a rather uncontroversial, unoriginal, and somewhat spineless 
critic” (250). These characteristics are what Dillane uses to refute readings that unquestioningly 
cite Eliot’s artistic practice as lying within the bounds of this article. While I agree that the 
journal/periodical should be considered because it reminds one of the rhetorical situation in which 
the essay was both composed and read, the element that Dillane omits is the experience of 
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discussing of the relative knowledge people gain, for instance, in their experience of 
railways, whether as passengers, engineers, directors, shareholders, and so on. Each 
individual brings a particular way of seeing the railway’s operation, and their degrees of 
expertise either make them fit or unqualified to make decisions as to its physical 
operation or its day-to-day management and efficiency. 
“The Natural History of German Life” calls for a particular mode or method of 
writing fiction modeled after the ethnographic writings of Wilhelm Heinrich von Riehl 
(1823-97). Eliot admires his close examination of the German peasantry, finding his 
descriptions much more truthful, more accurate than the kinds of romanticized 
descriptions found in English fiction of the same period. The point for Eliot of such close 
observation and accurate description is the chance to contribute to the betterment of 
English society; that is, she hopes fiction could become a helpful guide for reform:  
If any man of sufficient moral and intellectual breadth, whose observations would 
not be vitiated by a foregone conclusion, or by a professional point of view, 
would devote himself to studying the natural history of our social classes, 
especially of the small shopkeepers, artisans, and peasantry,—the degree in which 
they are influenced by local conditions, their maxims and habits, the points of 
view from which they regard their religious teachers, and the degree in which they 
are influenced by religious doctrines, the interaction of the various classes on each 
other, and what are the tendencies in their position toward disintegration or 
towards development,—and if, after all this study, he would give us the result of 
                                                                                                                                            
Ilfracombe, a tangible, material moment that influenced her as well, and is part of that rhetorical 
situation, too, insofar as it shaped the perspective of the writer. 
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his observations in a book well-nourished with specific facts, his work would be a 
valuable aid to the social and political reformer. (112) 
By “natural history of social classes,” Eliot gestures toward ethnographic study.64 Her 
aim and hope are clear, and it seems she has a solid faith in the accurate observation of a 
well-intentioned writer. There clearly seems to be an assumption here that the observer is 
of a higher class than those people who are the heart of the study: a writer who must 
observe this class of “shopkeepers, artisans, and peasantry” must have no experience of 
his own from which to derive his understanding. And the purpose of watching them so 
closely is to discern how they are influenced by “local conditions” and “religious 
doctrines” and how they interact with other classes. The point is to progress, so the 
group’s “tendencies…toward disintegration or towards development” are important to 
note. 
How is the reformer to make a change, then? It seems in looking at Eliot’s praise of 
Dickens earlier in the essay that such fiction—fiction written by the reformer, or by the 
novelist in the service of reform—is awakening of sympathy in the class of readers for 
the classes of society described. About Dickens, Eliot writes, "We have one great novelist 
who is gifted with the utmost power of rendering the external traits of our town 
population; and if he could give us their psychological character—their conceptions of 
life, and their emotions—with the same truth as their idiom and manners, his books 
would be the greatest contribution Art has ever made to the awakening of social 
sympathies” (111). In Eliot’s view, the novelist must apply keen observation not just to 
                                                
64 In Disorienting Fiction (2005), James Buzard considers both Eliot’s ambition for exalting 
“fellow-feeling” in the essay and the lack of broader historical and political perspectives in the 
provincial community of St. Ogg’s (287). 
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describe “external traits,” as we might find in studies such as Henry Mahew’s London 
Labour and the London Poor (1851), but also to evoke their “psychological character.” In 
developing a character’s mental attitudes and emotions along with their styles of dress, 
their activities, and their words, the observant novelist can evoke a reader’s 
understanding for that character, and in turn, shape the reader’s attitudes toward the 
world outside the book. 
The problem that Eliot sees in fiction—a complaint she voices in “Silly Novels by 
Lady Novelists” as well—is a lack of keen observation and a tendency to romanticize 
characters: that is, a sense of idealized figures whose speech and character are at odds 
with their education and experience. For example, in “Natural History,” Eliot writes, 
“How little the real characteristics of the working classes are known to those who are 
outside them, how little their natural history has been studied, is sufficiently disclosed by 
our Art as well as by our political and social theories” (108). She continues, explaining: 
The notion that peasants are joyous, that the typical moment to represent a man in 
a smock-frock is when he is cracking a joke and showing a row of sound teeth, 
that cottage matrons are usually buxom, and village children necessarily rosy and 
merry, are prejudices difficult to dislodge from the artistic mind, which looks for 
its subjects into literature instead of life. The painter is still under the influence of 
idyllic literature, which has always expressed the imagination of the cultivated 
and town-bred, rather than the truth of rustic life. (108-9) 
Eliot criticizes art here for imitating art, instead of imitating life. The problem, as Eliot 
argues, is that “idyllic literature” has been penned by “the cultivated and town-bred” who 
have very little if any experience on which to base their fictions and poetry. The “truth of 
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rustic life” offers more than jokey, healthy-gummed peasants with rosy cheeks and merry 
hearts. For Eliot, it is incumbent on the artist to show his or her subject in harsh, glaring 
light if need be, rather than to falsify, embellish, or shadow. She writes, 
Art is the nearest thing to life; it is a mode of amplifying experience and 
extending our contact with our fellow-men beyond the bounds of our personal lot. 
All the more sacred is the task of the artist when he undertakes to paint the life of 
the People. Falsification here is far more pernicious than in the more artificial 
aspects of life. It is not so very serious that we should have false ideas about 
evanescent fashions—about the manners and conversation of beaux and 
duchesses; but it is serious that our sympathies with the perennial joys and 
struggles, the toil, the tragedy, and the humour in the life of our more heavily-
laden fellow-men, should be perverted, and turned towards a false object instead 
of the true one. (110-11) 
At the heart of Eliot’s criticism is the failure of art to evoke sympathy for true, lived 
human experience: “the perennial joys and struggles, the toil, the tragedy, and the 
humour.” Because art is a “mode of amplifying experience,” any perversion of 
representation is all the more damaging. 
Eliot reads fiction’s purpose—to instill a sympathetic perspective that would augment 
social and political reform—through natural history’s method. That is, Eliot found that 
close observation would be the most useful strategy for getting to know others, and by 
knowing the habits and traditions and values of another person, or another people, one 
could best serve them politically and socially to better their condition and daily lives. In 
fiction as well as in the field that would come to be known as sociology, Eliot saw the 
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potential for evoking sympathy via fictional characterization, a characterization still 
founded on close description of realistic scenes, conversations, and personas. 
An essay long considered an important lens onto Eliot’s entry into a career as a 
novelist, “Natural History” appears just months before Marian Evans begins to write 
fiction, drafting the opening to “The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Barton” in 
September. Critics have looked for evidence of Eliot’s philosophy of fiction, as expressed 
in “Natural History,” in her later novels, but I am concerned here with the 1856 moment 
more specifically as it demonstrates an episode in which Eliot defines disciplinary 
boundaries as they currently stood and also suggests how and why, at the level of genre, 
they could be surmounted. One of the “tools” of scaling such disciplinary walls is 
empirical observation: observation feeds knowledge. Such knowledge varies in degree 
about any given topic, and the Victorians lived in a milieu of scientific inquiry, social 
surveillance, imperial expansion, and biological examination, all of which required acts 
of scrutiny and observation.65 The presumed divide between nineteenth-century natural 
history and fiction is further complicated by Eliot’s contemporaneous articulation of 
fiction’s characteristics in “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists.” In this latter essay, George 
Eliot employs natural history’s discourse of observation and classification ironically as a 
                                                
65 An analysis of Eliot and observation evokes conversations about objectivity among such 
scholars as Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, and about detachment, as described by Amanda 
Anderson. George Eliot may have agreed that “objectivity” and “detachment” were never truly 
attainable any more than one could approximate true sympathy with another individual. However, 
she emphasizes the benefit of trying to do both. See, e.g., Suzy Anger’s Victorian Interpretation. 
Anger argues we should understand Eliot as a writer who does not naively imagine the perfect 
attainment of sympathy, and who “struggles against what she regards as the destructive effects of 
skepticism about understanding, even as she fully acknowledges the difficulties. Rather than 
valorizing the impossibility of understanding, or even resigning herself to it, Eliot dramatizes the 
cost of assuming the passivity of the object of interpretation” (97). 
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means of underlining the artifice found in the fiction written by so many of her female 
contemporaries. 
Serious Novels by Lady Naturalists 
Within eleven days of composing “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists,” an article that 
would appear in the October 1856 issue of the Westminster Review, Eliot began writing 
“The Sad Fortunes of the Reverend Amos Barton,” a novella serially published in 1857 
by Blackwood’s and later collected into Scenes of Clerical Life. The holiday in 
Ilfracombe and Tenby, the review of Riehl, and the exercise in writing about women’s 
fiction all set George Eliot on the path that led to her successful career as a novelist and, 
with the exception of some of her contemporary reviewers and some Modernists of the 
early twentieth century, her esteemed critical reputation as perhaps the greatest of all 
Victorian novelists. “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists” exposes the artifice of many 
women’s novels in the 1850s.66 It is the contrivance of plot and character, and their very 
superficiality, that make such novels and their authors “silly” rather than any deficiency 
of intellect or education.  
Eliot develops this thesis from the outset of her essay via her layering of the terms of 
both landscape art and natural history. Opening her essay, Eliot writes: 
Silly novels by Lady Novelists are a genus with many species, determined by the 
particular quality of silliness that predominates in them—the frothy, the prosy, the 
pious, or the pedantic. But it is a mixture of all these—a composite order of 
                                                
66 Also, putting that artifice alongside the diction of natural history, to call genres of novels 
“genuses” is to bring in a different tradition entirely, and I might argue that it is not the tradition 
of her male contemporaries who were evolutionary thinkers, but rather that of the women natural 
 142 
feminine fatuity, the produces the largest class of such novels, which we shall 
distinguish as the mind-and-millinery species. (140) 
Eliot trusts her readers possess at least passing familiarity with the classification system 
of Linnaean taxonomy, linking literary genre with genus and varieties—forms, perhaps—
within that genre as species. Throughout the essay, Eliot applies an ironic tone to what 
she labels the “mind-and-millinery species” and “oracular species” of women’s fiction. 
Doing so suggests that the relationship between varieties of texts might be linked to the 
organic world. Yet the novels Eliot indicts fail because they are lifeless and inorganic: 
they resemble nothing so much as a painting full of stock characters in a banal set piece: 
figures like a “vicious baronet, an amiable duke, and an irresistible younger son of a 
marquis” compete for the heroine’s affection “in the foreground,” with other rivals in the 
“middle distance” and “dimly indicated beyond” (140). Using terms of visual art, Eliot 
links one observational practice with another, and the ultimate effect of such linkage is 
one of artifice. The people depicted are art objects rather than living beings in a realistic 
environment. 
Elsewhere in the “Silly Novels” essay, George Eliot continues using scientific diction 
to humorous effect. When she criticizes the author of Rank and Beauty, whose 
protagonist falls in love with the Prime Minister through the medium of print only, she 
uses parallax as a metaphor to describe this character’s perspective: “This enthusiastic 
young lady by dint of reading the newspaper to her father, falls in love with the prime 
minister, who, through the medium of leading articles and ‘the resumé of the debates’, 
shines upon her imagination as a bright particular star, which has no parallax for her, 
                                                                                                                                            
historians and botany-hobbyists. Eliot is bringing their practice to bear on fiction, not just the 
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living in the country as simple Miss Wyndham” (Selected Essays 145-146). Her diction 
makes sense given the context of the novel. The passage she quotes from Rank and 
Beauty tells us that Amy’s expectations of finally meeting the prime minister are not 
disappointed: “It seemed as if a picture on which she had long gazed was suddenly 
instinct with life, and had stepped from its frame before her” (146). Using this metaphor, 
George Eliot suggests no optical distortion between a planet or star’s position and where 
it appears to the observer. Importantly here, she plays with prose that has nothing to do 
with Darwin—the figure most often cited when discussing Eliot’s engagement with 
contemporary science—and everything to do both with the establishment of natural 
history and amateur astronomy as respectable pastimes for Britons and their emergence 
as identifiable tropes in the literary marketplace. From Mary Somerville’s On the 
Connexion of the Physical Sciences—which Marian Evans had read in 1840—to Gatty’s 
Parables from Nature or Jane Loudon’s Modern Botany (1851), science writing was 
practiced by men and women, professionals and amateurs alike. What becomes even 
more intriguing in Marian Evans’s turn to writing fiction in September of 1856, having 
recently written two articles with natural history as their central theme or motif, is her 
evident awareness that natural history was a literary tradition women were already 
practicing. “Silly” novels might best be remedied not by looking to fiction by men, but by 
applying the skills of observation women naturalists were using in their instructions for 
practicing marine botany or amateur astronomy. 
Scholars have grappled with Eliot’s essay, especially feminist scholars who find in 
her castigation of a certain kind of “silly” novel a larger indictment of women writers and 
                                                                                                                                            
work of Riehl. 
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an alliance with men against her fellow countrywomen. But as critics like Susan Rowland 
Tush have pointed out, Eliot’s criticism is for the superficial and artificial content of 
these books, rather than of the character or intellectual capacity of their authors. Like 
Tush, too, critics have examined how Eliot’s novels measure up to the standards she 
defines in the “Silly Novels” essay. Perhaps it is no great leap to see in Middlemarch, for 
instance, a rewriting of the “mind-and-millinery” elements Eliot sketches in “Silly 
Novels”: 
She is the ideal woman in feelings, faculties, and flounces. For all this, she as 
often as not marries the wrong person to begin with, and she suffers terribly from 
the plots and intrigues of the vicious baronet; but even death has a soft place in his 
heart for such a paragon, and remedies all mistakes for her just at the right 
moment. The vicious baronet is sure to be killed in a duel, and the tedious 
husband dies in his bed, requesting his wife, as a particular favour to him, to 
marry the man she loves best, and having already dispatched a note to the lover 
informing him of the comfortable arrangement. (141) 
Dorothea’s feelings and faculties, if not her flounces, ultimately carry the day despite her 
erring assessment of and choice to marry Casaubon; Sir James Chattam is attentive and 
vain, but not vicious; and while tedious Casaubon dies in his bed, he spitefully denies an 
easy alliance between Dorothea and Ladislaw. Where silly novels might give us a heroine 
whose fortune guarantees “that whatever vicissitudes she may undergo, from being 
dashed out of her carriage to having her head shaved in a fever, she comes out of them all 
with a complexion more blooming and locks more redundant than ever” (141), 
Rosamond Vincy’s marriage to Lydgate fulfills “none of her hopes” (581); she is stung 
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by Ladislaw’s departure from Middlemarch, harboring a secret “belief that he had, or 
would necessarily come to have, much more admiration for herself” than for Dorothea, 
“Rosamond being one of those women who live much in the idea that each man they 
meet would have preferred them if the preference had not been hopeless” (581). George 
Eliot’s eye gives us a portrait of women and men, “warts and all”: her narrative voice is 
not always complimentary, but it is nuanced, and the people who populate her novels are 
as recognizable for their human frailty as they are for their strength. 
In “Silly Novels by Lady Novelists,” George Eliot argues that women may equal men 
in the quality of their fiction, and adds the difference of a woman’s experience. She 
explains, “a cluster of great names, both living and dead, rush to our memories in 
evidence that women can produce novels not only fine, but among the very finest; —
novels, too, that have a precious specialty, lying quite apart from masculine aptitudes and 
experience” (162). There is no restriction on their doing so, says Eliot, of either education 
or form. The only difficulty is that of mastering the technique, and it is that pitfall Eliot 
believes many of her contemporaries fall prey to. A novel, “like crystalline masses…may 
take any form, and yet be beautiful; we have only to pour in the right elements—genuine 
observation, humour, and passion” (162). Here, then, Eliot advocates that there should be 
some rules for fiction, or at least, a technique novelists should follow: observation, 
humor, and passion, and these are the elements she aims to instill in her own enterprise as 
a writer. 
George Eliot’s Novel Genre 
The naturalist’s eye Marian Evans had developed in Ilfracombe—an eye likewise 
educated by the varied books of natural history published in the decades preceding The 
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Origin of the Species—becomes omnipresent in the prose of George Eliot. In The Mill on 
the Floss, George Eliot’s characters must figure out how to reconcile their pasts with 
their living present and their hopes for the future. While on the one hand, the challenges 
they face are social and economic—Mr. Tulliver’s financial downfall and the loss of the 
mill to Wakem, for instance—they are also present in the traditions of family history, in 
gender expectations, and in the common experiences of life, loss, and death. To show the 
changing fortunes of the Tulliver family, the novel’s formal structure mimics the growth 
and decline of all living organisms: Eliot traces her characters’ daily lives and growth. 
Her prose also evokes the feeling of floating down the very river which dominates 
Maggie’s imagination as a child and influences the family’s financial stability: the 
novel’s movement, or its pacing, alternately rushes or slows. The novel is filled with a 
sense of time, growth, change, love, loss, and destruction: the inevitable, common 
experiences of being human. The novel form allows Eliot to illustrate the workings of 
heredity and environment together. Most significantly, it offers a way of contrasting a 
seemingly inevitabilities—fate—with happenstance. In 1869, George Eliot revisits some 
of the same episodes of Tom and Maggie Tulliver’s childhood—some of which were 
drawn from her own childhood—in the set of eleven sonnets titled “Brother and Sister.”67 
The sonnets contemplate these shared scenes in a far more personal voice and tone, and 
the conclusion of the poem offers a markedly different resolution. In this section, I 
consider the formal similarities and differences between the eleven sonnets comprising 
“Brother and Sister” (1869) and Book I of The Mill on the Floss. The juxtaposition of the 
sonnet sequence and the novel highlights the differences in narrative voice: while the 
                                                
67 ”Brother and Sister” appears in The Legend of Jubal and Other Poems (1874). Citations of 
the poem in this chapter, however, refer to The Complete Shorter Poetry of George Eliot, volume 
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lyric speaker of the sonnets recalls her youth and finds a peaceful, if melancholic 
resolution, the novel’s narrator tries to remain a detached observer of the action. 
Beginning The Mill on the Floss with a scene of Dorlcote Mill in the half-sleeping, 
half-waking memory of the narrator’s mind, George Eliot offers the first glimpse of the 
landscape in which the novel takes place. As readers familiar with the novel know, 
landscape matters greatly to this tale’s climactic scene, and the risings of the River Floss, 
with the consequent floodings of St. Ogg’s, foreshadow the tragic fates of the novel’s 
protagonists. George Eliot associates St. Ogg’s with the landscape surrounding it, making 
the lives of its inhabitants part of the natural history of the area. Later in Book I, the 
narrator describes St. Ogg’s as  
one of those old, old towns which impress one as a continuation and outgrowth of 
nature, as much as the nests of the bower-birds or the winding galleries of the 
white ants: a town which carries the traces of its long growth and history like a 
millennial tree, and has sprung up and developed in the same spot between the 
river and the low hill from the time when the Roman legions turned their backs on 
it front he camp on the hill-side, and the long-haired sea-kings come up the river 
and looked with fierce eager eyes at the fatness of the land. It is a town “familiar 
with forgotten years.” (115-16) 
In this description, one might hear echoes of the passage in her Ilfracombe journal, 
quoted earlier in this chapter, where she describes how the building atop Lantern Hill 
looks “as if it were the habitation of some mollusc that had secreted its shell from the 
material of the rock” (218). In both descriptions, she naturalizes human habitations, 
                                                                                                                                            
2, edited by A.G. Van den Broek and William Baker (2005). 
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making them seem organic and breaking down the presumed boundaries between human 
and nonhuman dwellings. In The Mill on the Floss, the sense of man as “a parasitic 
animal—an epizoon making his abode on the skin of the planetary organism” 
(“Ilfracombe” 218), has been replaced by a sense of continuity and community. 
Part of this sense of continuity and humankind’s harmonious presence within a 
natural landscape comes from growing up in such an environment as St. Ogg’s. Tom and 
Maggie Tulliver spend their childhood in the pastoral landscape of the town, associating 
its scenes with those they read about: Tom thinks “people were at a disadvantage who 
lived at another spot of the globe,” and when Maggie reads of Christiana passing the 
bridge-less river in Pilgrim’s Progress, she pictures the Floss. The places where we 
spend our youth, George Eliot suggests, color our impressions and shape our 
associations. “Life did change for Tom and Maggie,” explains the narrator,  
and yet they were not wrong in believing that the thoughts and loves of these first 
years would always make part of their lives. We could never have loved the earth 
so well if we had had no childhood in it,—if it were not the earth where the same 
flowers come up again every spring that we used to gather with our tiny fingers as 
we sat lisping to ourselves on the grass—the same hips and haws on the autumn 
hedgerows—…What novelty is worth that sweet monotony where everything is 
known, and loved because it is known?” (41) 
Familiarity breeds affection, suggests the novel’s narrator, a sentiment shared by 
Margaret Gatty in “The Red Snow,” a tale included in her third series of Parables. Set in 
the Alps, Gatty’s story describes how a little boy’s frequent observation of the nearby 
mountain leads him to become fondly attached to it: he “never wearied of watching the 
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huge mountain, but got to love it more and more, with a love mixed with respectful awe, 
and a feeling as if it had some sort of life and consciousness” (153). To know a place, 
both Gatty and George Eliot suggest, is to love it.  
Not only do these scenes of pastoral beauty inspire love, says the narrator, they 
likewise stimulate the imagination and are the source of nostalgia in later life. In the same 
passage describing the changes Maggie and Tom would eventually experience, the 
narrator continues:  
These familiar flowers, these well-remembered bird-notes, this sky, with its fitful 
brightness, these furrowed and grassy fields, each with a sort of personality given 
to it by the capricious hedgerows—such things as these are the mother tongue of 
our imagination, the language that is laden with all the subtle inextricable 
associations of the fleeting hours of our childhood left behind them. Our delight in 
the sunshine on the deep-bladed grass to-day, might be no more than the faint 
perception of wearied souls, if not for the sunshine and the grass in the far-off 
years which still live in us, and transform our perception into love. (41-2) 
Nostalgia is a facet of love, the narrator suggests, and one that is fed by the natural 
environment surrounding us in our youth. The details of this passage—the description of 
a sky’s “fitful brightness,” the furrows of the field, the hedgerows—are delivered 
prosaically enough, unlike the depiction Eliot provides in “Brother and Sister.” 
Just as this passage of the narrator’s musings follow a scene in which Maggie and 




Long years have left their writing on my brow, 
But yet the freshness and the dew-fed beam 
Of those young mornings are about me now, 
When we two wandered toward the far-off stream 
With rod and line. Our basket held a store 
Baked for us only, and I thought with joy 
That I should have my share, though he had more, 
Because he was the elder and a boy. 
 
The firmaments of daisies since to me  
Have had those mornings in their opening eyes, 
The bunchèd cowslip’s pale transparency 
Carries that sunshine of sweet memories, 
 
 And wild-rose branches take their finest scent 
 From those blest hours of infantine content. 
Here the poem’s speaker recollects a scene from her youth that comes back with clarity, 
for the years “have left their writing on my brow” and bring the sensations of the fresh 
morning’s “dew-fed” beams and the fragrance of the wild roses back to mind. But where 
the scene in Mill offers the free indirect discourse to illustrate both Tom and Maggie’s 
thoughts about their companionship in the outing, the lyric voice of the sonnet remains in 
the speaker’s mind alone.  
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Both the passage in Mill and Sonnet II in “Brother and Sister” relate a similar idea 
about the associations early experiences create in our minds. But the resolution to the 
poem varies significantly from the novel’s climax. Despite the fact that both the end of 
the second book of the novel and the beginning of the last sonnet of the poem share the 
theme that school time marks a break from their careless rambles as children, Maggie and 
Tom find a reconciliation at the novel’s end, albeit in a tragic way. When Mr. Tulliver 
loses his lawsuit, his property, and his health, Tom leaves school and the narrator remarks 
he and Maggie “would never more see the sunshine undimmed by remembered cares. 
They had entered the thorny wilderness, and the golden gates of their childhood had for 
ever closed behind them” (191). Similarly, the last sonnet of “Brother and Sister” begins, 
“School parted us; we never found again / That childish world where our two spirits 
mingled / Like scents from varying roses that remain / One sweetness, nor can evermore 
be singled” (11). If the narrative of Mill creates a sense of the transition from childhood 
to maturity, innocence to experience via the structure of the plot and the formal structure 
of closing one book and beginning another chapter, the poem imposes its structure 
through the tight formal elements of the sonnet, adhering to the ABAB rhyme scheme 
and iambic pentameter.  
In addition to these structural devices, the novel and the poem conclude differently: 
the poem ends in melancholy, the novel in tragedy. In the sonnet, the third quatrain reads, 
“Till the dire years whose awful name is Change / Had grasped our souls still yearning in 
divorce, / And pitiless shaped them in two forms that range / Two elements which sever 
their life’s course” (11). Eliot’s poem employs vaguely scientific diction, “two forms” 
that “range,” two “elements” that sever whatever force binds them together and move in 
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different directions. In the poem, the brother and sister never find the same camaraderie 
and singleness of spirit they enjoyed as children, and while the poem’s speaker laments 
the change, she closes the sonnet with a couplet reaffirming her consolation in the 
memories shared because she would live it again if she could: “But were another 
childhood-world my share, / I would be born a little sister there.” Poetic structure, here 
the well-known Shakespearean or English sonnet form, offers the familiarity of a lyric 
voice, the development of an idea through the three quatrains, and the resolution in the 
final couplet, including the “turn” or volta in the word “but,” providing a satisfying 
conclusion that finds consolation within the brother and sister’s estrangement. 
Maggie and Tom Tulliver, however, face a far more violent end in the seemingly 
unforeseen flooding of the Floss. The question of fate or chance is one of the central 
tensions with which the novel grapples, suggested by the habits and behaviors of the 
characters the novel traces in just over a decade. Characters like Mr Glegg find 
continuities in nature, for example, but not by close observation of organisms and their 
environment. Mr Glegg adheres to a version of natural theology in his thinking, finding 
concordances between animal life and notable events. “He surprised himself by his 
discoveries in natural history,” the narrator explains, 
Finding that his piece of garden-ground contained wonderful caterpillars, slugs, 
and insects, which, so far as he had heard, had never before attracted human 
observation: and he noticed remarkable coincidences between these zoological 
phenomena and the great events of that time,—as, for example, that before the 
burning of York Minster there had been mysterious serpentine marks on the 
leaves of the rose-trees, together with an unusual prevalence of slugs, which he 
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had been puzzled to know the meaning of, until it flashed upon him with this 
melancholy conflagration. (120) 
Mr Glegg’s interpretation of linked events amounts to a kind of augury, of revising his 
earlier confusion about the increase in slugs and reading them instead as a portent of 
imminent calamity. The slightly mocking tone of the narrator’s parenthetical aside 
indicates how one might interpret Mr Glegg’s causal thinking: “Mr Glegg had an unusual 
amount of mental activity, which, when disengaged from the wool business, naturally 
made itself a pathway in other directions” (120). The narrator’s remark suggests Mr 
Glegg is best left to contemplating wool alone. But the novel questions more seriously 
whether one might predict someone’s future via their past actions: would Maggie and 
Tom have been destined to repeat the same pattern of estrangements and reconciliations 
because of their character traits? Could surviving the flood have finally reunited them, 
once and for all? The questions are psychological, but perhaps geological in the novel’s 
plumbing the depths of characters’ minds, and in George Eliot’s layering of hints about 
what would come to pass. As much as a flood is an unforeseen event, a consequence of 
meteorological phenomena over which the residents of St. Ogg’s could exert no 
influence, the narrative makes its arrival almost inevitable.  
From Mrs. Tulliver’s admonition to her daughter not to play so close to the river—
“Maggie, Maggie…where’s the use o’my telling you to keep away from the water? 
You’ll tumble in and be drownded some day, an’ then you’ll be sorry you didn’t do as 
mother told you” (13)—to her prediction both children would drown—“They’re such 
children for the water, mine are…they’ll be brought in dead and drownded some day. I 
wish that river was far enough” (103)—the novel prepares a reader for Tom and 
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Maggie’s downfall. The narrative voice ironizes the seeming inevitability of their fate 
especially in a moment describing Maggie, the river, and destiny together: “Maggie’s 
destiny, then, is at present hidden, and we must wait for it to reveal itself like the course 
of an unmapped river we only know that the river is full and rapid, and that for all rivers 
there is a final home” (402). Unlike the river, Maggie is “mapped” already in the sense 
that she is a fictional character: just as the “final home” for all rivers is the vast ocean, the 
conclusion of all lives—and all tragedies—is death. 
When George Eliot began writing fiction, the novel had already become one of the 
most significant literary forms, and critics were largely invested not in defending its 
importance, but rather in apprising its value in teaching moral and social lessons (Maitzen 
14). When the anonymous reviewer of Jane Eyre writes in the Christian Remembrancer, 
“The Novelist is now completely lord of the domain of Fiction. Whatever good or evil is 
to be done in the present day through that medium, must be done by him” (Maitzen 20) 
for example, it is perhaps no surprise that the reviewer sees responsibility in that role, and 
a duty he or she evidently finds lacking in Charlotte Brontë’s book, where “all virtue is 
but well masked vice, all religious profession and conduct is but the whitening of the 
sepulcher, all self-denial is but a deeper selfishness” (Maitzen 18). When he reviews 
Thackeray and Dickens in The North British Review in 1851, David Masson aims to trace 
the sources of the public’s preferences between the two most renowned novelists of the 
day. He compares the two writers’ works to forms of art: the low and the high, the Real 
and the Ideal. The low school, or the real style of art, has verisimilitude, or resemblance, 
as its goal; high art gives instead a sense of the ideal, “taking the mind out of itself into a 
region of higher possibilities, wherein objects shall be more glorious, and modes of 
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action more transcendent than any we see, and yet all shall seem in nature” (Maitzen 36). 
He finds the epitome of the real school in Thackeray; of the ideal in Dickens. For each, 
Masson suggests that the “moral spirit and sentiment of a work of fiction” is the bar by 
which the novel’s success should be tried (38). The idea of being true to spirit, sentiment, 
and emotion is a theme of George Henry Lewes’s essay, “The Lady Novelists” (1852) as 
well. “All poetry, all fiction, all comedy, all belles lettres,” he writes, “even to the playful 
caprices of fancy, are but the expression of experiences and emotions; and these 
expressions are the avenues through which we reach the sacred adytum of Humanity, and 
learn better to understand our fellows and ourselves” (Maitzen 46). 
Reviews of The Mill on the Floss demonstrate readers’ appreciation of George Eliot’s 
method. An unsigned review in the Spectator on April 7, 1860 praises the writer’s 
“instinctive knowledge of the inner workings of a child’s mind” and parallel George 
Eliot’s written portrait of Maggie and Tom to that of an artist’s rendering: “the lines are 
few, the touches seem but mere accidental tints left but he pencil, but the character is 
painted to the very life” (Carroll 110). Despite taking issue with the novel’s presentation 
of spiritual conflict and passionate love—“emotions over which we ought to throw a 
veil”—the critic in the Saturday Review admits that “in the description and in the 
dialogue there are exhibited a neatness of finish, a comprehensiveness of detail, and a 
relish for subdued comedy that constantly brings back to our recollection the best 
productions of Miss Austen’s genius” (Carroll 116). If not universally in agreement about 
the novel’s morality, critics of The Mill on the Floss approved of its art and its 
resemblance to lived experience. 
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Into the mid-Victorian conversation about fiction’s duty to provide moral instruction 
and its need to be true to the writer’s experiences and emotions, George Eliot adds natural 
history’s methods of observation. To understand others is not to romanticize them unduly 
but to describe their manner and morals, foibles and failings, with equal attention and 
skill. Her reading of Riehl was but one source of George Eliot’s thinking about the aims 
for fiction. Her own experience in Ilfracombe helped her practice both natural history and 
narrative, and the trip itself coincided with a burgeoning of natural history texts and 
amateur naturalist guidebooks. To find natural history parallels in The Mill on the Floss is 
not a new discovery; rather, the experience of reading George Eliot’s familiar novel in 
the context of women’s natural history texts illuminates matters of form and the mutual 
exchange between narratives of natural history and the novel.  
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Chapter 4: 
Evolutionary Erotics and Ethics:  
Constance Naden’s Philosophical Poetics 
By the end of the nineteenth century, young Victorian women had access to higher 
education and were distinguishing themselves in their classes. Though unable to earn 
degrees in British universities until the twentieth century, they began work in a variety of 
disciplines, including the sciences.68 Yet one consequence of entry into the professional 
world of science was that women, too, became subject to the divisions among scientific 
disciplines. No longer was it feasible for anyone, regardless of sex, to synthesize the most 
current scientific research the way Mary Somerville had done so concisely earlier in the 
century. Female students of science, like their male counterparts, began to focus on 
particular sciences for advanced study.  
During the same decades when women began attending Oxbridge, they also entered 
the various “redbrick” civic institutions, located in Britain’s most industrial cities, that 
frequently emphasized scientific and engineering studies. Constance Naden (1858-1889), 
a poet, science student, philosopher, and advocate for women’s rights and charities, 
entered one such civic institution, Mason Science College in Birmingham (later the 
                                                
68 Women had been accepted into women’s colleges at Oxford and Cambridge since the late 
1860s, and while they were able to sit the examinations, the universities would not grant them 
degrees, in part because the degree conferred a say in university governance. Girton and 
Newnham Colleges at Cambridge were founded in 1869 and 1871, respectively; by 1874 women 
could sit for the degree exams. At Oxford, Lady Margaret Hall was founded in 1878, the same 
year London University began admitting women; Somerville College at Oxford was founded in 
1879. Oxford began granting women degrees in 1921; Cambridge not until 1948. For a history of 
women’s higher education in Britain, see e.g., Carol Dyhouse’s No Distinction of Sex? Women in 
British Universities, 1870-1939 (1995). For a Victorian woman’s perspective of women’s 
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University of Birmingham) in 1881, one year after T. H. Huxley had given his famous 
address on science and culture at the college’s opening. Previously, she had attended 
botany and field classes at the Birmingham and Midland Institute (Hughes 17). Naden 
was a gifted student of science, earning first class certificates in botany, organic 
chemistry, physiology, geology, and physics (Holmes 190). It was at Mason College that 
Naden composed the poems comprising her two published volumes of poetry, Songs and 
Sonnets of Springtime (1881) and A Modern Apostle; The Elixir of Life; The Story of 
Clarice; and Other Poems (1887). As John Holmes writes, “Tennyson may have been 
widely regarded by his contemporaries as having the best grasp of science, but of all the 
Victorian poets it was Naden who had the most comprehensive and up-to-date scientific 
education” (190). Upon leaving the college, Naden also left poetry behind, “having since 
then never written a verse even as a pastime” (Daniell xi). She turned instead to 
philosophy, espousing a secular materialism influenced by her scientific education, 
Herbert Spencer, and a former army doctor named Robert Lewins, whom Naden had met 
in 1876.  
Naden’s poems likewise contemplate the philosophy she adopted and named “Hylo-
Idealism,” a variation of Lewins’s monistic “hylozoism,” a theory that proposed matter 
(hyle-), rather than some kind of supernatural or external spirit, animated life and gave 
rise to consciousness. Under Naden’s Hylo-Idealism, each individual forms a subjective 
universe within his or her own mind. Her philosophy sought to reconcile body and spirit, 
and so did her verse. Yet few scholars have examined the ways in which Naden’s secular 
and scientific philosophy infused her poetry, deeming their interest only historical 
                                                                                                                                            
education, see The Higher Education of Women (1866) by Emily Davies, a co-founder of Girton 
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(Holmes 191). In a study of how women used form in various ways to interpret and 
communicate science, Naden’s philosophical poetry and her comedic verse are important. 
She subtly manipulates poetic conventions to question, if not undermine, Victorian social 
conventions regarding both gender and theology. This chapter considers the degree to 
which poetry could satisfy Naden’s scientific and philosophical ambitions at a moment 
when other women poets, too, used poetry to think through scientific questions. 
Naden’s poetry illuminates a variety of ways a late-Victorian woman could both 
respond to scientific and philosophical ideas and also express ambitions for women’s 
autonomy, but though Naden’s poems have slowly begun appearing in anthologies of 
Victorian literature, she is still an under-examined Victorian poet in today’s 
scholarship.69 Since 1977, scholars have published fewer than a dozen examinations of 
Constance Naden’s writings. These studies of Naden’s poetry have most often focused on 
the progressive feminism found in a group of poems published in A Modern Apostle 
under the heading “Evolutional Erotics.” In these poems, Naden humorously skewers the 
choices of male and female lovers who variously uphold and refute Darwin’s theory of 
sexual selection as it applied to human relationships. While some scholars have discussed 
Naden’s Hylo-Idealism in tandem with her poetry, none of these studies has investigated 
fully how Naden’s chosen forms shaped the delivery of her efforts to unite both reason 
and emotion, philosophy and poetry.70 This chapter places Constance Naden’s writings 
                                                                                                                                            
College, Cambridge. 
69 See, for example Victorian Women Poetes: An Anthology (1995), edited by Angela 
Leighton and Margaret Reynolds; Nineteenth-Century Women Poets (1996), edited by Isobel 
Armstrong and Joseph Bristow; and the online resources for the second edition of The Broadview 
Anthology of British Literature: The Victorian Era (2012), edited by Joseph Black, et al.. Naden’s 
Complete Poetical Works (1894) is also available online at the Victorian Women Writers Project. 
70 Studies of Naden have been published by Philip E. Smith II and Susan Harris Smith, James 
R. Moore, Marion Thain, Albert D. Pionke, Charles LaPorte, Andrea Kaston Tange, Nour 
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into a broad tradition of women’s choices of form and genre in which to engage scientific 
ideas in nineteenth-century Britain. Examining Naden’s poems in conversation with her 
philosophical essays also written while at Mason College, I argue Naden employed 
poetry’s formal features as part of her Hylo-Idealist project. Naden used prosodic 
elements like feminine end rhyme to particular ends, not just to unsettle Darwinian 
notions of sexual selection but also to underline her atheistic philosophy. But because 
she, not unlike John Stuart Mill, ultimately saw the aims of poetry and philosophy 
diverging—poetry might be personal, Naden thought, while only philosophy could be 
universal—Naden left the former behind. Ironically, though, while Naden’s Hylo-
Idealism fell into obscurity shortly after her death in 1889, her poems have begun gaining 
new life in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. 
In a study of nineteenth-century women’s use of genres to articulate, accommodate, 
counter, or support scientific ideas, Constance Naden stands out as a Victorian woman 
who published poetry and science. She illustrates both a culmination and a departure 
from the emerging tradition of women’s scientific writing this dissertation has traced in 
its first three chapters. As a science student, poet, and philosopher, Naden’s career at the 
fin de siècle shows how vastly different women’s educational and professional 
opportunities were from those in the century’s first decades. Where her predecessors 
more often had to learn at home in their families’ libraries, Naden received a formal 
scientific education. Naden, too, published both science and poetry for an audience 
comprised of male and female peers; she was not a “popularizer” for nonspecialist 
                                                                                                                                            
Alararbi, and John Holmes. Marion Thain offered the first thorough investigation of Naden’s 
Hylo-Idealistic poetics in “‘Scientific Wooing’: Constance Naden’s Marriage of Science and 
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audiences. Her writings likewise demonstrate the materialist ideas that gained 
prominence in the latter half of the nineteenth century: Naden, like George Eliot, gave up 
her religious faith for a secular philosophy, thus putting her at far remove from 
religiously-minded women science writers like Mary Somerville, Margaret Gatty, and 
even her closer contemporary, Arabella Buckley. Reading Constance Naden’s poems 
within a literary history of Victorian women’s science writing shows how pervasive the 
tensions were between religious and secular science even by the end of the century. 
Coming in the wake of Darwin’s Origin and Descent, Naden’s “Evolutional Erotics” 
poems tackle these anxieties with humor, thereby diffusing the threatening implications 
of evolutionary thought. Naden’s more earnest efforts to infuse her poems with Hylo-
Idealism, however, present her philosophy without ambivalence: her prosodic choices 
fortify her themes and present a unification of spirit and matter, emotion and intellect, 
theme and form.  
In this chapter, I examine how Constance Naden’s secular science and philosophy 
appear within the lighthearted and serious poems of both Songs and Sonnets of 
Springtime and A Modern Apostle. Naden’s poems, written during her college years and 
occasionally published in the Mason College Magazine, reveal her experiments in poetic 
form. In the first half of the chapter, I focus on the comic “Evolutional Erotics” poems to 
illustrate how Naden adapts her rhythms and rhyme to shape a reader’s reaction to 
recognizable Darwinian theories. I then extend my analysis of the poems’ formal features 
to argue in the second part of the chapter for a deeper understanding of Naden’s 
incorporation of Hylo-Idealism into her poetics. While the tone of the poems discussed in 
                                                                                                                                            
Poetry” (2003); Nour Alarabi has offered readings of Naden’s philosophy more recently in 
 162 
both halves of the chapter differ dramatically, I show Naden’s poems adhere to an 
internal prosodic consistency. The chapter concludes by suggesting why the results of 
Naden’s poetic experiments led her to leave poetry behind: Naden was not an innovator 
in Victorian poetics, and her investment was not in adapting a genre to a new subject the 
way Gatty or Buckley had done with fairy tales for children. Like Somerville, however, 
she echoes familiar poetic forms—again, including examples from Byron, like the meter 
of Don Juan—to evoke comparisons and subvert her readers’ expectations. If she 
hypothesized she could incorporate science and philosophy into her poems—and despite 
her ability to do so—Constance Naden ultimately found the genre of poetry ill-fitting for 
her philosophical ambitions. Yet her method of integrating science and philosophy into 
poetry illuminates another corner of late Victorian materialist debates for today’s readers. 
“Evolutional Erotics” 
 In taking scientific theories as subject matter for poetry, Naden was not alone 
among her contemporaries, including other women poets. In “The Ascent of Man” 
(1888), Mathilde Blind (1841-1896), for instance, sought a communion between the 
individual lyric voice and the community of living organisms united within Darwinian 
evolutionary theory, as Jason Rudy has argued.71 In Blind’s poetics, her regular meter 
collides with isolated lyric “spasms” (Rudy 444). A. Mary F. Robinson (1857-1944) 
offers a contemplative response to evolutionary theory in “Darwinism” (1878? 1902), a 
poem written in regular quatrains of iambic tetrameter, and suggesting that evolution 
came in response to an “unborn and aching thought,” an unrest in the human soul 
(Leighton and Reynolds 547). The poet May Kendall (1861-1943) less frequently 
                                                                                                                                            
“Constance Naden’s Philosophical Poetry” (2012). 
71 See Rudy’s “Rapturous Forms: Mathilde Blind’s Darwinian Poetics” (2006). 
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addresses scientific topics in her poems, yet her “Lay of the Trilobite” (1885) imagines a 
fossil’s rebuke of human hypocrisy:  
The native of an alien land 
You call a man and brother, 
And greet with hymn-book in one hand 
And pistol in the other! 
 
You’ve politics to make you fight 
As if you were possessed: 
You’ve cannon and you’ve dynamite 
To give the nations rest: 
The side that makes the loudest din 
Is surest to be right. (Leighton and Reynolds 631) 
As John Holmes has argued, Kendall’s poem cautions against taking humanity’s 
seemingly esteemed place in evolution too seriously (“Lay” n. pag.). Emily Pfeiffer’s 
(1827-1890) poem “Evolution” (1880) suggested that hunger—an insatiable longing—
rather than an instinct for reproduction, drove the changes in species over time, not unlike 
the “unrest” in A. Mary F. Robinson’s poem. We should read Naden’s poems 
interrogating evolutionary theory as part of this larger conversation among women poets 
at the fin de siècle, and recognize that only Kendall and Naden offer their critiques using 
a comic or satiric tone. 
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 The pliancy of comedy—its ability alternately to entertain, parody, and critique—
has long made it a desirable genre for artists of the word, image, and stage. 72 No less true 
for nineteenth-century England than for the Athens of Aristophanes, poets and 
playwrights have often chosen comedy to articulate the vexed social position of women.  
The implicit purpose and politics behind a comic writing style vary according to the 
social conditions in which these artists compose. In Constance Naden’s case, her comic 
poems of courtship participate within a larger cultural spirit of Victorian antagonism 
toward Darwin’s theory of sexual selection. Choosing comedy as a genre for critique 
meant that women like Naden could both defuse and pique readers’ disquiet about 
women’s agency and power within the dynamics of sexual selection. Naden’s poetics in 
her “Evolutional Erotics” poems offer, as it were, a comedy of choices: her lovers’ 
selection of potential marriage partners parody the tropes of romantic lyric poetry. 
Written as “light verse,” these poems wryly illustrate how women, not men, select their 
mates.  The poems’ humor adds a deceptive air of superficiality to an otherwise incisive 
commentary on the social dynamics of unmarried men and women. 
 Naden’s section “Evolutional Erotics” in A Modern Apostle comprises just four 
poems: “Scientific Wooing,” “The New Orthodoxy,” “Natural Selection,” and “Solomon 
Redivivus, 1886.” All four are short lyrics voiced by first-person speakers, in marked 
contrast to the long narrative poems that precede it in the volume (“A Modern Apostle,” 
“The Elixir of Life,” “The Story of Clarice”). “Scientific Wooing” describes a young 
man’s desires to woo his intended, Mary Maud Trevylyan, using tropes from chemistry, 
                                                
72 In addition to the vast number of humorous poems published in the nineteenth-century, 
poetry—the genre and its forms—could become an object for parody as well. Carolyn Williams’s 
essay “Parody and Poetic Tradition: Gilbert and Sullivan’s Patience” (2008) articulates how 
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Newtonian physics, botany, and mathematics. “The New Orthodoxy” takes an epistolary 
format, written as a poetic letter from a scientifically-minded young woman, Amy, to her 
fiancé Fred, whom Amy fears has lost his faith in secular evolutionary theory. “Natural 
Selection” again voices the perspective of a scientific young man, this time one who loses 
the object of his affection, Chloe, to another suitor who dances and sings far better than 
the speaker. Lastly, “Solomon Redivivus, 1886” recounts the evolution of mankind from 
the most basic organisms to the highest forms of life, epitomized in the figures of King 
Solomon and the Queen of Sheba. Each of these poems is witty in tone, exhibits a regular 
meter and rhyme scheme, and treats its subject lightly: that is, without too deep an 
inquiry into its subject. The musical, sing-song quality of the poems’ rhythms are playful 
rather than ponderous. 
 Naden’s use of rhyme is one of the most striking formal features of her courtship 
poems. Playful uses of rhyme typically characterize poetry considered “light verse.” 
Coupled with trimeter or tetrameter feet, end-stopped lines and masculine line endings—
where the stress falls on the last syllable of a poetic foot—call attention to unusual 
rhymes. The distinction of calling rhymes masculine or feminine—meaning rhymes 
ending with stressed or unstressed syllables, respectively—derives from the entry of 
French loan words and poetry into the English language. The Oxford English Dictionary 
traces the idea of masculine and feminine rhymes or endings to sixteenth-century 
England and texts like Henry Wotton’s Courtlie Controversie of Cupid’s Cautels (1578) 
or Samuel Daniel’s Panagyricke (1601), so this gendered notion of rhyme scheme was 
widespread among poets by the nineteenth century.  
                                                                                                                                            
parody on stage could humorously skewer both low and high nineteenth-century poetic practices, 
the idyllic and the aesthetic. 
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 Rhyme, composed of either the stressed or unstressed endings of lines, then, was 
not a neutral element of prosody: it was fraught with implications of both gender and 
quality. Some nineteenth-century prosodists paid little attention to rhyme, favoring 
instead the rhythms of poetic meter. In John Earle’s chapter on prosody in The Philology 
of the English Tongue (1873), for instance, he suggests rhyme serves as meter’s 
helpmate:  
Rhyme is an attendant upon metre; its office is to mark the ‘verse’ or turn of the 
metre, where it begins again. Rhyme is an insignificant thing philologically, as 
compared with alliteration: for whereas this is, as we have before shown, an 
accentual reverberation, and rests upon the most vital parts of words; rhyme is but 
a syllabic resonance, and rests most frequently upon those syllables which are 
vocally of the lowest consideration. (613) 
Earle’s chapter discusses far more diligently the sources of alliterative accent in English 
verse. George Saintsbury (1845-1933) treats rhyme just in an appendix to the third 
volume of his History of English Prosody (1910). In the Science of English Verse (1880), 
American poet Sidney Lanier (1842-1881) explains multisyllabic rhymes as “feminine, 
female, or double-ending rhymes” (285). By the twentieth century, feminine rhymes were 
associated with humor, as described in George R. Stewart’s The Technique of English 
Verse (1930): “To many people double rime has seemed a debased form fit for comic or 
burlesque purposes” (169-70). Conversely, Egerton Smith argues in The Principles of 
English Metre (1923) that “the deliberate use of disyllabic rimes in a regular alternating 
scheme really commences in the early nineteenth century with Scott, Moore, Byron, 
Shelley, and Praed,” and Smith’s footnote to this statement criticizes Keats’s use of 
 167 
feminine rhyme for making “the rhythm too effeminate in character” (181). While they 
are used in contrast to Augustan verse’s masculine endings, says Smith, they were 
“spasmodically frequent” instead of having an “organic structural function” (181).  
 While on the surface a pattern of halting or humorous end-rhymes may appear to 
keep a poem’s message in the realm of entertainment only, Naden’s poems repeatedly 
assert a female power of sexual selection under the guise of parody.  Her satiric rhymes 
serve as one instrument of resistance.  Writing about rhyme as “a performance of 
resurrection,” Gillian Beer argues that a variety of poets—including Swinburne, Hopkins, 
James Clerk Maxwell, May Kendall, and Mathilde Blind—used rhyme to question belief, 
not only what to believe but also the very possibility of believing (193).  Beer observes, 
“belief...has as its corollary resistance to belief, and rhyming light verse in the Victorian 
period specializes in satiric inversion” (193).  When Beer examines Naden’s “The New 
Orthodoxy,” for example, she reads Amy’s chastisement of her fiancé’s lapsed “faith” in 
science as one such satiric inversion: the orthodoxy of the poem is not religious faith but 
rather the notions of secular materialism. Such a reading is clearly evident and 
compelling. What is more, the poem evinces a subtly shifting power dynamic between 
the affianced couple as well. 
 When the speaker in “The New Orthodoxy,” Amy Merton, writes to her fiancé 
Fred, she first answers the concerns he has expressed about how her studies have affected 
her feelings toward him. The opening stanza’s lines imply Amy’s efforts to reassure him 
have failed—“you’re not content / Though I quote the books you lent, / And I’ve kept 
that spray you sent/ Of the milk-white heather” (139). While she has reciprocated with 
his romantic gestures, Fred fears Amy is “too ‘advanced’ / To remember all that chanced 
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/ In the old days, when we danced, / Walked, and rode together” (139). Assuring Fred 
that “beneath the curls / Of the most ‘advanced’ of girls / Many a foolish fancy whirls,” 
Amy wryly indicates even educated girls can be romantic. But then she turns the subject 
to the real source of her misgivings about Fred. She questions whether rumors of her 
fiancé’s scientific skepticism are true and hints that their engagement may not survive 
such differing philosophies. The reason for her hesitation appears in the fifth stanza, just 
over halfway through the poem: 
Oh, the wicked tales I hear! 
Not that you at Ruskin jeer, 
Nor that at Carlyle you sneer, 
 With his growls dyspeptic: 
But that, having read in vain 
Huxley, Tyndall, Clifford, Bain 
All the scientific train— 
 You’re a hardened sceptic! (140) 
Despite her lover’s hurried requests to marry, Amy pauses.  While their hearts had been 
“so meetly matched” in childhood, their subsequent educations at Oxford and Girton 
have erected a larger obstacle to marital bliss than his parents’ class-based objections.  
Here, Amy points out that Fred’s dismissal of secular scientists and intellectuals—
biologist T. H. Huxley; physicist John Tyndall; mathematician William Clifford; and 
pioneer of psychology, Alexander Bain—counts as a far more serious piece of gossip 
than simply a dismissal of John Ruskin or Thomas Carlyle. The marriage will not 
proceed without her assent, and she lists her reservations in the subsequent stanzas, 
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ending the list of rumors with the most weighty accusation, “Something worse they 
whisper too, / But I’m sure it can’t be true— / For they tell me, Fred, that you / Scoff at 
Herbert Spencer!” (208).  Responding to these rumors with alarm, Amy exhorts Fred to 
explain: 
Write--or telegraph--or call! 
Come yourself and tell me all: 
No fond hope shall me enthrall, 
   No regret shall sway me: 
Yet--until the worst is said, 
Till I know your faith is dead, 
I remain, dear doubting Fred, 
Your believing   AMY. (141) 
Naden inverts the rhetoric of spiritual faith and belief, making scientific principle the 
higher authority that would legitimize their union.  The final stanza uses diction and 
rhyme subversively, casting Fred in the Christian role of a doubting Thomas and 
ominously rhyming his name with “dead,” suggesting the potential end to their 
engagement. The form of the poem reinforces its sense. Each of the poem’s octaves 
consists of a pattern of trochaic tetrameter tercets followed by a trimeter line with a 
feminine ending. (To identify the pattern of stress, I have printed the stressed syllables in 
boldface.) The symmetry of the poem’s form (eight stanzas of eight lines each), the 
regular meter, and the heavy aural repetition conveyed by three consecutive rhymes 
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discourage a reader or listener from taking the sense of the poem too seriously or 
critically; the sound is too strong, too reminiscent of nursery rhymes or ballads.73 
 Yet the form of the poem and its satiric inversions are just what demonstrate how 
Naden is participating in a conversation about sexual selection. Her speaker suggests that 
while “jeering” and “sneering” at Ruskin and Carlyle could be overlooked, rejecting 
Darwin and Spencer, the two foremost proponents of natural selection and “survival of 
the fittest,” respectively, is unacceptable. It is enough to make Amy reconsider Fred as an 
eligible suitor.  Common reasons for breaking an engagement might include infidelity, 
cooled passions, familial disapproval, or other breaches of trust; here, however, Amy’s 
reservations suggest a husband would have to agree with her scientific worldview. A 
dismissive skepticism is not, in Naden’s poem, an attractive quality in a mate. Naden’s 
choice of the poem’s structure and form also underline such a theme: her feminine end 
rhymes in the fourth and eighth lines of each stanza result from removing the last 
unstressed syllable of the tetrameter lines. In the parlance of prosody, the feminine stress 
is missing. This subtraction does not, however, suggest that the female voice is 
“peripheral in the poem,” as Patricia Murphy argues, “implying only a limited 
opportunity for a woman to participate in the discourse of science, as well as poetry” 
(“Fated Marginalization” 121). Rather, the masculine triplet lines suggest excess and, 
perhaps, Fred’s redundant belaboring of his proposals. Instead of seeing the B-lines as 
missing the final stress of the tetrameter lines, a reader might instead notice that the 
tetrameter lines end on the initial stress, snipping off the unstressed second syllable of the 
trochaic foot. Far from being a “feeble version of its male counterpart,” as Murphy claims 
                                                
73 The rhyme scheme of these stanzas is AAABCCCB. 
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(121), Amy’s voice—emphasized by the feminine endings of the B-lines—stands out in 
defiance. 
 While “The New Orthodoxy” rejects religious faith, Naden’s other poems suggest a 
scientific mind is not wholly a desirable trait.  If Amy Merton seeks a husband who will 
complement her “new orthodoxy,” she still might steer clear of Mary Maud Trevylyan’s 
suitor in “Scientific Wooing.”  This time voiced by an amorous young man, Naden’s 
poem still reveals that in the courtship dance, it is the man who must woo and appear to 
his best advantage. Unlike Darwin’s male peacocks, to court his intended, a human 
suitor’s “strut” should display both his physique and his acumen.  Yet beneath the 
humorous facade, the use of rhyme in “Scientific Wooing” reveals the speaker’s brash 
and aggressive personality, a trait that may likely outweigh an attractive appearance. 
 In “Scientific Wooing,” rhyme again diverts the poem’s reader or listener, and the 
conspicuous changing of registers between love and science create a humorous 
atmosphere simultaneously with a subversive critique of the speaker’s motives.  Drawing 
again upon Gillian Beer’s analysis of rhyme, we can consider more fully how Naden’s 
poem negotiates the power relationship between men and women.  As Beer writes, rhyme 
sometimes 
trivializes.  That may indeed be an important cultural function for rhyme, 
observable in some of these Victorian verses:  trivializing can defuse anxieties--
while at the same time the agitation of rhyme can give expression to anxiety.  
Anxiety and release are held together, neither negated.  Rhyme contaminates.  It 
can cross speech registers and cultural zones kept wide apart.  It may, thus, 
become a form of cultural treachery (or critique), at odds with authority. 
 172 
…Rhyme’s unargued juxtaposition of unlike words can topple all the grave 
hierarchies of what it is polite (or politic) to couple with what.  So ‘light verse’ 
may throw light on the dark corners of a culture. (199-200) 
In “Scientific Wooing,” rhyme throws its light on the speaker’s desire to win over—even 
conquer—Mary.  The unusual rhymes almost immediately provide amusement by 
subverting our expectations: 
For when my daily task was o’er 
I dreamed of H2SO4, 
   While stealing through my slumbers placid 
Came Iodine, with violet fumes, 
And Sulphur, with its yellow blooms, 
   And whiffs of Hydrochloric Acid.  (135) 
Even a reader familiar with a vast quantity of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English 
parodic verse is likely unprepared for “o’er” to rhyme with the chemical notation for 
sulphuric acid; nor are we likely to expect clouds of gaseous iodine and sulphur to be 
likened to fragrant “blooms,” or to consider the best-fitting rhyme for “placid” to be 
“acid.”  Very likely, a reader could quickly read the poem, dismiss it with a laugh as an 
example of uncomplicated light verse, and move on to Naden’s serious sonnets.  Instead, 
I suggest that the speaker’s boasting should be read as a parody of male displays of 
sexual prowess performed to attract a female; here, the speaker thinks his knowledge of 
science, not attractive physical features, will help him successfully court Mary.  
However, Naden’s rhymes call out to be read ironically; we likely empathize with Mary 
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Maud, who never actually appears on the poem’s stage, and we may believe her to be 
better off without her ardent suitor. 
 This “youth of studious mind,” the poem’s speaker, appears a more narcissistic than 
dedicated lover; his interest seems to dwell on parading his scientific understanding 
rather than making more sincere, if less elaborate metaphors for his love.  He wishes for a 
spectroscope that could measure a “pure and incandescent” glow of love in Mary’s eyes; 
he compares his attraction to her using Newton’s law of universal gravitation; he 
imagines singing a “deep Darwinian lay” whose sexually suggestive imagery of 
“trembling stamens” and stigma-kissing anthers would, no doubt, make his intentions 
known even more explicitly than he could by floriography.  For all of his veiled 
references to mating (i.e., “sweet communion,” “Chemic union,” and flower pollination), 
the speaker fails to see that scientific knowledge alone will not engender healthy 
offspring.  All of these scenarios reveal the speaker’s flawed logic and the limitations of 
his metaphors, for each undermines the legitimacy of his claim to a superior intellect and, 
by extension, a desirable sex characteristic.74   
 Much to his dismay, the suitor who voices “Natural Selection,” for instance, comes 
to realize that his choice of a potential mate matters little in the evolutionary game.  
Despite his efforts to win over Chloe, he discovers that she prefers “an idealess lad” who 
knows no science:  “He seeks not the How and the Why, / But he sings with an amateur’s 
grace, / And he dances much better than I” (143).  Thus the narrator realizes that Chloe 
                                                
74 Naden’s choice in naming the speaker’s intended partner Mary Maud Trevylyan evokes a 
real-life counterpart, a woman who was, in fact, more than sympathetic to men of science. 
Seventeen-year-old botanist Paulina Jermyn (1816-1866) fell in love with Sir Walter Trevelyan at 
the 1832 meeting of the BAAS. Lady Trevelyan became a patron of the arts, becoming friends 
with Ruskin, Swinburne, the Brownings, the Rossettis and other members of the Pre-Raphaelite 
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adheres to Darwinian principles in both philosophy and in practice. She attests to a belief 
in evolution when she admonishes his desecration of “an ancestor’s grave” by collecting 
the bones of “cave-men,” and, as “we know the more dandified males / By dance and by 
song win their wives,” she chooses a suitor who possesses the traits and skills her 
upbringing, i.e., her own breeding, has deemed desirable (143). 
 While women do the choosing in Naden’s comic poems, they do not always 
“naturally select” the best mate possible.  Putting into conversation one of Naden’s 
poems from her earlier volume, Songs and Sonnets of Springtime (1881), with “Scientific 
Wooing” suggests one potential outcome if the latter’s speaker were to successfully woo 
Mary Maud Trevylyan.  In “Love Versus Learning,” the female speaker describes her 
ambivalence about the choice she has made.  Even though the poem does not explicitly 
state that the pair will marry, the final stanza closes off any alternate reading because the 
speaker puts down the pen with which she has been journaling--presumably her diary 
contains the “text” of the poem we are reading--as soon as her suitor knocks at the door. 
 The narrator of “Love Versus Learning” admits that her initial impression of her 
lover was flawed, and at the same time, her confidences allow the reader to question her 
judgment even further.  Basing her assessment on her suitor’s qualifications, she 
succumbs to her girlish fancies of falling in love with a man of learning: 
He promised to love me for ever, 
   He pleaded, and what could I say? 
I thought he must surely be clever, 
   For he is an Oxford M.A. 
                                                                                                                                            




But now, I begin to discover 
   My visions are fatally marred; 
Perfection itself as a lover, 
   He’s neither a sage nor a bard.  (89) 
Her lover’s devotion to learning has lasted only as long as his formal education; now that 
he’s left college behind him, he has decided to leave any new opinions and thought there 
as well.  Thus he likewise discourages the narrator from pursuing any intellectual 
pursuits, belittling her efforts to discuss logic or science and calling her a “dear little 
goose” (89).  Still, he wins over the narrator with seemingly clever scientific analogies 
and compliments: 
He says that the sun may stop action, 
   But he will not swerve from his course; 
For love is his law of attraction, 
   A smile his centripetal force.   
 
His levity’s truly terrific, 
   And often I think we must part, 
But compliments so scientific 
   Recapture my fluttering heart.  (90) 
Curiously, the narrator seems to dismiss his frivolous attitude thanks to a well-timed 
compliment that may owe something to Shakespeare’s Hamlet; yet the success of these 
facile compliments puts the narrator’s discernment into question.   
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“Scoffing at each grave occupation” and calculating “how to make two into one” 
suggest that the lover’s wordplay is designed only to charm the narrator and retain her 
affection, not to express sincere feeling.  The rhyme and rhythm of the poem also 
underline the speaker’s limited judgment.  The quatrains all contain a regular trimeter 
composed of an iamb and two anapests, again evoking a child-like adherence to a nursery 
rhyme beat.  Noticeable again is Naden’s inclusion of feminine end rhymes in all of the 
A-lines, and the consistency with which she clings to the extra syllables here highlights 
the narrator’s intent to remain with her chosen partner, whatever the cost.  Or, perhaps the 
devotion to a regular rhythm indicates a reluctance to allow any real questioning of her 
choice; to step out of the rhythm would be to step out of the relationship and admit the 
possibility of never finding “the sage and the lover combined.”  In either case, the poem 
does emphasize this woman’s choice, and the comic tone glosses over the serious 
implications of an unequal marriage.  
 Within these “Evolutional Erotics” poems, Naden has carefully employed comedy 
to subvert Darwin’s assertion that the human animal has balked at nature and made 
sexual selection the province of the male.  Naden’s poems hold the idea up to ridicule by 
illustrating how the choice of a partner still resides with women.  However, she does not 
make women the paragon of intellect unilaterally; women are capable of making a poor 
choice just as well as a wise one, as her earlier poem, “Love Versus Learning” 
demonstrates.  Evolution relies on natural selection; one may infer that the weaker unions 
are not fruitful, intellectually and/or biologically.  It seems, however, that ultimately 
Naden is less concerned with the biological offspring of these pairings.  Instead, her 
poems focus on the philosophical, not just social, marriages of equal individuals, a radical 
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notion that Naden couches in light verse so that its threat is tempered by the fact that 
readers can elect to read the message as a facetious one.  If the form of the poem must 
follow the spirit of the theme, Naden’s aesthetic features serve her political and social 
commentary. 
Naden’s Poems of Hylo-Idealism 
In part one of this chapter, I have suggested Naden’s engagement with Darwinian 
sexual selection manifests not only in her poems’ themes but also in their poetic form. 
The rhythms of “Evolutional Erotics” poems conform to features associated with 
lighthearted verse and ballads, yet Naden’s rhymes do more subversive work in 
maintaining the presence of a female voice. Turning now to her philosophical poems, I 
demonstrate how Naden’s choices in stanza forms, meter, and rhyme again cohere to 
inform a poetics steeped in a belief of the unity between matter and ideal, body and spirit. 
My analysis of Naden’s prosody is informed by current scholarship in historical poetics 
written by Kirstie Blair, Jason David Hall, Meredith Martin, Jason Rudy, and others. 
Blair and Rudy demonstrate the correspondence between poetic form and physiological 
response; Martin establishes English prosody’s concurrent development with narratives 
seeking to define national culture: meter was not a static and ahistorical form; and Hall 
describes late nineteenth-century scientific experiments with metrics, acoustics, tonal 
duration, and stress.75 These studies demonstrate the historical and cultural contingency 
of poetic form, correcting the notion that prosody has always comprised a fixed set of 
rules abstracted from the lived experiences of poets and their readers. It is this historical 
                                                
75 See, e.g., Kirstie Blair’s Victorian Poetry and the Culture of the Heart (2006); Jason David 
Hall’s “Materializing Meter: Physiology, Psychology, Prosody” (2011); Meredith Martin’s The 
Rise and Fall of Meter (2012); and Jason Rudy’s Electric Meters (2009). 
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sense of prosody in Victorian Britain that I apply to Naden’s poetics. However, Naden’s 
poetry is less invested either in reflecting or promoting national character, or registering 
poetic rhythms in the body than it is in demonstrating a unity between matter and 
phenomena.  
 Naden’s career as a poet and philosopher is notable for this study of the genres of 
women’s scientific writing because she published both poems and scientific essays. 
Worth noting is how Naden used different names and initials according to the kind of 
publication. Though she published her poetry under her given name, Constance C. W. 
Naden, she published her philosophical articles under the initials C.N., sometimes under 
the name Constance Arden, and sometimes the initials C.A. (Hughes 29). Her articles 
appeared in journals that discussed both philosophy and the sciences of mind, including 
The Journal of Science, Knowledge, the Agnostic Annual, and London Society (Hughes 
30). 
 Constance Naden articulated her theory of Hylo-Idealism most explicitly in 1884, 
when she published “Hylo-Idealism: the Creed of the Coming Day” in Our Corner. In 
this essay, she makes a case for the material origins of consciousness. Central to human 
perception is sight, Naden argues, and by association, the physiology of both the eye and 
the optic nerve become paramount. Science, Naden writes, 
tells how a myriad ethereal waves, of inconceivable minuteness, enter the tiny 
window of the eye, and beat against the delicate lining of its darkened chamber. 
The pulsations are taken up, and transmitted along the optic nerve to the base of 
the brain, and thence to the grey thought-cells of the cerebral hemispheres. And in 
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these grey thought-cells lives the God who says, “Let there be light,” and there is 
light. (276) 
She goes on to explain how an injury to the optic nerve would thus impede the messages 
conveyed to the brain and thus permanently change the scope of that human brain’s 
perception of external phenomena. The cerebrum, Naden argues, “is not a First Cause, 
since a stimulus is needed to set him into action; but it is certainly the only authentic 
Creator of the world as yet discovered by science, philosophy, or religion” (276). Naden 
also discusses how organic life emerges from inorganic elements though chemistry. 
About cellular renewal and decay, she writes, “the circle from inorganic to organic, and 
back again from death to life, and from life to death, is never interrupted. Nowhere can 
we point to a manifestation of energy, and say:—This is the work of pure nous, the spirit; 
hype, the physical agency, here finds its occupation gone. The parent of light, sound, 
odor, also generates the fairest imaginings of the poet, the grandest generalizations of the 
scientist or thinker, the noblest deeds of hero and saint” (278). Naden’s atheistic 
philosophy allows no supernatural agency in the development of organic life nor the 
higher forms of sentience, artistic creativity, or intellectual contemplation. In Hylo-
Idealism, matter itself generates consciousness: thought is no longer an immaterial 
essence but a physiological property inherent in higher species. 
When she turns her attention to human friendships and sympathy, she acknowledges 
that no one can truly transgress the boundaries of another individual’s personality. Yet 
she says this inability is true in one sense only. In another sense, such communion 
transpires constantly: 
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All with whom we live, all with whom we hold intercourse, all of whom we read, 
hear, or think, are received into the mind through the portals of the senses, and 
become actual parts of the ego. We understand them only so far as we are able to 
identify them with ourselves. Our own thoughts give us a key to their thoughts, 
and enable us to translate their words and gestures. (279-80) 
Naden sees in human relations the analogy of two facing mirrors, where each reflects the 
reflection of the other. Human sympathy resides in each human mind’s ability to 
recognize the outlines of another’s character by comparison with his or her own. Here, 
Naden suggests, lies the “germ of all altruistic morality” (280). Naden’s notions of 
sympathy appear similar to Herbert Spencer’s, whose “Data of Ethics” she likewise 
discusses in another essay, “Evolutionary Ethics,” published in Induction and Deduction 
(1890). There, following Spencer, Naden identifies a scientific basis for sympathy as 
character trait evolving from social conditions in which it is useful (112). But then she 
expands on Spencer’s epistemological sympathy, or synthetic philosophy, using her own 
Hylo-Idealism to suggest the material source of thought and the physical “germ” of 
sympathy: “the thought of a fellow creature carries with it the thought of his feelings; and 
here, at last, we reach the germ of sympathy” (130). 
 If monism, or oneness, is the heart of Naden’s philosophy, then it inflects the form as 
well as the sense of her poems explicitly addressing her philosophy’s ideals. In the same 
way that Naden chooses a light touch to satirize the courtship dances of her fellow men 
and women at Mason College—upholding sexual selection at the same time she 
undercuts Darwin’s diminishing of women’s agency—she adopts a serious tone, style, 
and poetics for her philosophical poems. Yet while she shows herself to be adept at the 
 181 
formal features of serious poetry as well as those of comic verse, poetry’s supposed 
limitations to subjective experience rendered it unsuitable for her broader ambitions as a 
philosopher. Yet her choices in form and subject offer today’s readers insight into one 
strain of secular thought that burned brightly for a short time before it was extinguished. 
Far from becoming the “creed of the coming day,” Naden’s Hylo-Idealism lingers in her 
poetry. These poems represent one scientific woman’s intervention into the most timely 
debates of her day. 
“The Astronomer” opens Songs and Sonnets of Springtime (1881), beginning a 
section of poems voiced by speakers who each find discord in their beliefs, an opposition 
between what they believe and what they experience. Despite the religious beliefs 
possessed by a number of the speakers, none is content and tranquil in his or her current 
state. Following “The Astronomer,” Naden places poems voiced by a young woman 
going to confession, a Roman philosopher addressing Christian priests, a druid, a 
Carmelite nun, an alchemist, a sculptor, and many others. “The Astronomer” establishes 
many of the same kinds of internal conflicts voiced by the speakers of the subsequent 
poems, and it is notable that the voice opening the volume is that of a scientist. Naden 
places her secular scientist into the same category as her Christian, pantheistic, and 
polytheistic speakers. Naden’s astronomer voices an awe of the sublime universe he 
studies—similar to the idea of astronomy proposed by Mary Somerville—but he yet 
remains troubled about his own prospects in the universe—not unlike the fears expressed 
by Swithin St. Cleeve in the passage from Thomas Hardy’s Two on a Tower (1882), with 
which I began chapter one. The troubled astronomer of Naden’s poem finds a sense of the 
divine that upheld Mary Somerville’s pleasure in astronomy, yet he laments a “lack of 
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earth-born hope” for humanity to find harmony with the wider universe. With “The 
Astronomer,” Naden begins her poetic efforts to illustrate a philosophy that would unite 
earthly experience and celestial contemplation. 
Describing his “chosen home” in an observatory atop a mountain where he can see 
uninterrupted vistas of sky, sea, and earth, the opening stanzas emphasize the 
astronomer’s distance from his fellow men. Though he enjoys the earthly scenes, he has 
given them up for his star-gazing. “All these I love,” he states, “but only heaven is near, / 
Only the tranquil stars I know; / I see the map of earth, but never hear / Life’s tumult far 
below” (3). His chosen path means he only has the stars for company, and he looks at 
“common fields and trees” in “half-regretful ignorance” (3). The speaker’s choice to 
forego a social life with his fellow men continues as a theme throughout the poem. 
Comparing his work as an isolated astronomer with that of men on the shores and 
fields below, the astronomer questions their respective choices: 
Scant fare for wife and child the fisher gains 
 From yon broad belt of lucent grey; 
Rude peasants till those green and golden plains; 
 Am I more wise than they? 
 
Oh, far less glad! And yet, could I descend 
 And breathe the lowland air again, 
How should I find a brother or a friend 
 ‘Mid earth-contented men? (4) 
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A fisherman’s labors only yield “scant fare” for his family, and the peasants working the 
fields are “rude,” or primitive compared to the celestial scope of the astronomer’s toil. In 
answering the question ending the previous stanza, “Am I more wise than they?” the 
astronomer shifts the terms of the query, answering “Oh, far less glad!” Across the space 
between the stanzas, the speaker associates wisdom with gladness, inverting the sense of 
wisdom as an intellectual pursuit for knowledge versus the sagacity of lived experience. 
But in the following lines’ turn—“And yet, could I descend / And breathe the lowland air 
again”—the astronomer demonstrates again his binary thinking: atop his mountain 
observatory, he misses the social life of laboring men below, but he imagines that if he 
were to leave his lofty observatory, he would find no true camaraderie among men who 
didn’t share a similar love for the stars. 
In the following stanzas, the astronomer continues this train of thought, imagining a 
married life marred by a similar sense of longing despite the loving caresses of a wife. He 
fears that however much he might love her, he “needs must break the heart / that puts its 
trust in me” (4). His consolation as a solitary astronomer comes in the form of his muse, 
Urania, whom he imagines supporting his steadfast astronomical study. Eventually, 
Urania grows too brilliant even in his imagination, blinding him so much that he dares 
not look. Overwhelmed by her radiance, the astronomer asks, “How shall immortal 
splendour wed the gaze / Of man, who knows but that which seems, / Whose sight were 
blinded, if the sun should blaze / With unrefracted beams?” (6). Highlighting human 
limited sensory experience, the astronomer uses the terminology of science to draw an 
analogy between direct sunlight and a god-like muse. 
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Yet the astronomer also recognizes that muses, like the legends of gods and heroes, 
are but the creation of man’s brain and thus subject to the whims of human storytelling: 
“But what is she, whose beauty makes me blind, / Whose voice is like the voice of Fate? / 
What, save a lustrous mirage of the mind, / My slave, whom I create?” (6). Invoking the 
muse of astronomy, the speaker turns the terms of inspiration from an external source to 
an internal creation. The point of such musings, in fact, comes from the fact that “from 
such dear illusions Wisdom springs, / Though these may fade, she shall not die; / In 
fabled forms of heroes and of kings, / E’en yet we map the sky” (7). Mythologies serve a 
practical purpose in the ongoing work of astronomy, naming constellations and charting 
the skies. But Naden’s poem emphasizes the human source of these mythologies. 
“The Astronomer” highlights the common bonds between the star-gazing man and the 
celestial objects that occupy his hours: 
Kinsman is he to all the stars that burn 
 Mirrored in eyes of sleepless awe; 
And from his brotherhood with dust, may learn 
 The heavens’ living law. (7) 
Naden’s lines elegantly figure the stars as a reflection in the astronomer’s eyes, 
metaphorically bringing the stars from the heavens to a human plane, and then 
reinforcing this unity by emphasizing man’s “brotherhood with dust.” Likewise, the 
astronomer discovers profound spiritual union with the universe during his isolated study: 
When the skies glitter, when the earth is cold, 
 In some divine and voiceless hour, 
The heavens vanish, and mine eyes behold 
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 The elemental Power. 
 
Now has the breath of God my being thrilled; 
 Within, around, His word I hear: 
For all the universe my heart is filled 
 With love that casts out fear. 
 
In one deep gaze to concentrate the whole 
 Of that which was, is now, shall be, 
To feel it like the thought of mine own soul, 
 Such power is given to me. (8) 
Naden’s astronomer looks to a power beyond the stars and experiences a sublime 
vision. Though a scientist, Naden’s astronomer is religious, using diction in the third 
stanza—“of that which was, is now, shall be”—that resembles the closing of the 
Anglican gloria patria: “as it was in the beginning is now and ever shall be, world 
without end.” Because he has divided his intellectual pursuits from his earthly longings—
the poem ends with a wish for “the heights and depths of human joy to come”—Naden’s 
astronomer experiences the same disharmony expressed by the other poetic speakers in 
this section of the volume. The closer expression of Naden’s Hylo-Ideal comes later in 
Songs and Sonnets of Springtime in “Twilight” and “Undiscerned Perfection,” but its 
fullest expression appears in “Das Ideal.” 
 Already a disciple of Lewins’s philosophy when she began to write poetry, Naden 
faced a challenge in many of her verses to discern how one might discover and express 
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the synthesis of material and ideal that Hylo-Idealism promises. Championing a monistic 
philosophy, Naden’s early poems also reveal an inspiration drawn from German 
Romanticism. Frequently, her poems assert that the verbal expression of the ideal—i.e., 
what the Romantics might term the sublime—is a nearly insurmountable challenge. That 
is, the knowledge of the spiritual in the material, or the figurative “land where poetry and 
science meet,” cannot be expressed through ordinary human speech. As evening steals 
across the land in Naden’s “Twilight,” for example, the speaker contemplates nature’s 
secrets and demonstrates this same Romantic longing. Just as poets in their verses try to 
unravel the mysteries locked within “tender buds,” Naden’s speaker asks, 
What wizard’s wand can charm the secret sweetness 
   From the fair prison, where it lies concealed? 
What poet’s lay can show in grand completeness 
   The inmost heart, by human speech revealed? 
 
We twine the spell of rich harmonious numbers, 
   We conjure up the graceful words in vain: 
Our lighter fancies waken in their slumbers; 
   Without a voice the noblest thoughts remain.  (63-4) 
The language of neither mathematics nor poetry can penetrate the material world to 
reveal its soul. The speaker then compares this futile aim of scientists and poets to 
billowing ocean waves that restlessly ebb and flow and never betray the still quiet of “the 
tranquil deep,” then to the depths of the earth that rest calmly while men “haste o’er vale 
and mountain, sea and shore” (64). The deep secrets of nature and the material earth 
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exist, and one might pursue them, but our comprehension is only an approximation. Yet 
the importance lies in acknowledging that such a truth exists: “And far beyond the realms 
of starlight glory / Are mysteries too high for Fancy’s wing” (65). These mysteries cannot 
be revealed until the human being becomes one with nature; literally, not until death: 
For there are griefs, that none has ever spoken, 
   Joys, that no mortal tongue has power to tell;  
The silence of the soul must be unbroken 
   Till to the speech of earth we bid farewell.  (65) 
Words cannot get to the spirit of the material; this is the mystery we cannot fathom. Yet if 
full disclosure of one’s soul or nature’s mysteries is impossible, some kind of semblance 
may still be proposed. This speculation is what I think Naden tests—through the aesthetic 
and the matter of her poems. If the material of a poem is its words, its rhyme, its rhythm, 
then each must strive to match the ideal which the poet tries to make them represent. 
Thus, in “Twilight,” we should note that these are quatrains of iambic pentameter, 
appropriate for the melancholic tone of the poem. But again, the extra syllables in the A-
lines make the feminine end rhymes conspicuous throughout. For Naden, the power of 
matter—she celebrates the notion of earth as mater, mother and material—is paramount. 
These feminine endings not only add a softening to the sound of these lines when they are 
spoken, but they suggest the idea of a maternal presence.   
 Naden’s sonnets, too, affirm belief in this deficiency of language, and they also 
demonstrate a working-out of philosophical principles in verse form. “Undiscerned 
Perfection,” for instance, expresses the aims of Naden’s Hylo-Idealism. The “land” where 
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poetry and science meet is in the union of spirit and material, in the understanding that 
the two are not two mutually exclusive modes of human experience: 
Beyond the realm of dull and slumberous Night 
I long have wandered with unwearied feet; 
The land where Poetry and Science meet 
Streaks the far distance with a magic light: 
Fair visions glide before my dazzled sight, 
And shine, and change, and pass with motion fleet, 
But never clear, and steadfast, and complete 
In one transcendent brilliancy unite. 
I know, the seeming discord is but mine; 
The glory is too great for mortal eyes, 
All powerless to discover the divine 
And perfect harmony of earth and skies: 
I know that each confused and tortuous line, 
To fuller sight, in true perspective lies. (129) 
In this Petrarchan sonnet’s octave, the speaker laments not attaining the ideal, while the 
sestet offers the speaker’s musings on why such would be impossible. The wandering 
speaker and Naden the writer converge in the dual meanings of “unwearied feet” and 
“each confused and tortuous line,” encouraging us to read the poem as both philosophical 
and poetic quest. Inevitably, it seems the seeker cannot reach the goal, yet s/he 
acknowledges, “the seeming discord is but mine.” Perhaps the failure is only a personal 
one, still obtainable to one with “fuller sight.” 
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 Interwoven with German Romanticism and a feminist response to Darwinism, 
Naden’s Hylo-Idealist poetics is manifold. Certainly, it takes as a theme the unity of the 
material and the ideal. The most explicit expression of the theme, unsurprisingly, appears 
in “Das Ideal,” Naden’s poem dedicated to her mentor, Lewins, and written in German. 
Written in the first person, the speaker strives ever toward the ideal: 
Ich bin ein Sonnenkind, und strebe immer 
   Hinauf zum ew’gen Licht; 
Der Erdentag, der enge Wolkenschimmer 
   Stillt meine Sehnsucht nicht. (76) 
I am a child of the Sun, and constantly I strive 
   Upward toward the perpetual Light; 
The earthly day, the narrow cloud-luster 
   Does not quiet my yearning.76  
Here, Naden alternates lines of iambic pentameter and trimeter, again highlighting the 
feminine endings of the extra-syllable A-lines.  Writing in German affords Naden not 
only the symbolic homage to the German poets she translates elsewhere in this and her 
later volume of poetry, but also the chance to tie ideas together through rhymes not 
available in English. In the following stanza, for example, we see Naden forge a close 
formal bond between the concepts of time and infinity that English rhymes would not 
afford: 
 Zerreissen will ich die geträumten Schleier 
   Des Stoffs, des Raums, der Zeit, 
Und mich ergiessen, frei und immer freier, 
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   In die Unendlichkeit. (76) 
I want to shred the dreamed veil 
   Of material, of space, of time, 
And pour myself, free and ever freer 
   Into infinity. 
The reflexive phrase, “und mich ergiessen,” or “to pour myself,” is important here in 
light of subsequent lines. The human poet is his or her own agent for change, as we see in 
a following stanza: “Ich bin noch nicht.  Erst kann der Mensch enstehen, / Wenn er als 
Gott erschafft” (77). The lines translate as, “I not yet am.  Man can come into being only 
if he, as God, creates.” The speaker extends the idea by stating that the wind strengthens 
itself through its own blowing.  The ideal, then, can be found not by looking outward, but 
inward: 
Der kühne Dichtertraum ist nicht verloren, 
   Er war zu eng, zu bleich: 
Nur in des Menschen Seele wird geboren 
Das Erd- und Himmelreich. (78) 
The poet’s bold dream is not lost, 
   It was too narrow, too pale: 
Only in the human soul 
   Will the kingdom of earth and heaven be born. 
If her poems are evidence, Naden strives to reawaken the “poet’s bold dream” in her 
Hylo-Idealist verse. Within these poems, we see the quest to reconcile earth and heaven, 
the temporal and the eternal. 
                                                                                                                                            
76 Translations from the German are mine. 
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 To accept both the ideal and the material means that an individual cannot and must 
not shun either.  Such a philosophy underlies even the comic courtship poems discussed 
previously. The women in those poems face seemingly irreconcilable choices:  to marry a 
bookworm or a fop, to give up a fiancé or to abandon any intellectual endeavors. Aside 
from undercutting Darwin, however, the parodic tone suggests that these are really false 
choices for Naden. Conversely, a longer narrative poem, like “A Modern Apostle,” with 
monistic principles at its core, presents an alternative: the acceptance both of a woman’s 
heart and her mind, the possibility for a pairing in which her lover will see her as not 
object but equal. 
 In her second volume of poetry, A Modern Apostle, The Elixir of Life, The Story of 
Clarice, and Other Poems, Naden moves beyond expressing Hylo-Idealism merely as the 
subject matter or theme of many of her Romantic lyrics and sonnets and instead puts 
these philosophical notions into practice within her poetic characters’ lives, such as Alan 
and Ella in “A Modern Apostle,” or Wilfred and Clarice in “The Story of Clarice.” 
Placing Hylo-Idealism within the narrative of these poems puts philosophy on stage to let 
it speak through the characters’ voices and actions. So too, then, Naden enacts a poetics 
of her philosophy. Thematically, the notion is not so much that humans cannot fathom or 
express the Hylo-Ideal, but that any rejection of either spiritual or material is a grievous 
error. Only by embracing both can Naden’s poetical characters find happiness or 
fulfillment.   
 Upon opening the volume and reading the first poem, “A Modern Apostle,” 
Naden’s readers would likely notice the form, ottava rima, and thus perhaps expect 
something of the “quiet facetiousness” of Byron’s Don Juan. Naden, however, subverts 
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readerly expectations and maintains a generally serious tone throughout, with some light 
moments scattered in the first two parts. After Alan, the clergyman of an orthodox 
Christian sect, has a revelatory vision, he embarks on a mission to share his conversion 
with others. He soon meets Ella, the daughter of “the cleverest member” of a liberal 
congregation where Alan has found employment. From his friend George, whose 
language resembles that of Mary Maud Trevylyan’s suitor, Alan learns of Ella’s 
cleverness, and George advises Alan to pursue her: 
“Then their one daughter--did you meet her ever? 
   Slim shape, and soft brown hair, and dark-blue eyes, 
So gentle, that you scarce believe her clever, 
   And quite entrancing, were she not so wise: 
But oh, beware of Ella’s beauty! never 
   Let that Madonna fairness win your sighs; 
Or, if you should address her, use your tact, 
And study first the sciences exact. 
 
“The heavenly host she watches from her attics, 
   She knows the name and place of every star; 
True incarnation of Pure Mathematics, 
   She cares for all that is abstruse and far: 
Go, woo her with Dynamics and with Statics, 
   And term your love a force molecular; 
She then, perchance, may fathom your intention-- 
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   Plain language is beneath her comprehension.”  (24) 
The reader’s introduction to Ella arrives in stanzas featuring feminine end rhymes, which 
do not appear with great frequency elsewhere in the poem. George reveals his own 
gender prejudices, commenting that Ella’s beauty is deceptive: it does not suggest her 
cleverness.  George thinks that one would have to court her on her own terms, yet he 
seems to diminish her intelligence by proposing a few key phrases would be sufficient to 
win her over. 
 Though the two eventually meet and fall in love, Ella breaks off the relationship 
with Alan once she reads his theological writings. The first of the two main emotional 
climaxes appears when Ella realizes she must leave Alan, and it is this section which, I 
propose, the poem’s conclusion resolves. As Ella tries to reconcile the warring between 
her heart and her emotions, the poem’s narrator comments, 
What is a woman’s hope when she is torn 
   By passion and by thought, and cannot cease 
To think or love, nor teach herself to scorn 
   Her deepest life, nor ever win release 
From the harsh yoke, too heavy to be borne, 
   Of iron principles that crush her peace: 
Will not some opiate give her dreamful rest 
Till She return to the Great Mother’s breast? (38) 
Questioning the potential for a woman to choose between love, “her deepest life,” or her 
reason, “the iron principles,” the poem gives no easy answer. The most troubling and 
difficult stanza, perhaps, is the stanza that follows: 
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Nay!  rather let her maim her shrinking soul-- 
   That groping she may climb her lame way in 
To Life--than down to Death, seeing and whole, 
   Spring, damned by the inexpiable sin 
Of treachery; and in the longed-for goal 
   Find that fair-seeming Heaven which traitors win 
Whose gate is bliss; whose midmost point, a germ 
Of Hell, whence issues the undying worm.  (38) 
The stanza seems to suggest that it is society, rather than her own rational choice, that 
would have a woman like Ella “maim her soul” by choosing between two halves of 
herself than to meet her death happy and whole but condemned by her treachery to her 
sex, and thus ultimately deserving Hell. Read as an ironic moral by the narrator, the 
stanza suggests that Alan and Ella’s reunion and reconciliation later does not demonstrate 
Ella’s conversion to Alan’s theistic spirituality, but rather a recognition between the two 
that her effort to abandon her own desire was mistaken, as was Alan’s flawed 
understanding of his vision and mission. When they finally meet again on Alan’s 
deathbed after he has been mortally wounded by a stone thrown at him during a riot, Alan 
calls Ella “Truth’s radiant herald” and admits his own errors and illusions (61). The two 
share a kiss and in a silent moment, “the very soul of each / Shone visible, disrobed of 
veiling speech” (61). Finally together, they achieve a spiritual union surpassing 
conventions of earthly love.  The omniscient narrator concludes with a moral: 
For such your grief, what husbands and their wives 
   Once in long years each other’s soul can see? 
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But these found all to which high Passion strives-- 
   Perfect communion, from cold symbols free, 
The fleeting quintessence of myriad lives, 
   A concentrated brief Eternity, 
The mountain-vista of an endless age 
Not known by weary winding pilgrimage.  (62) 
Ella then becomes the modern apostle of the poem’s title as she rises from Alan’s 
bedside, her expression said to mirror her dead lover’s, whose “look was fraught / With 
peace that quenches all desire and dread” (63). In this long narrative poem, an earnest 
engagement with Darwin’s Descent is still noteworthy. Ella rejects her chance at 
romantic, worldly happiness when she rejects her suitor. Ella and Alan’s reunion comes 
too late for their continued earthly journey together, yet they experience a profound, 
sublime moment before Alan dies. Ella rises to take on Alan’s charge, but there is no 
indication she has given up her previous ideals, and in fact, she more likely will repudiate 
any suggestion that women should not endeavor to achieve both intellectual and 
emotional contentment. 
Conclusion 
Constance Naden’s Hylo-Idealist poetics encompasses a complex mixture of 
philosophical and scientific debates. She offers her readers a proto-feminist, materialist, 
and non-theistic monism that owed much to German Romanticism, and she playfully 
antagonizes Darwinian principles of sexual selection. In her form and aesthetics, she 
deploys feminine end-rhyme strategically to underline women’s agency, intellect, and 
subjectivity, while her comic tone cushions her incisive commentary on Victorian 
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stereotypes of both men and women. The feature so central to Naden’s poetics, yet 
unremarked upon by scholars, is this very intersection of sexual selection and Hylo-
Idealism within poems that pointedly discuss the position of women within Victorian 
courtship rituals and practices.  
Naden concludes my study of nineteenth-century women science writers because she 
encompasses so many of the characteristics her predecessors strove for in their own work, 
like the adaptation of a literary genre like poetry for scientific ends. As a Victorian 
woman at the end of the nineteenth century, Naden epitomizes the heights to which a 
woman science student might reach in her education, though she died from complications 
following surgery to remove an ovarian cyst at age thirty-one, thus foreclosing the 
possibility she could have gone on to even greater acclaim in philosophy, science, or 
poetry. At the same time, Naden also reveals the paradox of women’s entry into formal 
scientific study at institutions of higher learning: she was a product of the specialization 
of scientific disciplines, and while she excelled in all of them—her geology professor at 
Mason College, especially noted her talents in his subject—she could not have united 
them synthetically except within the larger confines of philosophy.  
Neither did Constance Naden continue to use poetry as a means of reaching audiences 
outside the community of professional scientists. For her, poetry and science were to 
remain distinct discourses, and perhaps her choices of publishing each under different 
names suggest the division that existed in her attitudes toward them. Charles Lapworth, 
Naden’s geology professor, writes in his reminiscences of his former student,  
Poetry had gradually become to her more or less a recreation. “Clarice,” she told 
me, was written during her convalescence, after a sharp attack of illness, in 1886, 
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and other poems in similar hours of enforced leisure, when real work, as she termed 
it, was impossible. (xviii) 
Like James Clerk Maxwell, who also made time for lighthearted poetry as a respite from 
his research and experiments in physics—and for poking fun at his colleagues as well—
Naden used poetry as a diversion when more difficult mental work became too taxing. 
Ultimately, Naden left poetry behind. In her essay on the philosophy of Thomas 
Carlyle, she writes, “poetry may be personal; philosophy (world wisdom) must be 
universal” (Induction 144). From her standpoint at the close of the nineteenth century, 
poetry could not treat universal subjects. Philosophical research instead was “the goal of 
the sciences, the lodestar of poetry” (Lapworth xviii). Yet in fact, it is her poetry that has 
lasted, and it is here where tracing the outlines of her Hylo-Idealism rewards a reader 
seeking to understand one more facet of the religious and secular debates in the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. 
Earlier female popularizers or writers of accommodated science for children faced 
choices in writing that were circumscribed by societal notions of education and literary 
outlets appropriate for women. Growing up in the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
Naden, however, was able to choose the path that suited her best. This is not to say Naden 
lived in a world where women were considered equal to their male colleagues, but rather 
that Victorian women’s entry into higher education in the last three decades of the 
nineteenth century afforded them more liberty in choosing from a greater variety of 
careers. Constance Naden remains an important figure in Victorian studies not simply 
because her colleagues and readers ranked her second only to George Eliot in both 
acumen and talent, but because her poetry reveals a powerful engagement in the 
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discourses of both evolutionary theory and secular materialism. To assess her only as a 
droll writer of comic poems of courtship is to fail to see her within a long history of 
women’s multifaceted, literary engagement with science. 
*** 
In this study of genre and form, women’s efforts to interpret and communicate 
science are of primary interest because they not only were marginalized from science for 
most of the century, thus writing to nonspecialist audiences out of necessity, but also 
because their innovations in form led to changes in Victorian literary history as well. 
Once Mary Somerville had explained parallax in On the Connexion of the Physical 
Sciences, the success of the book meant it found its way into the hands of writers like 
George Eliot, Alfred Tennyson, and Thomas Hardy.77 Just as Byron had been a poetic 
inspiration for Somerville, parallax in turn became a metaphor for both novelists and 
poets. When Margaret Gatty offered natural history lessons in tandem with moral tales in 
her Parables from Nature, her stories find echoes in Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures 
in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass, where animals speak and the rules of 
nature are topsy-turvy. Gatty and Charles Dodgson were friends, corresponding at least as 
early as 1863.78 Arabella Buckley’s lectures demonstrate a methodology still practiced in 
physical science classes and textbooks for children and adolescent students today: a 
descriptive introduction of phenomena, questions including predictions, demonstrations 
that illustrate the behavior of the phenomena in question, and concluding remarks about 
implications and applications of the science. George Eliot’s inclusion of natural history’s 
habits of observation and methodical description appeared just as Darwinian evolutionary 
                                                
77 Anna Henchman’s new book The Starry Sky Within demonstrates just how extensively 
astronomy infused poetic imaginations about perspective and multiple points of view. 
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theory would capture the Victorian imagination, suggesting ways the novel could practice 
and interrogate the methods of scientific inquiry and writing. Constance Naden’s poems 
profited from the popularity of parodic verse, which offered a humorous method of 
questioning the implications of the theory of sexual selection, but so too could verse be a 
space in which to test the ability to contain philosophical propositions. But as the 
boundaries between scientific disciplines became increasingly fixed, generic borders 
between the sciences and arts likewise seemed to become more rigid, and assumed 
gender roles were not erased, despite women’s entry into higher education. 
 Though Naden’s stance suggests a division between poetry’s aesthetics and science’s 
seemingly prosaic logic, many women, especially toward the century’s end, sought ways 
of aestheticizing science. Barbara Gates calls women’s practices of seeking out the 
beautiful in nature the “Victorian female sublime,” a form of late nineteenth-century 
literature in which the woman writer tries to capture nature’s beauty and terror, but 
always finds it escapes the power of the writer’s pen (169). I have resisted this particular 
gendered formulation of the sublime because where Gates notes that the Victorian female 
sublime emphasizes the power of nature expressed in a rhetoric of absence (170), I have 
found earlier writers like Somerville, Gatty, and Buckley locate a pleasure in perceiving 
the pervasiveness of physical laws. Likewise, Gates focuses on women who traveled 
beyond England’s shores and found themselves in places “wild enough to evoke sublime 
reactions” like the Himalayas (Gates 171). If there is a difference between the 
Wordsworthian sublime, distilled from Burke and Kant, and the Victorian female sublime 
Gates describes, it is because the women like Somerville, Gatty, and Buckley find 
sublimity in the beautiful, and beauty in sublimity. Part of this assurance lies in their 
                                                                                                                                            
78 See Rose Lovell-Smith 51-2 n.16. 
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spiritual beliefs, of course, and adherents clung tenaciously to natural theology 
throughout the Victorian era. 
In looking forward to the twentieth century, the figure who embodies many of the 
concerns and themes considered in these four chapters is Beatrix Potter (1866-1943). 
Potter was an avid naturalist in her childhood, drawing the family’s pets and the small 
creatures who lived in the environs of the Potters’ home. In her adulthood, Potter studied 
mushrooms and fungi, illustrating what she found and writing up her observations.79 
Today, she is known more for her illustrated stories for children, like The Tale of Peter 
Rabbit  (1902), The Tale of Mrs. Tiggy-Winkle (1905), or The Tale of the Flopsy Bunnies 
(1909), than she is for her studies in mycology or her conservation efforts. If this project 
were to develop in the future as a study of how botany and juvenile literature mutually 
informed each other, Beatrix Potter would become a central figure. 
In “Beautiful Science,” my ambitions for examining the forms of Victorian women’s 
scientific writing has been two-fold: to discern a sense of how accommodations of 
science fit into the nineteenth-century literary landscape, and to perceive how 
understanding the expectations that literary genres bring to scientific writing might 
inform our historical understanding of nineteenth-century scientific debates. Women’s 
writing offered a way into both of these examinations because their marginalization, due 
to social expectations and structures that effectively kept the majority of them on the 
fringes of formal scientific study, opened up the opportunity to find the most fitting 
genres and forms in which to reach their intended audiences. 
                                                
79 A recent and detailed biography that includes Potter’s various pursuits is Linda Lear’s 
Beatrix Potter: A Life in Nature (2007). 
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Today, women’s participation in science remains a vexed topic as science 
departments continue to face the underrepresentation of women within their ranks. The 
education of girls in science likewise attracts attention, and new initiatives to keep 
adolescent girls in science classes appear every year. Women have a long history in 
science, but it is a story infrequently told. In “Beautiful Science,” I have offered one more 
narrative to demonstrate the creative, literary ways in which Victorian women made their 
way into a discipline that was not yet fully open to their participation.  
A.S. Byatt’s “Morpho Eugenia” offers one fictional account of Matilda Compton’s 
studies of ants and her fairy tale allegory, shining a light on women science writers who 
yet remain in the shadows of Victorian literary history and histories of science. Much 
more recently, Elizabeth Gilbert’s new novel, The Signature of All Things (2013), now 
might attract an even wider audience to the work of nineteenth-century women scientists. 
Gilbert’s novel traces the life of an American woman, Alma Whittaker, whose study of 
mosses takes her on a literal and figurative journey of discovery paralleling Darwin’s 
achievement in describing the process of natural selection. Gilbert’s novel, too, is the 
most recent addition to the discourse I have traced, placing scientific theories and 
inquiry—and women’s important activities within the discipline—at the center of its plot. 
Among both scholars and novelists, Victorian women scientists, naturalists, illustrators, 
and writers are becoming the focus of increasing attention. Considering how genre and 
form functioned as tools of scientific interpretation, accommodation, and communication, 
“Beautiful Science” knits the literary and scientific discourses of Victorian Britain 
together, enhancing both science historians’ comprehension of how literary genres could 
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affect the transmission of scientific debate, and literary historians’ understanding of how 
scientific debates altered the Victorian literary world. 
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